Multiple unit auctions with strategic price-quantity decisions |
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Authors: | Rafael Tenorio |
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Affiliation: | (1) College of Business Administration, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA, US |
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Abstract: | Summary. I study a multiple unit auction where symmetric risk-neutral bidders choose prices and quantities endogenously. In the model, bidders (a) may place non-linear valuations on the auctioned units, and (b) bid for several units at the same price (“lumpy” bids). I characterize quantity-symmetric and strictly monotone-increasing price equilibria for discriminatory and competitive auctions, and show that (i) if quantity strategy profiles are equal across auctions revenue- equivalence holds, (ii) expected revenue is higher if bidders bid for the entire supply rather than for shares of it, and (iii) equilibrium allocations may fail to be Pareto-optimal. Received: April 14, 1995; revised version: September 3, 1997 |
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Keywords: | JEL Classification Number: D44. |
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