The affectionate society: does competition for partners promote friendliness?

We study household formation in a model where collective consumption decisions of a household depend on the strategic choices of its members. The surplus of households is determined by individual choices of levels of friendliness to each other. A strategic conflict arises from a coupling condition that ceteris paribus, a person’s friendlier attitude reduces the individual’s influence in the household’s collective decision on how to divide the ensuing surplus. While partners in an isolated household choose the minimum level of friendliness, competition for partners tends to promote friendliness. We find that affluence does not buy affection, but can lead to withholding of affection by an affluent partner who can afford to do so. In general, the equilibrium degree of friendliness proves sensitive to the socio-economic composition of the population. We would like to thank Clive Bell, Edward Glaeser, Roger Lagunoff, Eva Terberger and seminar audiences in Berlin, Birmingham, Blacksburg, Exeter, Heidelberg, Manchester and at IHS in Vienna for helpful comments. We greatly appreciate the thoughtful comments of a referee.