Testing theories of behavior for extensive-form two-player two-stage games |
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Authors: | Dale O Stahl Ernan Haruvy |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA;(2) Department of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, USA |
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Abstract: | We examine choices in two-player extensive-form games that give subjects opportunities for individualistic as well as other-regarding
behavior, and where each subject makes choices in a variety of games. Following an extensive search over models, where we
estimate a single parameter vector for all the games rather than different parameter vectors for each game, we find that (1)
the level-n model organizes the data well, (2) other-regarding behaviors in these games appear to consist primarily of egalitarian and
utilitarian behaviors, and (3) there is no significant evidence for reciprocal behavior.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. |
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Keywords: | Extensive-form games Level-n Other-regarding preferences |
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