Program equilibrium |
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Authors: | Moshe Tennenholtz |
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Institution: | Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion—Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel |
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Abstract: | In a computerized setting, players' strategies can be implemented by computer programs, to be executed on a shared computational devise. This situation becomes typical to new Internet economies, where agent technologies play a major role. This allows the definition of a program equilibrium. Following the fundamental ideas introduced by von Neumann in the 1940s (in parallel to his seminal contribution to game theory), a computer program can be used both as a set of instructions, as well as a file that can be read and compared with other files. We show that this idea implies that in a program equilibrium of the one-shot prisoners dilemma mutual cooperation is obtained. More generally, we show that the set of program equilibrium payoffs of a game coincides with the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of it. |
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Keywords: | C72 C70 C60 |
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