On the Enforcement of Cooperative Environmental Policies |
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| Institution: | 1. Bogazici University, Institute of Environmental Sciences, Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey;2. Istanbul Technical University, Environmental Engineering Department, Maslak, Istanbul, Turkey;1. Laboratory of Geo-Information Science and Remote Sensing, Wageningen University, PO Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands;2. Knowledge Technology and Innovation group, Wageningen University, PO Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands;3. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM), R. Barão de Solimões, 12, Flores, Manaus-AM, Brazil;1. Bennett University, Greater Noida 201310, India;2. Rowan University, New Jersey 08028, USA;1. Natural Resources and Sustainable Development, Department of Earth Sciences, Uppsala University, Villavägen 16, 75236, Uppsala, Sweden;2. Department of Ecology, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden;3. Department of Urban and Rural Development, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden;4. Greensway AB, Uppsala, Sweden;1. Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom;2. Tampere University, Finland;1. School of Life Sciences, Institute of Eco-Chongming (IEC), East China Normal University, 500 Dongchuan Rd., Shanghai, 200241, China;2. Yangtze Delta Estuarine Wetland Ecosystem Observation and Research Station, Ministry of Education & Shanghai Science and Technology Committee, 500 Dongchuan Rd., Shanghai, 200241, China;3. Shanghai Zoo, 2381 Hongqiao Rd., Shanghai, 200335, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper investigates the sustainability of Pareto optimal policies for the replenishment of renewable resources shared by two countries with asymmetrical wealth. It does so within a two-country neoclassical growth model with externality. In the absence of commitment, it identifies simple self-enforcing mechanisms that implement social optima for a typical international resource (clean air) and a parametrization of the model to the United States and a country five times poorer. Such mechanisms are trigger strategies involving transfers of wealth between countries and threats of economic isolation in case of defection. Necessary transfers can represent up to 2.6% of U.S. wealth. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: Q20, C73, C68 |
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