Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences |
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| Authors: | Lars Ehlers Hans PetersTon Storcken |
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| Institution: | a Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlandsf1l.ehlers@ke.unimaas.nlf1b Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Quebec, H3C 3J7, Canadaf2l.ehlers@ke.unimaas.nlf2c Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlandsf3h.peters@ke.unimaas.nl, t.storcken@ke.unimaas.nlf3 |
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| Abstract: | Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterization of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin (Public Choice35 (1980), 437-455). Thereby, the work of Moulin (1980) is extended to the probabilistic framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D81. |
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| Keywords: | strategy-proofness single-peaked preferences probabilistic decision schemes |
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