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Environmental regulatory enforcement with “green” consumers
Authors:Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas
Affiliation:1. Departamento de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de La Rioja, Logro?o, 26004, Spain
Abstract:We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions
Keywords:Monitoring agency  Compliance    Green consumers”    Fine
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