On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union

The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to following its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem.     

Do the ECB and the fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world

A two-country model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness is employed to investigate the implications for macroeconomic stability and the welfare properties of three international policy arrangements: (a) cooperative, (b) non-cooperative and (c) monetary union. I characterize the conditions under which there is scope for policy cooperation and quantify the costs of non-cooperation and monetary union. The non-cooperative equilibrium may be suboptimal because of terms of trade spillover effects, while monetary union may be suboptimal because of the sluggishness of relative prices. Both the costs of policy competition and of a monetary union are sensitive to the values assumed for the intertemporal and international demand elasticity and the degree of openness of the economy. Independently of the calibration scenario adopted, the ECB has little to gain by coordinating with the Fed.     

International dimensions of optimal monetary policy

This paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. An inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms’ markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such a policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis-à-vis increased uncertainty in the export market. As higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non-monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through.     

Designing domestic institutions for international monetary policy cooperation: A Utopia?

In a wide variety of international macroeconomic models monetary policy cooperation is optimal, non-cooperative policies are inefficient, but optimal policies can be attained non-cooperatively by optimal design of domestic institutions/contracts. We show that given endogenous institutional design, inefficiencies of non-cooperation cannot and will not be eliminated. We model the delegation stage explicitly and show that subgame perfect, credible contracts (chosen by governments based on individual rationality) are non-zero, but are different from optimal contracts and hence lead to inefficient equilibria. Optimal contracts require cooperation at the delegation stage, which is inconsistent with the advocated non-cooperative nature of the solution. A general solution method for credible contracts and an example from international monetary policy cooperation are considered. Our results feature delegation as an equilibrium phenomenon, explain inefficiencies of existing delegation schemes and hint to a potentially stronger role for supranational authorities in international policy coordination.     

Financial Differences and Business Cycle Co-Movements in a Currency Area

I propose a unitary framework to interpret the links between differences in financial structures and the monetary policy regimes, on the one hand, and the correlation of business cycles, on the other. Using a two-country micro-founded model with financial frictions I predict that a greater financial diversity should reduce cyclical correlation under a given monetary regime and that moving from independent monetary policies to a hard peg or a common currency should increase it, for any given degree of financial diversity. I use the recent experience of EMU to test these ideas and show that my model explains reasonably well the broad patterns of business cycle correlation observed recently among the main euro area countries.     

Monetary Policy Transmission with Interbank Market Fragmentation

This paper shows how interbank market fragmentation disrupts the transmission of monetary policy. Fragmentation is the fact that banks, depending on their country of location, have different probabilities of default on their interbank borrowings. Once fragmentation is introduced into standard theoretical models of monetary policy implementation, excess liquidity arises endogenously. This leads short-term interest rates to depart from the central bank policy rates. Using data on monetary policy operations, I show that this mechanism has been at work in the euro area since 2008. The model is used to analyze conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures.     

The Credit Channel at the Zero Lower Bound through the Lens of Equity Prices

This study examines the impact of unconventional monetary policies on the stock market when the short‐term nominal interest rate is stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Unconventional monetary policies appear to have significant effects on stock prices and the effects differ across stocks. In agreement with existing credit channel theories, I find that firms subject to financial constraints react more strongly to unconventional monetary policy shocks [especially large‐scale asset purchases (LSAPs)] than do less constrained firms. These results imply that the credit channel is as important as the interest rate channel in the transmission of unconventional monetary policies at the ZLB.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union

This paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilization in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union, which incorporates persistence in inflation and non-Ricardian consumers, and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy can play an important role in reacting to inflation, output, and the terms of trade, but that not much is lost if national fiscal policy is restricted to react, on the one hand, to national differences in inflation and, on the other hand, to either national differences in output or changes in the terms of trade. However, welfare is reduced if national fiscal policy responds only to output, ignoring inflation.     

Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union at the Zero Lower Bound

This paper constructs a two‐country core–periphery New Keynesian model of a currency union to address the interaction between the objectives of regionally directed fiscal policy constrained by a single currency and the aggregate use of fiscal policy in face of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy interest rates. We identify an optimal path of aggregate and relative fiscal policy responses to a negative region‐specific demand shock. Our results show that (i) in a monetary union, the optimal policy response to an asymmetric reduction in demand concentrated in the periphery always entails a relative shift of fiscal expenditure toward the worse‐affected regions, (ii) though no aggregate fiscal response is required outside the ZLB, and (iii) optimal union‐wide fiscal policy is expansionary at the ZLB. Therefore, optimal policy always entails an expansion in the periphery at the ZLB, but the optimal fiscal response in the core regions can be either expansionary or contractionary depending on the parameters of the model. However, (iv) fiscal expansion in the core is warranted if the periphery cannot implement an expansion due to constraints on public spending.     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.     

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady‐state debt to follow a random walk. In this paper we consider the nature of the time inconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policymaking. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady‐state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government's objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi‐commitment policy, which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises.     

Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion

In models of monetary policy, discretionary policymaking is typically constrained in its ability to manage public beliefs. However, when a policymaker possesses private information, policy actions serve as signals to the public about unobserved economic conditions and belief management becomes an integral part of optimal discretion policies. This article derives the optimal time‐consistent policy for a general linear‐quadratic setting. The optimal policy is illustrated in a simple New Keynesian model, where analytical solutions can be derived as well. In this model, imperfect information about the policymaker's output target leads to lower policy losses.     

Optimal monetary policy with the cost channel

In the standard new Keynesian framework, an optimizing policy maker does not face a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and stabilizing the gap between actual output and output under flexible prices. An ad hoc, exogenous cost-push shock is typically added to the inflation equation to generate a meaningful policy problem. In this paper, we show that a cost-push shock arises endogenously when a cost channel for monetary policy is introduced into the new Keynesian model. A cost channel is present when firms’ marginal cost depends directly on the nominal rate of interest. Besides providing empirical evidence for a cost channel, we explore its implications for optimal monetary policy. We show that its presence alters the optimal policy problem in important ways. For example, both the output gap and inflation are allowed to fluctuate in response to productivity and demand shocks under optimal monetary policy.     

The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies

I analyze a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the financing of productive investment is affected by a moral hazard problem. I solve for jointly Ramsey‐optimal monetary and macroprudential policies. I find that when a financial friction is present in addition to the standard nominal friction, the optimal policy can replicate the first‐best allocation if the social planner can conduct both monetary and macroprudential policy. Using monetary policy alone is not enough: a policy trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and output gap emerges. When policy follows simple rules, the source of fluctuations is relevant for the choice of the appropriate policy mix.     

Real exchange rate persistence and monetary policy rules

The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects of alternative monetary rules on real exchange rate persistence. Using a two-country stochastic dynamic general equilibrium with nominal price stickiness and local currency pricing, we will show how the persistence of purchasing power parity deviations can be related to a monetary theory of these deviations. When monetary policy lean against the wind, there is no relationship of proportionality between the time during which prices remain sticky and the persistence of the response of the real exchange rate: in this case high nominal price rigidity is not sufficient, per se, in generating any persistence following a monetary shock. Moreover, we emphasize the role of interest rates smoothing policies and relative price stickiness within countries in understanding the relationship between the real exchange rate and monetary shocks. With reasonable parameters values, a wide range of monetary policy rules can generate real exchange rate autocorrelations around the ones observed in the data.     

影响国际货币政策协诟有效性的主客观因素

影响国际货币政策协调有效性的因素有很多,这些因素可以区分为客观和主观两个方面。其中,客观方面的因素主要有经济开放度、出口商定价方式、外部冲击、国际金融市场的完善程度、政策制定者信息、汇率传递速度、贸易结构的非对称性等;主观方面的因素包括市场主体理性预期、政策制定者动机、强势国家主导、搭便车行为和时间不一致性、经济运行的不确定性、中央银行外汇市场联合干预等。文章结合国内外研究文献对这些因素的影响机理进行评述。     

Exchange rate volatility and productivity growth: The role of financial development

The vast empirical exchange rate literature finds the effect of exchange rate volatility on real activity to be small or insignificant. In contrast, this paper offers empirical evidence that real exchange rate volatility can have a significant impact on productivity growth. However, the effect depends critically on a country's level of financial development. The results appear robust to time window, alternative measures of financial development and exchange rate volatility, and outliers. We also offer a simple monetary growth model in which real exchange rate uncertainty exacerbates the negative investment effects of domestic credit market constraints.     

Money Creation: Tax or Public Liquidity?

I revisit the example of non‐neutral anticipated monetary expansions used in Lucas (1995) Nobel Prize Lecture, within a broader definition of monetary policy tools, such as paying a nominal return on money or using open market operations, to show that money expansions increase output by reallocating consumption across heterogenous individuals and time periods. This result survives with noninterest‐bearing cash when the latter does not generate relevant distortions.     

Fiscal and monetary policies and the cost of sudden stops

This article investigates the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on output growth during sudden-stop balance of payments crisis in emerging markets and developing countries. Sudden stops in capital flows, and subsequent deep recessions, are a frequent occurrence in these countries but there is no professional consensus, and little systematic empirical evidence, shedding light on the macroeconomic policy mix most likely to limit output losses during these episodes. To address this issue, we investigate 83 sudden-stop crisis in 66 countries using a baseline empirical model to control for the various determinants of output losses during sudden stops. We measure the marginal effects of policy on output losses, and find strong evidence that monetary tightening (rise in the discount rate or unsterilized rise in international reserves) and discretionary fiscal contraction are significantly correlated with larger output losses following a sudden stop. Fiscal expansion is associated with smaller output losses following a sudden stop, but monetary expansion has no discernable effect. The macroeconomic policy mix associated with the least output loss during a sudden-stop financial crisis is a discretionary fiscal expansion combined with a neutral monetary policy.     

The effect of a common currency on the volatility of the extensive margin of trade

This paper studies the effects of the European monetary unification on the volatility of the extensive margin of trade. First, we highlight empirical novel facts about the effects of monetary unification. We build country-level measures of the extensive margin of intra-EMU exports and describe how their volatilities evolved over time. We show that the adoption of a common currency has been associated with an increase of the volatility of the extensive margin of exports for most countries, and a decrease in the volatility of the extensive margin of exports for Germany. Second, we address this question theoretically and build a two-country version of the model of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) with endogenous entry, heterogenous firms, endogenous tradability, endogenous labor supply and sticky prices. We compare the volatility of the extensive margin of trade under fixed exchange rates and in a monetary union. Monetary unification does imply an increase in the volatility of the extensive margin of trade for pre-EMU followers (such as France or the Netherlands) and a decrease in the volatility of the extensive margin of trade for the leader (Germany). This pattern is qualitatively consistent with the data but arises only if monetary policy responds moderately to output.