THE ECONOMICS OF TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE

Abstract. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that tax evasion is now fairly extensive throughout Western Europe and North America. Academic economists have shown considerable interest in various aspects of tax evasion. In this article we examine the literature on two particular issues. First, why do individuals evade their tax obligations and second, what policies should governments pursue in attempting to reduce or eliminate evasion? We concentrate on income tax evasion which has been the major preoccupation in the literature. We first show that the compliance costs of income tax evasion are quite substantial. We then examine theoretical attempts to model individual taxpayers behaviour. Here we find that it is extremely difficult to make unambiguous predictions concerning the effects of changes in important variables, such as income tax rates. Next, we review the empirical ‘evidence’ obtained from (i) attitudinal surveys, (ii) tax games, and (iii) econometric analysis of individuals’ tax returns. All of these studies are found to be flawed in certain major respects. Finally, we consider a number of policy options available to tax authorities. Given the difficulty of determining a socially optimal level of evasion, governments are likely to pursue suboptimal policies aimed at entirely eliminating tax evasion. However, even here there is considerable disagreement about the design of an efficient policy.     

A quantitative view on policymakers’ goal,institutions and tax evasion

We develop a general theoretical model to compare two different policymakers both facing tax evasion. Policymakers differs in that they aim to maximize either the fiscal revenues ( $T$ ) as in a social-democracy as, e.g., Sweden, or the GDP as in a capitalistic country as, e.g., the USA. Both Bureaus can manoeuvre the tax rate and the share of tax receipts spent to fight the tax evasion rather than to increase the public capital. Our model merges the indications of two distinct, and sometimes conflicting, approaches to the analysis of tax evasion in that reconciling them. We also find that the feedbacks between the private and public sector are linked to some Laffer-type relationships usually unexplored by the existing literature. As compared to capitalistic systems, then, our results show that social-democracies end up imposing higher tax rates and, possibly, more pervasive regulations. Consequently, they are likely to suffer from larger tax-evasion-to-GDP ratios. This notwithstanding, social-democracies spend relatively more to contrast tax dodgers. On the other hand, $T$ -maximizing governments have better institutional settings and greater employment rates. Whichever the preferred target, however, no policymaker is able to erase totally the tax evasion, which may explain why this latter is so pervasive and persistent even among the richest countries.     

Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies

Business tax evasion is an important issue for governments. Yet the factors that determine business tax evasion have not been sufficiently examined in the literature in general, and in transition contexts in particular. To address this gap, this study uses the WB/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) database with a sample of over 12,692 firms from 26 transition economies. Applying various modelling strategies, we argue that tax evasion is a function of firm-level and institutional-level variables. We contribute to the literature by providing robust evidence showing that the perceived tax burden has a positive impact on tax evasion. We also find that the tax evasive behaviour of firms is positively influenced by low trust in government and in the judicial system as well as by higher perceptions of corruption and higher compliance costs. We find that smaller firms, individual businesses and firms in sectors that are less visible to the tax administration are more likely to get involved in evasive behaviour. Overall, institutional factors play an important role in determining firms’ tax evasion behaviour in transition economies. This finding has important policy implications.     

土地增值税税收流失风险的防范机制研究——来自广东省汕头市地方税务局的征管经验

房地产税收流失风险是税务管理的重点和难点。在研究现行土地增值税征管模式的基本特征及存在问题的基础上,汕头市地方税务局引进风险管理机制,对土地增值税的管理由事后管理向事前和事中管理转变。探索出"前馈控税、项目管理、信息比对、模型构建"的土地增值税收流失的风险防范机制。并据此提出了一些政策建议。     

Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion

It is a striking feature of EU tax policy that countries find it difficult to agree on capital tax coordination. This is in conflict with the prevailing theoretical view, according to which tax coordination is beneficial. This paper develops a political economy argument which may help to explain this puzzle. We consider a model of tax competition where fiscal policy decisions are taken via majority voting and tax evasion is possible but costly. It turns out that tax coordination agreements may fail to generate political support because middle income groups may lose from tax coordination, even if their capital income is below average.     

The shadow economy as an equilibrium outcome

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of tax evasion where agents choose to report some of their income. Unreported income requires using a payment method that avoids recordkeeping in some markets—cash. Trade using cash to avoid taxes is the ‘shadow economy’ in our model. We then calibrate our model using money, interest rate and GDP data to back out the size of the shadow economy for a sample of countries and compare our measures to traditional reduced form estimates.     

Does Tax Evasion Affect Occupational Choice?*

This paper presents a novel micro‐econometric procedure that identifies the extent to which occupational choices are distorted by opportunities for tax evasion. Previous studies claim to have found significant and substantial effects, but analysis and replication of their methods reveals that they generate conflicting and misleading results. The paper then implements the new procedure using several British micro‐data sets. A thorough empirical investigation reveals that occupational choice between self‐employment and paid employment is not robustly related to pecuniary factors in general, and is invariant to tax avoidance and evasion opportunities in particular.     

Exploring tax evasion in the context of political uncertainty

We present a model of agents facing the uncertainty of two future forms of government who are able to insure against this uncertainty by hiding funds from taxation. In order to choose whether or not to hide funds from taxation, agents need to know policy choices that each government would make should it come to power. But each government, before it could make its decision, would need to know the choices of the agents who would, for example, produce tax revenues. This informational tension is resolved endogenously. We derive the resulting level of tax evasion in society and the optimal choices made by the potential governments. We examine how changes in governmental structure would affect the level of tax evasion, and how that, in turn, would affect a particular form of capital flight.     

Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion

Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-systematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.      

Optimal dynamic tax evasion

We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with some modifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes. In the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive, unless the subsistence consumption level is higher than a given threshold. In the latter case the relationship is usually negative , but the value of elasticity depends on the form of absolute risk aversion. In particular we show that for increasing relative risk aversion, for a tax rate higher than 50%, the elasticity may even become positive. US data are consistent with IRRA preferences.     

APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS TO TAX EVASION

The paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer. The construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the Yitzhaki version of the Allingham–Sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion. Recent approaches have applied non‐expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction. The models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the Yitzhaki model.     

The Deterrent Effect of Whistleblowing on Tax Collections

Abstract

Many countries use tax-related whistleblowing programs, but the evidence on these programs suggests information provided by whistleblowers yields modest tax collections. However, when every citizen could become a whistleblower, deterrence from tax evasion can by itself increase tax collections. We find that tax collections significantly increased after the introduction of the whistleblowing mechanism in Israel in February 2013, although this mechanism directly yielded little or no tax collections. In support of the hypothesis that deterrence led to the increase in tax collections, we find that collections increased in industries with high tax-evasion risk, but not in industries with low tax-evasion risk. Furthermore, the increase in tax collections occurred in corporations, where the timing and magnitude of tax payments are more discretionary, but not from employees, for whom employers directly deduct taxes. Eventually, following reports that the whistleblowing mechanism is ineffective, deterrence diminished and tax collections decreased, suggesting the deterrence effect was temporary.     

基于博弈论的个人所得税逃税行为分析

在我国,由于税制不健全、征管水平比较低以及纳税人依法纳税意识淡薄,个人所得税的逃税问题更是极为严重,给国家经济秩序和税法体制造成了很大的危害。通过建立个人所得税税收稽查博弈模型,分析影响个人所得税纳税人逃税行为选择的因素,以期能对我国税收征管制度的完善提供理论依据。     

企业税务筹划的现状与对策分析

税务筹划在西方发达国家早已是普遍存在的经济现象。随着我国市场经济的发展与成熟,税务筹划将越来越受到关注,并在企业中得到实际运用。在我国当前的纳税政策环境下,税务筹划存在一定的空间,但不是无限区,有时违法与不违法仅有一步之遥。税务筹划作为纳税人的一种理财手段,可以为企业节约纳税,实现经济效益最大化,壮大企业经济实力,但也存在筹划不当造成违法偷税的风险。因此,纳税人只有正确掌握和熟练运用税务筹划的技术,才能真正取得税务筹划的成功,为企业创造出经济效益。     

Transfer Prices: A Financial Perspective

The arguments for and against transfer pricing schemes so far have focused on profit‐seeking approaches based on tax differentials, or on evasion of government enforced goods and fund flow restrictions. This article shifts to a value‐seeking framework where transfer prices act as strategic tools that may enhance value for the multinational with a foreign affiliate by exploiting financial and/or tax arbitrage that also lead to ownership arbitrage. The results show that there is an optimal level of transfer price depending on the specific exchange rate distribution when the cost structure allows for a penalty for overcharging. Moreover, this article introduces a new form of tax arbitrage benefit of transfer prices that is based on present value of tax shields.     

浅谈刑法偷税罪的修订及其对税收工作的影响

《刑法修正案(七)》对刑法第201条偷税罪作了重大修改。从我国的法律看,刑法修订往往早于税法的修订,两者关于偷税违法行为和犯罪的界定上又具有很强的接续性。     

New and Current Evidence on Determinants of Aggregate Federal Personal Income Tax Evasion in the United States

Using the most current data available, this study seeks to identify any new as well as traditional determinants of personal income tax evasion. A variety of empirical estimates find that income tax rates, the IRS audit rate and IRS penalty interest rates, and the unemployment rate all influence tax evasion. In addition, rarely investigated variables including the tax‐free interest rate, the public's job approval rating of the president, and the public's dissatisfaction with government, along with previously unstudied variables, namely, the real interest rate yield on Moody's Baa‐rated long‐term corporate bonds and the real interest rate yield on three‐year Treasury notes, also affect income tax evasion.     

Tax enforcement,technology, and the informal sector

Theoretical models of the informal sector mostly assume—or end up with—a positive correlation between a measure of taxes and the size of the informal sector. However, some recent empirical studies associate higher taxes with a smaller informal sector size. In this paper, we build a theoretical framework—an extension to a two-sector growth model—which allows us to unravel the negative correlation between informal sector size and taxes. We find that (a) a higher degree of tax enforcement, (b) a higher productivity of formal sector households, and (c) a lower physical capital depreciation rate make for a negative relation between these variables. Our results suggest that enforcement and technological factors are likely candidates to account for this relationship.     

Tax enforcement policies,tax evasion and time allocation

Several studies examine the effect of tax rates on households’ labor supply decisions in attempts to account for observed differences in work hours across countries. Interestingly, these studies fail to consider a fundamental action associated with taxation: tax evasion. This paper introduces, into a general equilibrium model of household labor supply, the possibility that households can evade labor income taxes. We show that the relationship between tax-enforcement policies, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure and the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal work is key to explain formal labor supply in major OECD countries. In a model without informal work, there is a positive relationship between the elasticity of substitution and the tax rate on formal income and people tend to work more. This is the case for the United States, Greece, Finland and the United Kingdom. This relationship becomes negative once informal activities are introduced and the model can explain formal labor supply better in countries where agents work relative less, i.e., in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Norway and Sweden. We also obtain estimates of hours worked in the informal sector for these countries.     

Mathematical models describing the effects of different tax evasion behaviors

Microscopic models describing a whole of economic interactions in a closed society are considered. The presence of a tax system combined with a redistribution process is taken into account, as well as the occurrence of tax evasion. In particular, the existence is postulated, in relation to the level of evasion, of different individual taxpayer behaviors. The effects of the mentioned different behaviors on shape and features of the emerging income distribution profile are investigated qualitatively and quantitatively. Numerical solutions show that the Gini inequality index of the total population increases when the evasion level is higher, but does not depend significantly on the evasion spread. For fixed spread, the relative difference between the average incomes of the worst evaders and honest taxpayers increases approximately as a quadratic function of the evasion level.