“Timing Is Everything” and Marital Bliss |
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Authors: | Yosef BlumUriel G Rothblum |
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Institution: | Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Technion City, Haifa, 32000, Israelf1rothblum@ie.technion.ac.ilf1 |
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Abstract: | We first show that in a marriage market, when the stability of a matching is disturbed when a new agent joins the game, natural greedy behavior defines an equilibration procedure that converges to a stable matching for the extended problem. We then consider the iterative procedure under which agents join the game sequentially, and the natural greedy procedure is applied after the entrance of each agent. It is shown that this procedure converges to a stable matching for the original (global) problem and that for each agent, if the order of all other agents is given, he/she weakly improves his/her final outcome by deferring his/her arrival time. The agent that arrives last gets his/her optimal outcome under stable matchings. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C62. |
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