企业集群形成中的政府政策作用:理论研究与我国的实证分析

政府在企业集群形成中到底起什么作用?这一直是企业集群理论研究和实践中需要探讨的问题之一。事实上，企业集群的形成包含着各种类型的博弈活动，是各种博弈的演化结果。企业集群的形成过程本质上是一种类似于有限理性下学习速度较慢的大群体反复博弈——复制动态(Replicator Dynamics)进化博弈。为此，作者建立了企业集群形成的进化博弈模型，模拟了企业集群形成的演化路径，揭示了企业集群形成的内在机理，得出了政府在企业集群形成中的政策作用的一般规律性：政府的不作为；积极干预到不干预；注重引进关联性强的企业；重视中小企业的新建。并在此基础上，通过对我国几个典型的企业集群形成实践进行实证分析，检验和论证了政府在企业集群形成中的不同作用。

Theoretical Research on Policy Function of Government in Industrial cluster Forming and a Case Analysis

The Role of the government in industrial cluster forming is an issue of industrial cluster theory and practice. Actually, forming of industrial clusters revolves many game activities and is the result of game evolution. The forming process is essentially the replicator dynamic evolutional game which is similar to the reduplicative game of mass colony who are learning slowly. Therefore, the author erects an evolutional game model, simulates the evolution path and analyses the internal mechanism of industrial cluster forming. Government policy function consists of government inaction, from active interference to noninterference, introducing strongly related enterprises and attaching importance to establishing new small enterprises. This article examines and proves the government's functions in industrial cluster forming through a case analysis of the practice of several typical industrial clusters in our country.