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Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies
Authors:Ori Haimanko
Institution:CORE, Voie du Roman Pays 34, B-1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgiumf1haimanko@core.ucl.ac.bef1 Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israelf2haimanko@core.ucl.ac.bef2
Abstract:We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51, D61.
Keywords:market games  TU economies  core selection  Mertens value
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