Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada

In a decentralised tax system, the effects of tax policies enacted by one government are not confined to its own jurisdiction. First, if both the regional and the federal levels of government co-occupy the same fields of taxation, tax rate increases by one layer of government will reduce taxes collected by the other. Second, if the tax base is mobile, tax rate increases by one regional government will raise the amount of taxes collected by other regional governments. These sources of fiscal interdependence are called in the literature vertical and horizontal tax externalities, respectively. Third, as Smart (1998) shows, if equalisation transfers are present, an increase in the standard equalisation tax rate provides incentives to raise taxes to the receiving provinces. A way to check the empirical relevance of these hypotheses is to test for the existence of interactions between the regional tax rate, on the one hand, and the federal tax rate, the tax rate set by competing regions, and the standard equalisation tax rate, on the other hand. Following this approach, this paper estimates provincial tax setting functions with data on Canadian personal income taxation for the period 1982–1996. We find a significant positive response of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal income tax rate, the tax rates of competing provinces, and the standard equalisation rate (only for receiving provinces). We also find that the reaction to horizontal competition is stronger in the provinces that do not receive equalisation transfers.     

Optimal redistributive tax and education policies in general equilibrium

This paper studies optimal linear and non-linear income taxes and education subsidies in two-type models with endogenous human capital formation, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous wage rates. Assuming constant human capital elasticities, human capital investment should be efficient under optimal linear policies, whether general equilibrium effects are present or not. Hence, education subsidies should not be used for distributional reasons. Due to general equilibrium effects, optimal linear income taxes may even become negative. Optimal non-linear policies exploit general equilibrium effects for redistribution. The high-skilled type optimally has a negative marginal income tax rate and a positive marginal education subsidy. The low-skilled type optimally faces a positive marginal income tax rate and a marginal tax on education. Simulations demonstrate that general equilibrium effects have only a modest effect on optimal non-linear policies.     

Personal Income Taxes in Developing Countries

Comparative work on income taxes in developing countries hascommonly looked at average tax rates. These rates are oftenconstructed by dividing revenue collections by some measureof private or personal income. Recent controversies have, however,focused on the incentive effects of marginal tax rates. Thisarticle develops and applies a simple methodology to comparemarginal official tax rates across a sample of fifty developingcountries. As would be expected given differences in fiscalcapacity, the poorest and the lower-middle-income countriesimpose relatively low marginal rates, and the rates for theupper-middle-income and developed countries are higher. Conversely,several low-and lower-middle-income countries' tax thresholdsstart at income levels which are low relative to their meanincome when compared with those of developed countries. Theresults warn against trying to derive information on the disincentiveeffect of a country's tax schedule from the highest marginalrate; our data show that this is not an accurate indicator ofoverall disincentive effects.     

Determinants of Regional Investment Decisions in China: An Econometric Model of Tax Incentive Policy

This paper examines whether concessionary tax rates and tax incentives can attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into certain designated areas in China. Since China opened its doors to foreign investors in 1979, tax benefits have been used extensively to attract FDI into different areas. In 1991, a new tax law was introduced which superseded two previous income tax laws. This new law provides additional tax benefits which improve the investment environment for foreign investors. This study investigates the effect of China's tax rates and tax incentive policy on FDI and on the locational choices of foreign firms. Our empirical results indicate that tax rates and incentives are important determinants of regional investment decisions in China, after controlling for potential confounding variables covering infrastructure, unemployment rate, wage rate and agglomeration economics. Specifically, areas offering lower tax rates and increased tax incentives are found to attract greater amounts of FDI. The impetus of the tax effect on FDI is more apparent in the post-1991 period due to changes in the tax laws. Our results also suggest that infrastructure variables are important determinants of regional investment decisions.     

The Elasticity of Taxable Income in New Zealand*

This paper reports estimates of the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net‐of‐tax rate for New Zealand taxpayers. The relative stability of the New Zealand personal income tax system, in terms of marginal rates, thresholds and the tax base, provides helpful conditions for deriving these estimates. The elasticity of taxable income was estimated to be substantially higher for the highest income groups. Changes in the timing of income flows for the higher income recipients were found to be an important response to the announcement of a new higher rate bracket. The marginal welfare costs of personal income taxation were consistent across years, being relatively small for all but the higher tax brackets. For the top marginal rate bracket of 39 per cent, the welfare cost of raising an extra dollar of tax revenue was estimated to be well in excess of a dollar. Implications of the findings are that: disincentive effects of high top marginal rates can be substantial even when labour supply responses are small; the welfare costs of increases in top marginal tax rates can be high; and announcement effects of tax policy changes can lead to considerable income shifting between time periods.     

Local taxes and political influence: evidence from locally dominant firms in German municipalities

We analyze the impact of locally dominant firms—i.e. firms that contribute a sizeable share to municipalities’ revenues—on local business tax rates. We argue that these firms have considerable political power locally even if they are not large in the regional or national perspective. These locally dominant firms can use their political power to voice their concerns directly vis-à-vis the local government—a channel of influence that is hardly available in municipalities with an atomistic structure of tax payers. We hypothesize that municipalities with locally dominant firms will set lower tax rates than municipalities in which tax-payers’ concentration is low. We test the impact of tax-payers’ concentration on local business tax rates using data from 423 municipalities in the German state Hesse between 1998 and 2005. The estimation technique accounts for spatial lags and autoregressive disturbances. Results support our central hypothesis: the higher the tax-payers’ concentration, the lower the municipal business tax rates.     

平均税率、标准税率与收入分布对个人所得税累进性的影响

运用中间累进性指标将个人所得税累进性的变化分解为标准税率的影响及收入分布的影响,对再分配效应变化也做了类似的分解,实证分析了我国2005~2011年个人所得税累进性及再分配效应的变化。结果显示,收入分布改变对于累进性的变化发挥主导作用,平均税率对于再分配效应的变化非常关键。因此,个人所得税的改革首先需要在分析居民收入分布的基础上进行,另外在累进性提高的同时也需十分关注税收规模的变化。     

Horizontal Inequity and Vertical Redistribution

Inequality of post-tax income among pre-tax equals is evaluated andaggregated to form a global index of horizontal inequity in the income tax.The vertical action of the tax is captured by its inequality effect on averagebetween groups of pre-tax equals. Putting the two together, horizontalinequity measures loss of vertical performance. The identification problem,which has previously been thought insuperable, is addressed by a procedurevalidating the banding of income units into close equals groups. Thehorizontal and vertical effects of a major Spanish income tax reform areevaluated. Lines for future investigation are suggested.     

How to arrest the decline of local government

In political terms, the case for abolishing rates and substituting a local income tax has frequently been made, notably by the Layfield Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance: political independence of local government can only come through financial independence from central government grant. The financial case, which has so far tended to go by default, is based on the premise that local spending decisions can only be made responsibly if the cost of these decisions is felt on the authorities’ own tax base. With the existing level of government support, that is impossible ‐ at least with a Government which appears reluctant to follow through the logic of its new block grant and make rates take the strain of extra spending. Historically, local government has lost its powers in direct proportion to the decline in its tax base. Only local income tax will allow expansion of local responsibility in the longer term, and provide the basis for proper financial accountability. That should appeal to a Government which has often professed its support for such an expansion, and yet is also concerned with making sure that taxing and spending decisions are taken together.     

The Impact of Taxes on Discount Bond Valuation and Risk

If the effective tax rates on ordinary income and capital gains are identical, the assumption of independence or dependence between ordinary income and capital gains tax rates is shown to have no impact on discount bond valuation or risk. However, even if the effective tax rates are identical, the shape and the sensitivity of the bond valuation and risk functions with respect to taxes are not identical under the alternative assumptions. A mathematical and numerical analysis of the sensitivity of changes in the discount bond valuation and risk functions with respect to income tax rates is provided. Comparisons between the sensitivities of changes in the discount bond valuation and risk functions and taxes under conditions of dependence or independence between ordinary income and capital gains tax rates are made.     

Using Financial Accounting Data to Examine the Effect of Foreign Operations Located in Tax Havens and Other Countries on U.S. Multinational Firms' Tax Rates

This paper investigates the effect tax havens and other foreign jurisdictions have on the income tax rates of multinational firms based in the United States. We develop a new regression methodology using financial accounting data to estimate the average worldwide, federal, and foreign tax rates on worldwide, federal, and foreign pretax book income for a large sample of U.S. firms with and without tax haven operations. We find that on average U.S. firms that disclosed material operations in at least one tax haven country have a worldwide tax burden on worldwide income that is approximately 1.5 percentage points lower than firms without operations in at least one tax haven country. Our results also show that U.S. firms face a 4.4% current federal tax rate on foreign income whether or not they have tax haven operations. Finally, we find that U.S. firms with operations in some tax haven countries have higher federal tax rates on foreign income than other firms. This result suggests that in some cases, tax haven operations may increase U.S. tax collections at the expense of foreign country tax collections.     

A regional diffusion theory explanation for states’ proposal and adoption of anti-passive investment company laws

We investigate the propensity of states to propose and adopt laws prohibiting the deduction of intercompany interest or royalties in response to the passive investment company tax minimization strategy (anti-PIC statutes). Using event history analysis with panel data from 1991–2005, we investigate whether regional diffusion theory explains the proposal and adoption of anti-PIC statutes. Our results provide support for the regional diffusion theory explanation, in that both proposing and adopting states have a higher proportion of adopting states in their particular Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) region. We find no relationship between decreases in states’ real corporate income tax revenues and their adoption of anti-PIC statutes, but do find that proposals are more common in states with slower growth in real personal income. This study contributes to existing state and local tax policy research by demonstrating that certain types of policy decisions may arise from reasons closely linked to herding behavior.     

Decomposition of progressivity and inequality indices: Inferences from the US federal income tax system

Vertical equity is an important criterion in evaluating a tax system. Vertical equity has two elements: progressivity and income equality. In this paper, we analyze the vertical equity effects of the US income tax system during 1995–2006 and show that income inequality increased substantially during the period combined with a significant reduction in real progressivity.     

Corporate tax policy and incorporation in the EU

In Europe, declining corporate tax rates have come along with rising tax-to-GDP ratios. This paper explores to what extent income shifting from the personal to the corporate tax base can explain these diverging developments. We exploit a panel of European data on legal form of business to analyze income shifting via incorporation. The results suggest that the effect is significant and large. It implies that the revenue effects of lower corporate tax rates—possibly induced by tax competition—will partly show up in lower personal tax revenues rather than lower corporate tax revenues. Simulations suggest that between 12% and 21% of corporate tax revenue can be attributed to income shifting. Income shifting is found to have raised the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio by some 0.25% points since the early 1990s. This research was carried out while Ruud de Mooij was a visiting fellow at DG ECFIN in October 2006. The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Commission.     

The effects of standardized tax rates,average tax rates,and the distribution of income on tax progressivity

This study examines the changes in US individual income tax progressivity over the 1986–2003 period using the indexes developed by [Kakwani, N.C., 1976. Measurement of tax progressivity: An international comparison. Economic Journal 87(March), 71–80]. Although progressivity over this time frame has generally been studied in the literature, we provide additional insights by decomposing the changes in index values to account for the effects of concurrent changes in the standardized tax rates, average tax rates, and the income distribution. The decomposition should prove to be particularly useful when different summary indexes lead to conflicting conclusions about progressivity changes, as is often the case. From a policy standpoint, we show that it is the standardized tax rates, a derivative of the legislated tax rates, which need to be monitored and managed to offset the negative progressivity effects of increasing before-tax income inequality.     

Tax reforms and the capital structure of banks

This paper studies the link between corporate income tax (CIT) reforms and domestic banks’ financing decisions. We use a dataset of CIT reforms and estimate the effect of tax rate changes on leverage, dividend policies and earnings management of banks. The results suggest that taxation influences all three variables. Leverage increases with the CIT rate in the first three years after the reform. The reason is that the statutory CIT rate determines the value of the debt tax shield. A higher tax rate increases incentives to use debt finance when interest payments are deductible from the CIT base. The tax effects we find are statistically and economically significant but considerably lower than those found in previous research. Also, dividend pay-outs increase after an increase in CIT rates. This could indicate that banks actively manage their pay-out policies around tax reforms and adjust their capital structure with changes in dividends. Furthermore, banks increase loss loan reserves in anticipation of tax rate cuts since losses become less valuable with lower CIT rates.     

Measuring revenue responses to tax rate changes in multi-rate income tax systems: behavioural and structural factors

This paper shows how income changes in response to changes in marginal income tax rates (MTRs) translate into tax revenue changes for the familiar multi-step income tax function used in many countries. Previous literature has focused on the relatively straightforward case of a proportional income tax or the top MTR only. The paper examines revenue responses at both the individual and aggregate levels, and it is shown that for individual MTRs within a multi-rate regime, simple expressions for tax revenue responsiveness can be derived that nevertheless capture the various behavioural and structural responses to income tax reforms involving changes to multiple rates and thresholds. Illustrations are provided using changes to the New Zealand income tax structure in the 2010 budget. This reduced all marginal tax rates while leaving income thresholds unchanged.     

Host-country governance, tax treaties and US direct investment abroad

We investigate how the quality of the host-country governance and a bilateral US income tax treaty affect the rates of return that US companies require on their foreign direct investment (FDI). Using indexes of corruption and political instability, we find that poor governance causes the companies to require significantly higher rates of return. This lends support to earlier authors who have concluded that poor governance discourages both local investment and inward FDI. After accounting for the quality of host-country governance, however, no evidence could be found that an income tax treaty has any effect on the required rates of return.      

Are U.S. Multinational Corporations Becoming More Aggressive Income Shifters?

This paper examines income shifting of U.S. multinational companies over the past two decades. Domestic and foreign policy makers are increasingly concerned with the effect of income shifting on dwindling tax revenues, however, extant research on income shifting by U.S. multinational enterprises is mixed. We address the disconnect between the academic literature and the policy maker's perceptions by examining the extent of multijurisdictional income shifting by U.S. multinational companies. We directly address conflicting results in extant literature and show that using either multiperiod proxies or instrumental variables overcomes weaknesses of annual proxies in this setting. Our tests show that U.S. companies have become more active at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have changed. Holding tax rate differences between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions constant, our empirical estimates suggest that our sample of 380 corporations with low average foreign tax rates collectively shifts approximately $10 billion of additional income out of the United States annually during 2005–2009 relative to 1998–2002 due to varying regulatory costs of shifting.     

The effects of tax rate changes on tax bases and the marginal cost of public funds for Canadian provincial governments

The efficiency losses from taxation vary directly with the responsiveness of a government??s tax bases to tax-rate increases. We estimate the dynamic responses of tax bases to changes in tax rates using aggregate panel data from Canadian provinces over the period 1972 to 2006. Our preferred empirical results indicate that a one percentage point increase in corporate income, personal income, and sales tax rates is associated with a 3.67, 0.76, and 1.17 percent reduction in their respective tax bases in the short run. The corresponding long-run tax base semi-elasticity estimates are higher: ?13.60, ?3.63, and ?3.18, respectively. We use the tax base elasticity estimates to calculate the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) for the provinces?? three major taxes. Our computations indicate that the corporate income had the highest MCF and that the sales tax had the lowest MCF in all provinces in 2006. The MCF for the personal income tax ranged from 1.44 in Alberta to 3.81 in Quebec. Our results imply that there would have been significant welfare gains in 2006 from reductions in provincial corporate income tax rates. Our computations also indicate that the equalization grant formula may reduce the perceived MCF of the provinces that receive these grants, and that increases in provincial corporate and personal income taxes can cause significant reductions in federal tax revenues.