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信息不对称引发的施工合同风险分析
引用本文:徐雷 等. 信息不对称引发的施工合同风险分析[J]. 价值工程, 2014, 0(14): 58-60
作者姓名:徐雷 等
作者单位:西安建筑科技大学土木学院,西安710055
摘    要:本文从信息不对称理论出发,着重探讨了在施工合同风险管理中业主方信息不足现象的表现形式,分析其产生原因、导致后果等,指出了信息不对称存在的普遍性和必然性,并基于业主方的角度对此提出了一些降低信息不对称程度、从根本上抑制逆向选择问题和道德风险的具体措施。

关 键 词:业主方  信息不对称  施工合同风险  信息不足

Analysis of the Construction Contract Risk Caused by Information Asymmetry
XU Lei,LI Ya-wei. Analysis of the Construction Contract Risk Caused by Information Asymmetry[J]. Value Engineering, 2014, 0(14): 58-60
Authors:XU Lei  LI Ya-wei
Affiliation:(School of Civil Engineering, Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi'an 710055, China)
Abstract:Based on the asymmetric information theory, this paper focused on forms, causes, and consequences of the insufficient information phenomenon of the owner in the risk management of construction contract, and pointed out the universality and inevitability of the information asymmetry, put forward a lot of specific measures which can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and restrain the " adverse selection" and the "moral hazard" fundamentally from the perspective of the owner.
Keywords:the owner  information asymmetry  construction contract risk  insufficient information
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