Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
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| Authors: | Eddie Dekel Drew FudenbergDavid K Levine |
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| Institution: | a Departments of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 60201, f1dekel@northwestern.eduf1b Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israelf2dekel@northwestern.eduf2c Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138, f3dfudenberg@harvard.eduf3d Department of Economics, University of California—Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, 90024, f4dlevine@ucla.eduf4 |
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| Abstract: | In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles” to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, C610. |
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| Keywords: | extensive-form games behavior strategies subjective uncertainty rationalizability self-confirming equilibrium |
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