Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
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Authors: | Roger B Myerson |
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Institution: | Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 60208, f1myerson@uchicago.eduf1 Economics Department, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 60637, f2myerson@uchicago.eduf2 |
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Abstract: | Scoring rules are compared by their equilibria in simple voting games with Poisson population uncertainty, using new techniques for computing pivot probabilities. Best-rewarding rules like plurality voting can generate discriminatory equilibria where the voters disregard some candidate as not a serious contender, although he may be universally liked, or may be symmetric to other candidates as in the Condorcet cycle. Such discriminatory equilibria are eliminated by worst-punishing rules like negative voting, but then even a universally disliked candidate may have to be taken seriously. In simple bipolar elections, equilibria are always majoritarian and efficient under approval voting, but not other scoring rules. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D72. |
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Keywords: | plurality number approval voting scoring rule Poisson game candidate serious race |
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