Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices |
| |
Authors: | Dirk BergemannJuuso Vä limä ki |
| |
Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, 06520-8268, f1dirk.bergemann@yale.edu.f1b Department of Economics, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdomf2juuso.valimaki@soton.ac.ukf2 |
| |
Abstract: | A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring. With private monitoring, i.e., when prices are not observable to the competing sellers, all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payoffs coincides with the stage game subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. This is in sharp contrast to the game with perfect monitoring where the folk theorem obtains. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43. |
| |
Keywords: | repeated games private monitoring collusion |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|