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上市公司股权激励盈余管理及影响因素研究
引用本文:陆唯文,刘涛. 上市公司股权激励盈余管理及影响因素研究[J]. 河北工业科技, 2013, 30(2): 92-96
作者姓名:陆唯文  刘涛
作者单位:上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
摘    要:自股权激励办法施行以来,股权激励作为一种降低代理成本的激励方式,被越来越多的上市公司所采用。然而实证发现,盈余管理会伴随股权激励发生,实行股权激励公司在业绩考核第一年存在显著的盈余管理现象,而业绩考核前一年并不存在。在影响盈余管理的因素上,公司选用考核范围更广的业绩指标能减少管理层进行盈余管理的动机,行权时长的增加会给管理层盈余管理造成一些困难,从而抑制管理层在后阶段盈余管理的行为。

关 键 词:股权激励  盈余管理  代理理论  公司治理

Study on earnings management of share options in listed companies and its influential factors
LU Weiwen and LiuTao. Study on earnings management of share options in listed companies and its influential factors[J]. Hebei Journal of Industrial Science & Technology, 2013, 30(2): 92-96
Authors:LU Weiwen and LiuTao
Affiliation:(Antai College of Economics & Management,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200030,China)
Abstract:Since the Listed Company Stockholder's rights policing method was issued,stock incentives have been gradually implemented by more and more listed companies to reduce agency costs.However,this paper finds out that the earnings management follows the stock incentives.During the first performance evaluation year,the earnings managements are positively related to share options.And this relationship is statistically insignificant before the performance evaluation period with the same companies.In terms of the influential factors,the earnings managements are negatively related to the adoptions of various earning indexes.Besides,the long exercise period makes the earnings management becoming difficult,which especially restrains the earnings management in the later phase.
Keywords:stock incentives  earnings management  agency theory  corporate governance
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