A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure |
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Authors: | David Pérez-CastrilloMarilda Sotomayor |
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Institution: | a Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica & CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spainf1David.Perez@uab.esf1b Departmento de Economia, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908, 05508-900, Sao Paulo, SP, Brazilf2marildas@usp.brf2 |
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Abstract: | For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism. Sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first. Then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy. Also, each buyer may report his or her indifferences (along with the previous buyers' indifferences) to the following buyer. The first phase determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. Reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers. Moreover, when buyers state their true indifferences, the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D78. |
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Keywords: | matching model assignment model mechanism implementation |
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