Determinants of Chinese direct investments in the European Union

This article analyses the determinants of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) activities in the European Union (EU). Evidence is based on panel Poisson models drawing on two investment monitors at the individual project level. Greenfield investments (GI) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are distinguished. The findings indicate that market size and bilateral trade are the main factors for Chinese investment in the EU. In contrast, business-friendly institutions do not foster FDI. Probably, Chinese investors are risk averse, and prefer regions with less competitive markets. The striking difference between GIs and M&As is related to unit labour costs. Higher costs make the host country less attractive for the establishment of new firms, but do not affect the involvement in existing firms. The sectoral dispersion of Chinese FDI in the EU did not change much since the global financial crisis. Most relevant shifts have occurred in research and development (R&D), where low-income EU countries have become increasingly attractive.     

中国企业海外研发机构组织与管理问题述评

随着中国企业从“制造商”向“投资家”的转变,建立海外研发机构进而充分利用国际市场创新成果,成为中国企业实现创新驱动的重要转型升级道路。尽管现有研究已经充分认识到后发国家企业建立海外研发机构的动机和组织管理特征有别于发达国家企业,但遗憾的是针对后发企业设立海外研发机构的组织与管理问题的详细分析还没有系统展开,研究结论比较分散。以此为切入点,对比式地梳理国外企业和中国企业海外研发机构设立动机、进入模式、战略定位和组织形式等若干海外研发组织与管理核心问题,在此基础上提出中国企业海外研发机构的潜在研究方向。结论有利于弥补已有海外技术投资领域对新兴市场企业关注不足的缺陷,可为未来中国企业海外研发机构的实证研究提供文献基础。     

我国境外投资所得税政策与发展

在经济一体化进程不断深化的环境下,我国境外投资出现发展变化,因而境外投资所得税政策有待改进,应与时俱进,借鉴国外成熟政策经验,增强我国企业的市场竞争力,提高政策执行力,同时对境外投资企业提供有利的税收政策支持和保护。     

Birds of a feather: Evidence on commonality of corruption and democracy in the origin and location of foreign investment in Russian regions

We examine the effects of subnational variations in corruption and democratization on the location decisions of foreign investors in Russian regions using firm-level panel data for the period 1996–2007. We link these effects to the level of corruption and type of political regime in the country of origin of a foreign investor. We find a relationship between attributes of foreign investors' home countries and attributes of the regions in which investment takes place: foreign investors from less corrupt and democratic countries tend to invest in less corrupt and more democratic Russian regions, whereas those from more corrupt and non-democratic countries tend to invest in more corrupt and less democratic regions. An inference is that, in Russian regions with high corruption and with autocratic government, foreign direct investment appears driven by the personal interests of controlling regional political elites who collaborate for mutual gain with foreign investors from corrupt and autocratic countries. Our results suggest a general conclusion that origin and location of foreign investment are linked by common political culture.     

论构建我国海外直接投资的保障制度

在我国海外直接活动的迅猛发展中,面临诸如国有化险、战乱险、汇兑险、商业险等投资风险。有效的防范和化解海外投资风险,进而保护和促进我国的资本输出,需要从我国涉外投资的法律制度建设、保险制度建设、宏观管理、跨国企业风险防范机制建立等方面入手,逐步建立健全海外投资的保障制度。     

我国对外直接投资的特点及动因研究

随着我国经济实力的提升,越来越多的国内企业选择扩展海外投资。考察了我国对外直接投资的特点与趋势,分析了现阶段我国海外投资的动因,从而有助于把握我国海外投资快速增长的原因。     

外来者劣势与海外并购企业的生产率提升

海外并购已成为新兴经济体企业对外投资和实现国际化扩张的重要战略选择。外来者劣势是中国企业海外并购活动面临着的诸多困难之一。“外来者”身份会对企业并购后的整合与生产率提升这一关键问题产生负面影响,化解负面影响需作深入的细化研究。选取2008-2015年中国上市企业共计197起海外并购事件,以制度距离、文化距离以及地理距离分别作为外来者劣势中合法性缺失和信息不对称的替代变量,分析外来者劣势对海外并购企业生产率提升的作用机制。结果显示,合法性缺失导致的外来者劣势对海外并购企业的生产率提升有显著负影响,但信息不对称对生产率的影响并不显著。调节效应检验结果表明,国内投资能显著弱化制度距离和文化距离引致的外来者劣势对海外并购企业生产率的负影响,国际化经验和出口能克服制度距离带来的合法性问题,但对文化距离带来的合法性缺失的弱化效果并不明显。     

Contractual Hazard,Political Hazard and FDI Ownership Structure in Joint‐venture Enterprises in China

This paper investigates how institutional environments, especially the contractual hazard and the political hazard, affect foreign investors’ share ratios in joint‐venture enterprises in China. We build a model combining Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights Theory to describe the tradeoff that foreign investors face between choosing a larger share ratio and a smaller one. We argue that when the contractual hazard increases, foreign investors request larger shares to avoid being held up by their domestic partners, and when the political hazard increases, they hold smaller shares to circumvent the local government's grabbing hand. Moreover, the effect of the contractual hazard is channeled through enterprises’ asset specificity. These theoretical predictions are verified by studying the relationship between the ownership structure of Chinese manufacturing joint‐venture enterprises and the provincial‐level institutions they are embedded in.     

Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.     

企业对外直接投资中的邻居效应:理论机制分析及实证检验

随着对外开放的扩大和深化,近年来中国企业对外投资增长迅速。企业全球配置生产会面临比国内生产更多的不确定性和风险,为提高投资效率,企业需从多方面获取对外直接投资的知识,包括从邻居企业获取信息和经验等。从理论机制上分析邻居效应产生的原因,包括知识溢出、竞争效应、信号传递、产业链带动等途径。在此基础上,构建2002-2013年期间详细的中国工业企业投资数据,实证检验企业对外直接投资中的邻居效应及其产生机制。结果表明:我国企业对外直接投资中确实存在邻居效应,即邻居企业的对外直接投资行为会通过多种方式促进企业"走出去"。进一步地,在省份范围内的邻居效应影响较弱;在行业内部以及细分投资市场的邻居效应影响较强。因此,应利用邻居企业的对外直接投资信息和经验,发挥企业之间的学习效应,提高我国企业对外直接投资成功率。     

GLOBAL AND DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL RISKS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

This paper investigates whether multinational enterprises (MNEs) take into account both global and diplomatic political risks when investing abroad. Whereas global political risk is common to all foreign investors, diplomatic political risk is dyad-specific as it is related to the overall diplomatic climate between the home and host countries. The main result of this study is that both global and diplomatic political risks matter for U.S. MNEs investing in developing countries. Their required return on investment rises when the political risk faced by all foreign investors worsens or when diplomatic tensions arise between the United States and their host countries, presumably because in both cases uncertainty about future returns increases.     

中国企业对外直接投资与企业生产能力

随着中国企业对外直接投资(OFDI)规模的日益扩大,企业OFDI对企业生产能力的影响问题成为学者们研究的重点议题.本文基于2013—2018年的企业OFDI数据,使用倾向得分匹配法系统研究对OFDI活动对中国企业生产能力的作用结果.研究发现:OFDI活动与企业生产能力之间存在着显著的因果关系.不论是从短期还是长期来看,OFDI活动都会对企业的生产能力产生正向推动作用,同时这种推动作用还会随着时间的推移而不断提高.另外,本文还将OFDI活动划分为三大类,不同类型的OFDI活动对企业生产能力的影响中存在着较为显著的差异性.本文的研究结论为推动中国企业开展OFDI活动及相关政府管理部门制定管理政策,提供了重要的参考和借鉴.     

中国商业银行海外发展战略探析

近几年,在中国银行业改革逐步深化与美债、欧债危机持续发酵的背景下,中国商业银行在经济一体化与金融全球化的浪潮中全面推进跨国经营战略,海外并购的规模不断扩大,海外设立的数量稳步增加。在总结和阐述相关动因的基础上,通过梳理工商银行与中国银行的发展实例,比较不同的策略选择与战略侧重,分析和研究银行海外发展的不同模式,结合实际案例寻找共性因素和成功经验,在研究国际环境的前提下,提出理性对待海外发展,踏实积攒过硬实力,积极迎接监管挑战等应对建议。     

Outward foreign direct investment and sovereign risks in developing host country

Outward foreign direct investment can affect developing, technology-receiving host countries mainly through tax revenue, technology spillover and the competition effect. With the consideration of these three effects of the outward foreign direct investment on host country, we develop a dynamic game model of interaction between foreign investors and host country from a dynamic perspective, to reveal the dynamic evolution mechanism of the sovereign risk faced by outward foreign direct investment. The result shows that: host governments usually give a specific tax holiday for outward foreign direct investors, and during the period of tax holiday investment decision of investors would be influenced by technology spillover effect, specifically, the greater the technology spillover the slower the growth of investment stock. Once the system reaches a stable state, the host country will impose a tax on multinational corporations. If the equilibrium tax rate of industries or regions which makes it easy to obtain technology spillover is high, then the equilibrium capital stock would be low.     

近代外国在华投资:规模与效应分析

传统观点认为,近代外国在华投资不仅盈利极其丰厚,而且还严重抑制了中国本土企业的成长与发展,成为阻碍近代中国经济发展的一个重要因素。本文通过对近代外国在华投资的规模、利润率以及外国投资与日俱增背景下中资企业成长、发展情况的分析,发现传统观点是值得商榷的,文章认为近代外国在华直接投资的正效应是非常明显的,不仅没有成为中资企业发展的阻碍,而且还刺激并促进了中资企业的成长与发展。当然,至于外国间接投资的效应则需要进行具体分析。     

Democratic Accountability,Regulation and Inward Investment Policy

We examine the effect of domestic political accountability on leaders' strategies for attracting foreign direct investment to less developed countries. We consider two policy areas: the tax burden imposed on firms and the regulatory environment in which they operate. We find that democratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lower tax rates to foreign investors, whereas autocratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lax regulation. This result is driven by the greater elasticity of the political survival function to environmental and labor regulations in more democratic countries. Analyses of firm‐level survey data confirm our main theoretical conclusions.     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.     

中国企业对发达国家的逆向投资:创造性资产的分析视角

缺乏垄断优势的中国企业为什么要对发达国家进行逆向投资?这在现有的跨国公司理论中很难得到合理的解释。中国企业对发达国家的逆向投资是以寻求创造性资产为特定目标的战略性投资。在动态的全球竞争条件下,以寻求创造性资产为目标的海外投资并不以垄断优势为前提条件,具有局部竞争优势的中国企业可以通过逆向投资,采取在发达国家当地建厂、设立技术监听站和跨国并购等形式,寻求并获得未来竞争的关键性资源——创造性资产,并通过全球化来利用这些资产构建新型的资源和能力基础。     

Attracting Fdi in a Politically Risky World*

Conventional wisdom holds that lack of government commitment deters foreign investment in developing countries. Yet this explanation is not convincing because some econometric studies have found little support for the role of political risk and host governments can offer upfront subsidies that compensate foreign investors for their sunk cost. This paper shows that a second commitment problem upsets the argument. A multinational firm cannot credibly commit to invest in only one country. Since countries differ in production costs and government credibility, this article explains the pattern of investment in a politically risky world.     

产业集聚、所有制结构与外商投资企业的区位选择

产业集聚理论认为,同一产业内的企业由于正的外部性具有聚集在同一地理范围内的倾向。在本文中,我们运用条件Logit概率模型,结合国家统计局对外商投资企业的调查数据,估计产业集聚程度、所有制结构以及其他传统的地区特征因素对外商投资企业地理区位选择的影响。我们发现存在非常显著的集聚效应,这意味着偶然的政策和历史因素将长久地影响企业生产活动的地理分布,这对理解中国的地区差异具有重要意义。