How and when is dual trading irrelevant?

Within a general model of speculative trade, we derive the aggregate consequences of dual traders who process retail liquidity trades and trade on their own account. We prove that dual trading reduces total expected speculator profits unless speculators process all liquidity trade and trade with the same intensity on liquidity trade. In contrast, dual trading does not affect the information content of prices. We show how results generalize when we endogenize (a) speculator information via costly information acquisition about fundamentals or costly processing of liquidity trade, and (b) liquidity trader motives and welfare via endowment shocks.     

Non-Fundamental Speculation

We study an intertemporal asset market where insiders coexist with “non-fundamental” speculators. Non-fundamental speculators possess no private information on fundamental values of assets, but have superior knowledge about some aspect of the market environment. We show that the entry of these (rational) speculators can lead to reductions in market liquidity and in the information content of prices, even in an efficient market. Also, equilibrium trades display patterns of empirical interest. For example, speculators appear to chase trends and lose money after market “overreactions,” while insiders trade as contrarians and profit after such overreactions.     

Financial Speculators' Underperformance: Learning, Self-Selection, and Endogenous Liquidity

We develop an equilibrium model of learning by rational traders to reconcile several empirical regularities: Cross sectionally, most individual speculators lose money; large speculators outperform small speculators; past performance positively affects subsequent trade intensity; most new traders lose money and cease speculation; and performance shows persistence. Learning from trading generates substantial endogenous liquidity, reducing bid–ask spreads and the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks on asset prices, but amplifying the effects of real shocks. Introducing slightly overconfident traders increases bid–ask spreads, hurting all traders. Finally, behavioral theories cannot reconcile all of these empirical regularities.     

Imperfect Competition, Information Heterogeneity, and Financial Contagion

This study examines how heterogeneity of private informationmay induce financial contagion. Using a model of multi-assettrading in which the three main channels of contagion throughfinancial linkages in the literature (correlated information,correlated liquidity, and portfolio rebalancing) are ruled outby construction, I show that financial contagion can still bean equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneousfundamental information. Risk-neutral speculators trade strategicallyacross many assets to mask their information advantage aboutone asset. Asymmetric sharing of information among them preventsrational market makers from learning about their individualsignals and trades with sufficient accuracy. Incorrect cross-inferenceabout terminal payoffs and contagion ensue. When used to analyzethe transmission of shocks across countries, my model suggeststhat the process of generation and disclosure of informationin emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financialcontagion (JEL D82, G14, G15).     

Informed arbitrage with speculative noise trading

We consider speculative noise trading when some naïve speculators trade on noise as if it were information [Black, F., 1986. Noise. Journal of Finance 41, 529–543]. We examine the optimal trading strategy of an informed investor who faces such naïve speculators in the market. We find that the informed investor trades aggressively on her information and takes large, opposite positions against the naïve speculators. The trading volume is thereby drastically magnified. While such speculative noise trading enhances liquidity, it makes prices less efficient. The overall dynamic patterns that emerge from our model are most consistent with the evidence for interday variations in volume, volatility, and transaction costs.     

Different momentum effects across countries: An explanation based on investors' behavior

We establish a model in which speculators use feedback trading characteristics to infer the behavior of irrational investors and induce them to trade. We also discuss the stability and time series of asset prices. Our results show that: (1) speculators have speculation and arbitrage demands and make “noise” to induce irrational investors to trade, (2) the time series of asset prices show stable momentum and a reversal effect when fundamental traders dominate the market, and (3) momentums are unstable and perform poorly under extreme circumstances. Our article offers a unique approach to understanding the micro mechanism of different momentum effects in various markets and suggests a plausible theoretical framework to illustrate such differences.     

A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon

We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices. Infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short-sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, a higher lending fee ("specialness"), and trades at a premium consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions for small frictions, and provide a calibration generating realistic on-the-run premia.     

Hedge Fund Contagion and Liquidity Shocks

Defining contagion as correlation over and above that expected from economic fundamentals, we find strong evidence of worst return contagion across hedge fund styles for 1990 to 2008. Large adverse shocks to asset and hedge fund liquidity strongly increase the probability of contagion. Specifically, large adverse shocks to credit spreads, the TED spread, prime broker and bank stock prices, stock market liquidity, and hedge fund flows are associated with a significant increase in the probability of hedge fund contagion. While shocks to liquidity are important determinants of performance, these shocks are not captured by commonly used models of hedge fund returns.     

Market Orders and Market Efficiency

This work compares a dealer market and a limit-order book. Dealers commonly observe order flow and collect information from multiple market orders. They may be better informed than other traders, although they do not earn rents from this information. Dealers earn rents as suppliers of liquidity, and their decisions to enter or exit the market are independent of the degree of adverse selection. Introduction of a limit-order book lowers the execution-price risk faced by speculators and leads them to trade more aggressively on their information. Introduction of the book also lowers dealer profits, but increases the informational efficiency of prices.     

The “make or take” decision in an electronic market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity

This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.     

Should short-term speculators be taxed,or subsidised?

Summary This paper explores the welfare implications of a securities transaction tax when long-term information contained in stock prices can improve resource allocation but speculators have short horizon objectives. Speculators can trade on information of differing time horizons and profit maximizing firms can use long-term information contained in stock prices to improve their investment decisions. The model takes full account of the effect of a tax on market liquidity and welfare for all market participants. Surprisingly, a subsidy on short-term speculation can increase the amount of equilibrium trade on long-horizon information. This is because short-term informed trade exerts a positive externality over long-term informed trade when speculators have a short planning horizon. The cost of paying the subsidy may be smaller than the gain in firm value, while no trader is made worse off.This paper is a revised version of chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation written at the European University Institute. I wish to thank Paolo Battigalli, James Dow, Thierry Foucault, Rainer Kiefer, Matt Spiegel, Erik Theissen, the co-editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. I would also like to thank audiences at the workshop of the ESSFM Gerzensee and EFA Annual Meetings 2000.     

Strategic trading and learning about liquidity

Many practitioners point out that the speculative profits of institutional traders are eroded by the difficulty in gauging the price impact of their trades. In this paper, we develop a model of strategic trading where speculators face such a dilemma because of incomplete information about time-varying market liquidity. Unlike the competitive market makers that they trade against, informed traders do not know the distribution of liquidity (“noise”) trades. Instead, they have to learn about liquidity from past prices and trading volume. This learning implies that strategic trades and market statistics such as informational efficiency are path-dependent on past market outcomes. Our paper also has normative implications for practitioners.     

Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation

Standard models of informed speculation suggest that traders try to learn information that others do not have. This result implicitly relies on the assumption that speculators have long horizons, i.e., can hold the asset forever. By contrast, we show that if speculators have short horizons, they may herd on the same information, trying to learn what other informed traders also know. There can be multiple herding equilibria, and herding speculators may even choose to study information that is completely unrelated to fundamentals.     

Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation

Analyses of rational speculation usually presume that it dampens fluctuations caused by “noise” traders. This is not necessarily the case if noise traders follow positive-feedback strategies—buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall. It may pay to jump on the bandwagon and purchase ahead of noise demand. If rational speculators' early buying triggers positive-feedback trading, then an increase in the number of forward-looking speculators can increase volatility about fundamentals. This model is consistent with a number of empirical observations about the correlation of asset returns, the overreaction of prices to news, price bubbles, and expectations.     

Intraday asymmetric liquidity and asymmetric volatility in FTSE-100 futures market

In this study, we use both quote and trade data for the FTSE-100 futures for 2001–2004 in order to examine asymmetric volatility in the context of extreme sells. We define extreme sells as ask quotes that involve large percentages of total depth, selling orders executed at prices much closer to bids than to asking prices, and consecutive sell-initiated trades. Sell trades tend to demand higher liquidity than buys, while extreme trading conditions demand more liquidity than non-extreme ones. In extreme sells, liquidity demand surpasses supply. We show that asymmetric liquidity (quote demand vs. supply) better explains the asymmetric volatility observed in high-frequency data than trade information does. Ask-depth share plays a dominant role in asymmetric volatility, while order flow (sell-initiated volume share) makes a far smaller contribution.     

The Globalization Risk Premium

In this paper, we investigate how globalization is reflected in asset prices. We use shipping costs to measure firms' exposure to globalization. Firms in low shipping cost industries carry a 7% risk premium, suggesting that their cash flows covary negatively with investors' marginal utility. We find that the premium emanates from the risk of displacement of least efficient firms triggered by import competition. These findings suggest that foreign productivity shocks are associated with times when consumption is dear for investors. We discuss conditions under which a standard model of trade with asset prices can rationalize this puzzle.     

Flying under the radar: The real effects of anonymous trading

Using unique data on TSX Attributed Trading and a new proxy of Tobin's Q that accounts for intangible capital (Peters and Taylor, 2017), we investigate the impact of anonymous trading (AT) on managers' ability to use feedback conveyed by stock prices to improve investment efficiency. We show that AT reduces investment efficiency and that both anonymous buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades have comparable effects. The negative effect of AT on managerial learning from stock prices is significant only for tangible investments and when disagreement among anonymous traders is high. Taken together, our new evidence indicates that AT distorts investment sensitivity to Tobin's Q, plausibly because anonymity attracts additional (uninformed) liquidity trading, which negatively impacts the effectiveness of asset prices in aggregating private information and in revealing fundamentals.     

Prices, liquidity, and the information content of trades

We investigate the effect of asymmetric information on pricesand liquidity by analyzing trades, quotes, spreads, and depths.Information content should increase with trade size and theinformation asymmetry of the trading period. Results show thatprice and liquidity effects are significantly associated withinformation content as measured by both trade size and timingrelative to information events. Results are stronger for purchasesthan sales. Quoted prices are better measures of informationeffects than transaction prices, because they control for bid-askbounce. Finally, trades that a priori contain no informationhave no impact on prices and liquidity, despite their largesize.     

The Downside of Asset Screening for Market Liquidity

This paper explores the tension between asset quality and market liquidity. I model an originator who screens assets whose cash flows are later sold in secondary markets. Screening improves asset quality but gives rise to asymmetric information, hindering trade of the asset cash flows. In the optimal mechanism (second‐best), costly retention of cash flows is essential to implement asset screening. Market allocations can feature too much or too little screening relative to second‐best, where too much screening generates inefficiently illiquid markets. Furthermore, the economy is prone to multiple equilibria. The optimal mechanism is decentralized with two tools: retention rules and transfers.     

Cash Flow Volatility, Prices and Price Volatility: An Experimental Study

The value of an asset is equal to the present value of its expected future cash flows. It is affected by the magnitude, timing and riskiness, or volatility, of the cash flows. We hypothesize that if the expected values of two assets?? cash flows are equal, the value of the asset with more volatile cash flows will be lower. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the volatility of cash flows on the volatility of prices. We consider a simple experimental environment where subjects trade in an asset which provides dividends from a known probability distribution. The expected value of the dividends is identical in all experimental treatments. The treatments vary with respect to the volatility of dividends. We find that when dividends are more volatile, transaction prices are lower. We also find that the volatility of prices is lower in the treatment with highly volatile dividends. In addition, as expected, trading volume is lower when cash flows are less volatile.