Bargaining and strikes: Towards an evolutionary framework

Conventional models of strikes start with the assumption that the bargainers' uniquely rational beliefs can be worked out in advance. Strikes are then explained as either the result of institutional constraints or of the possibility of irrationality. By contrast the evolutionary approach begins with a recognition that bargaining is naturally indeterminate and that, in the absence of a unique model of rational bargaining, conflict-free agreements between rational trades unions and firms reflect the evolution of one out of many possible conventions. This paper explores the alternative interpretation of strikes afforded by this perspective. In particular, it shows how strikes help shape the dispositions of bargainers (as opposed to just revealing it), how periods of conflict are succeeded by periods of industrial peace (and vice versa), and how the stability of bargaining protocols depends not only on the conventions regulating the relations between unions and firms but also on those between workers and union leaders as well as on technological innovations.