创新型中小企业与商业银行的演化博弈及信贷稳定策略研究

创新型中小企业融资难由来已久,特别是在以间接融资为主的金融环境下如何明晰银企关系,形成与之匹配的信贷策略,是化解企业融资约束的关键。本文首先建立银企演化博弈的理论框架,对创新型中小企业与商业银行的信贷行为演化过程及演化稳定性标准进行探讨,并从创新风险与监管奖惩两个维度构建银企演化博弈模型,分析两类群体在长期信贷博弈中的演化稳定策略。结果表明,银企双方均对高收益策略有模仿倾向,但创新型中小企业在与银行的长期合作中会对少数企业的违约行为具有抵御性;研发创业期企业所受融资约束最高,当且仅当创新成功率高于最小下限时,商业银行才考虑与企业发生信贷关系;政府、信用担保等外部力量与内生要素的相互制衡对实现银企信贷稳定状态具有重要作用。     

The relationship banking paradox: No pain no gain versus raison d'être

Relationship banking paradox refers to the case that credit market competition may threaten relationship banking practice, but it may stimulate it as well because of differentiation. Using a mixed model of adverse selection and double moral hazard, this paper shows that for some parameter values, relationship banking arises even when the banks compete à la Bertrand, hence supporting the no pain no gain hypothesis. This is due to multilayer nature of the information asymmetry by double moral hazard where an outside bank that does not have the borrower's proprietary information is unable to exert optimal levels of effort in the continuation game.     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

The Choice Among Interbank Settlement Systems: The European Experience

This paper addresses the choice of banks between alternative channels for interbank payments. The conventional view assumes a tradeoff between the safety of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) and the liquidity savings of multilateral netting. Moreover, correspondent banking is believed to be inefficient, both in terms of liquidity and of administrative costs. In the last decade, however, the impulse of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, technological changes and the management of RTGS systems by central banks have reduced the difference between the various systems. This is especially true for risk, whereas liquidity cost crucially depends on the refinancing policy adopted by the central bank and the co-ordination among the participants. On the basis of the recent evolution of payment systems in Europe, we verify the importance of liquidity, as well as other variables like transaction costs, for the choice of banks among different settlement systems. Cost factors imply that the nature of payments flows (value, commercial versus financial) and some structural features of the banking systems (dimension of the intermediaries, concentration of the banking sector) become important. The analysis is carried out both through a theoretical model and a cross-country comparison based on three data sources: ECB (European Central Bank, EBA (Euro Banking Association) and SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication).     

绿色信贷能否缓解银行系统性风险*——基于中国22家上市银行的证据

本文选取2009—2020年中国22家上市银行年度数据，构建面板回归模型,就绿色信贷对银行系统性风险的影响及其传导机制与异质性特征进行实证分析。研究表明：绿色信贷对银行系统性风险具有抑制作用。风险承担与盈利能力在绿色信贷与银行系统性风险的关系中承担着双重中介作用。绿色信贷对银行系统性风险的影响存在异质性特征。相对于国有银行、低环境规制时期银行及经济上行期银行，绿色信贷对非国有银行、高环境规制时期银行及经济下行期银行系统性风险的抑制作用更为明显。该成果将为防控中国银行业系统性风险提供重要的理论指导与决策参考。     

SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS AMONG SAVINGS BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS IN THE SPANISH CONTEXT

ABSTRACT ** :  This article examines the socially responsible offer of savings banks and credit unions in Spain. In particular, it has been analysed their perceived commitment with socially responsible investments, their product portfolio, their marketing strategy, and their reported forecasts of future growth. The findings lead us to conclude that a socially responsible market in Spain is at an introductory stage among credit unions, and at a growth stage among savings banks. The paper outlines managerial implications for marketing managers so as to reap the potential benefits derived from this approach to investment.     

On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets*

We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets by studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible. Standard banks can alleviate moral‐hazard problems, while financial markets operated by investment banks can alleviate adverse‐selection problems. In competition, standard banks are forced to increase repayments, since financial markets can attract the highest‐quality borrowers. This, in turn, increases the share of shirkers and may make lending unprofitable for standard banks. The coexistence of financial markets and standard banks is socially inefficient. The same inefficiency may occur with the entrance of sophisticated banks, operating with a combination of rating and ongoing monitoring technologies.     

基于博弈视角的银企信贷关系分析

银行和企业之间的信贷关系是影响我国经济增长的重要因素。由于信息不对称,银企信贷关系存在着很大的不确定性。本文通过对银企信贷行为的博弈分析,找出信贷风险的存在原因。通过增大企业贷款前的伪装成本,减少企业的逆向选择行为;增大企业贷款后的惩罚成本,减少企业的道德风险行为,从根本上改变银企之间的信息不对称状况,有利于银企关系的良好发展。     

Moving toward risk-based deposit insurance premiums in the European Union: the case of Spain

This article provides a scenario-based analysis of how the European Union proposal for a new funding model for deposit insurance systems (DISs) would affect the Spanish banking sector. We examine the risk profiles of commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives over the period 2007 to 2011 and compare the contributions to the deposit insurance fund (DIF) under the current flat-rate regime with those that would have occurred under the new risk-sensitive system. We find that a risk-based scheme could provide an incentive for sound management by reducing the premiums for credit institutions with better risk profiles. We also conclude that the proposed reform may help to mitigate the moral hazard associated with larger credit institutions.     

Natural or unnatural selection? The end of lending relationships for small businesses

We investigate the situation where small business borrowers and banks end their lending relationships. If credit allocation is efficient, banks terminate their relationships with risky borrowers. Alternatively, small business borrowers are more likely to end their relationships when they have poor investment opportunities and do not require borrowed funds. However, if the soft budget constraints of banks or credit crunches are a significant problem, banks are likely to continue their relationships with risky firms or end their relationships with nonrisky firms, which is representative of an unnatural credit allocation. Using Japanese firm-level data, we show empirically that these relationships end naturally, with natural credit allocation supported even during the recent global financial crisis.     

Credit creation under multiple banking regulations: The impact of balance sheet diversity on money supply

Since the recent financial crisis along with more concentration of banking supervision, we have stepped into a new regulatory regime where multiple regulations are at play simultaneously. In this paper, we study the collective impacts of multiple regulations on credit creation in a heterogeneous banking system. Each single regulation imposes a constraint on credit creation for each bank, while with multiple regulations, only the most stringent one plays the determinant role on money supply. For the homogeneous banking system with identical balance sheets, they share the same binding regulation. In contrast, for the heterogeneous banking system with diverse balance sheets, the binding regulation for each bank may be different from other's. Those banks, who are bound by different regulatory constraints from homogeneous banks, would bring about an overall reduction in money supply, because those binding regulations impose a lower capacity (compared with the one in the case of homogeneous banks) for the banks to extend their balance sheets in this condition. We put forward an agent-based model of commercial banks integrated with two processes: credit creation and fund transfer, to demonstrate the reduction effect. The results facilitate the understandings of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy via banks and its interaction with prudential regulations.     

The business cycle implications of banksʼ maturity transformation

This paper develops an RBC model where banks use short-term deposits to provide firms with long-term credit. The demand for long-term credit arises because firms borrow in order to finance their capital stock which they only adjust at infrequent intervals. We show that maturity transformation in the banking sector dampens the consumption and investment response to a technology shock. Our model also implies that the average deposit rate is less persistent than the average long-term loan rate, which we show is in line with corporate interest rate data in the US.     

Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information

We consider a random matching model where agents have complete access to each others' histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing, given random unobservable incomes. There is capital accumulation and an endogenous interest rate. The key feature of this environment is that information is mobile across locations, while there are frictions associated with transporting goods. Optimal allocations in the dynamic private information environment resemble real-world credit arrangements in that there are credit balances, credit limits, and installment payments. The steady state has the property that there is a limiting distribution of expected utility entitlements with mobility and a positive fraction of agents who are credit constrained.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D8, E1.     

Bargaining over loan contracts with signaling

This paper combines a sequential bargaining game between an enterprise and a fixed number of banks with a signaling game through which the enterprise reveals her project quality as well as her market-speed on the lending market. We characterize subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium loan contracts that are supported by separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in the signaling game. In contrast to existing models of lending markets, low-quality investment projects might be rewarded with more favorable equilibrium loan contracts than high-quality projects. Also in contrast to existing models, an increase in the competitive pressure between banks reduces the aggregate welfare in our model. The reason is that more favorable loan conditions come with a greater incentive for the ‘strong’ entrepreneur to distinguish herself from her ‘weak’ counterpart through socially wasteful signaling costs.     

Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly

I discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react strategically to the central bank’s presence due to its low externalities, there is a risk that it backfires, with these other banks’ taking more risky positions than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank may actually be to stay out.     

Union–firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency

This paper shows that a modified alternating offers Rubinstein model can provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union–firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the parties engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firm always moves first in the wage bargaining game. The equilibrium wage is, therefore, unique. In the second example, we examine a two-part-tariff alternating offers bargaining protocol, where the parties bargain over the wage and transfer payments. We show that this bargaining protocol has a Pareto efficient, unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, although the parties do not bargain over the level of employment, the outcome under this protocol is, nevertheless, socially optimal.     

论中小企业的信贷困境与中小银行的抵押品观念创新

近年来我国银行为避免企业信用状况不良导致的违约风险问题，对信息不透明、信用风险高的中小企业普遍采取严格的抵押品型信贷配给，而中小企业介入信贷市场普遍受到抵押资产不足的约束。中小银行与中小企业长期密切合作是实现银行抵押资产观念创新、建立声誉机制的重要途径。     

Asset bubbles,banking stability and economic growth

This paper examines the relationships between the asset bubble and the banking stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that the moral hazard caused by the deposit insurance and limited liability might facilitate the banks to hold bubble assets for the purpose of risk premium. Meanwhile the supervisory intensity, leverage ratio and credit spread provide the conditions for banks to hold bubble assets through their effects on risk premium. Once the banks hold the bubble assets, their stability will deteriorate because of four types of effects, namely internal leverage, cash withdrawal, credit friction and network effects. This paper also utilizes the BMA-PVAR model to test the theoretical findings by employing the data from 26 representative economies for a period between 2000 and 2014. The empirical evidences are consistent with the theoretical findings that the equity bubbles will lower the banking stability. The empirical evidences also suggest that the banking instability will be detrimental to the economic growth.     

企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。     

Central Banking and Post-Keynesian Economics

Abstract

The Post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money has given much attention to the role of the central bank in the money creation process. Circuit theory has neglected this role, in so far as it has focused on the relationship between banks and firms within a monetary production economy. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. First, it intends to fill this gap in circuit theory, by providing a role for the central bank in settlement of interbank debts. Secondly, it aims at reinforcing the Post-Keynesian analysis of central bank money by considering both the money-purveying and the credit-purveying roles of the settlement institution in the interbank market. The result of this analysis is a more comprehensive theory of endogenous money, where the lender-of-last-resort facilities of a central bank are viewed as an endogenous phenomenon involving both a money creation and a credit operation between the central bank and the domestic banking system. In such a framework, monetary policy consists of setting the base rate of interest at a level that enables banks to limit their bilateral debt position in the interbank market, so as not to disrupt the workings of the payment system by either an illiquidity or an insolvency crisis.