The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design |
| |
Authors: | Georgia Kosmopoulou Steven R Williams |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019-2103, USA, US;(2) Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820, USA, US |
| |
Abstract: | Summary. In a Bayesian model of group decision-making, dependence among the agents' types has been shown to have a beneficial effect
on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve the efficient choice associated with complete information. This
effect is shown here to depend as much upon the use of large monetary transfers among the agents as it does upon dependence:
if the transfers are bounded in magnitude, then nonexistence in the case of independence of an efficient, incentive compatible,
ex ante budget-balanced and interim individually rational mechanism is robust to the introduction of a small amount of dependence
among types. This robustness result supports the use of the simplifying assumption of independence in mechanism design.
Received: October 28, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997 |
| |
Keywords: | JEL Classification Numbers: D82 C7 D7 |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|