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会展组展商信号传递博弈分析
引用本文:汤乃进.会展组展商信号传递博弈分析[J].江苏商论,2014(9):37-39.
作者姓名:汤乃进
作者单位:南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210009
摘    要:在会展市场中组展商和参展商之间存在着严重的信息不对称现象,从而导致虚假展会问题严重,本文通过建立信号博弈模型,对组展商信誉信号水平的各种均衡情况进行分析,在可能产生的混同均衡、准分离均衡和分离均衡中,只有分离均衡是最有效率的,并在此分析的基础上提出相应的策略和建议。

关 键 词:会展  信息不对称  信号博弈  均衡模型

Game analysis of exhibitors signal transmission
Tang Nai-jin.Game analysis of exhibitors signal transmission[J].Jiangsu Commercial Forum,2014(9):37-39.
Authors:Tang Nai-jin
Institution:Tang Nai-jin (College of Economy & Management of Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 210009)
Abstract:In the exhibition market group of exhibitors phenomenon, leading to a false show a serious problem, this and exhibitors have serious information asymmetry article through the signal game model is established, on the exhibition business reputation signal levels of various equilibrium situation carries on the analysis, the possible pooling equilibrium, separating equilibrium and separating equilibrium, only separating equilibrium is the most efficient, and on the basis of the analysis put forward the corresponding strategies and suggestions.
Keywords:Exhibition  Incomplete information  Signaling game  Equilibrium model
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