Public Procurement at the Local Level in Austria: The Economic Consequences of Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Public Services

This paper looks at possible problems concerning the economic effects of the introduction of an compulsory competitive tendering for general economic interest services at the local level. It examines the framework in Austria and some fundamental problems of competitive tendering. An obligation binding local authorities to put general economic interest services up for competitive tender, as currently intended by the European Commission (i.e. service concessions), would have considerable medium- and long-term effects on both the process of municipal service provision and the economic position of municipal (public) enterprises. The paper concludes that, from an economic point of view, procurement through competitive tendering does not appear to be effective or tenable for all general economic interest services in (all) different areas. The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering for service concessions in all areas of public services is therefore something best forgotten.     

THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS OF DELEGATION CONTRACTS IN THE FRENCH URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT SECTOR: WHY COMPETITIVE TENDERING IS A MYTH

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper analyses the French recent experience of franchising in the urban public transport sector in the light of Transaction Cost Economics arguments. It provides theoretical arguments supported by empirical evidence explaining why the compulsory use of competitive tendering in this sector did not translate into better performance, the main reasons being the lack of transparency of the attribution process and the limited monitoring capabilities of local authorities.     

Competition and Costs: Evidence from Competitive Tendering in the Scottish National Health Service

This paper estimates the impact of competitive tendering on cleaning costs in Scottish National Health Service hospitals. Unlike previous studies, which have relied on cross‐sectional data, a five‐year balanced panel of 176 hospitals is used to estimate a series of fixed effects regression models. These panel estimates suggest that previous studies have likely over‐estimated the cost‐savings associated with competitive tendering. The findings also suggest that the lower costs associated with competitive tendering have more to do with auction theory than with any intrinsic efficiency of the private sector.     

Competitive provision of public services: cost savings over successive rounds of tendering

We study the evolution of the cost of public service provision when subjected to a competitive tendering process. We add to the existing literature by analysing cost savings over successive rounds of tendering. Previous results in the literature show that initial cost savings tend to disappear over time with the age of the contract. Our findings suggest that each additional round of tendering will be followed by a renewal of cost savings. Thus, keeping competitive pressure via periodic tendering appears to address the problem.     

Competitive Tendering and Optimal Size in the Regional Bus Transportation Industry: An Example from Italy

When defining how to implement tendering procedures for the regional bus transportation industry, one of the main problems local authorities have to face is setting the area size to be assigned as franchised monopoly.
This paper's aim is to analyse the topic by combining some empirical results and evidence from recent developments in the Italian regional bus industry. The empirical results show that the bus transportation sector is characterized by the presence of economies of density and scale. These results imply that the best strategy for introducing competition in the bus industry is a competitive tendering approach for an area of given dimension and not necessarily a route-by-route tendering. However, it seems that the criterion applied by local authorities in Italy is much more related to political issues—such as jurisdictional boundaries of a municipal or provincial area—than a desire to promote the exploitation of economies of scale and density.     

Questions About the Initiative of the European Commission Concerning the Awarding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering of Public Service Concessions

The ruling of the European Commission is that the award of contracts by regional or local authorities for the provision of services of general economic interest must be done by way of competitive tendering. Such contracts must not be awarded to the authority's own public enterprises or to any other enterprise, including by means of unilateral State act, without a call for tenders, a practice that had previously been common in many Member States. Public service concessions are also subject to the competition rules of the EC Treaty. Should the European Commission enact a directive concerning compulsory competitive tendering, this would result, for several Member States, in a serious change of paradigm as regards the awarding of public service concessions. Against this background, this article will attempt to find answers to the following questions: —How is the present relationship of the regional or local authority with its own public enterprise to be considered? —Are there any limits to applying the rules on competition of the EC Treaty to public service concessions? —What kind of positive and negative effects concerning economic efficiency and supply of specific public services result from the awarding of public service concessions and from compulsory competitive tendering? —What kind of, and what amount of, transaction costs result from compulsory competitive tendering and from the awarding of concessions? —Does competitive tendering work properly, and are public tenderers given equal opportunities? —Are there any alternatives to compulsory competitive tendering that would achieve an efficient market performance and provide sufficient supply?     

Inefficient Credit Booms

This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks. In particular, it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post . Even though from a first-best perspective the equilibrium always displays under-borrowing, from a second-best point of view excessive borrowing can arise. The inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market. This generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts. The model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies, which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis.     

An Ordered-Probit Analysis of Price and Performance in Competitively Tendered Contracts

Abstract
This article adopts an ordered-probit estimation procedure to investigate the influence of competitive tendering on contract price and performance. Using a two-equation recursive system the findings of Domberger, Hall and Li (1995) turned out to be robust to the ordered-probit methodology which confirmed the strong negative effect of competitive tendering on contract price. The evidence also suggested that performance was either enhanced or remained the same in the presence of competition. Overall, the results of this investigation support the view that competitive tendering generates efficiency gains without adverse effects on quality of service .     

The determinants of tendering periods for PPP procurement in the UK: an empirical analysis

The procurement of infrastructure projects via public–private partnerships (PPPs) is rising globally. PPPs are, however, often characterized by lengthy tendering periods, defined as the difference between contract notice and financial close. Tendering periods are important because they account for a significant proportion of overall project delivery time. Slow tendering deters bidders and thus reduces competition for contracts. We source data on 670 PPP projects in the United Kingdom and use a duration analysis model to empirically examine factors that impact tendering period duration. Our results reveal significant sectoral variation with projects in the health and housing sectors taking significantly longer to reach financial close. We also show that, after controlling for other factors, projects with higher capital values and projects that overlap with the timing of general elections are associated with significantly longer tendering periods. We further examine the impact of the competitive dialogue procurement method and find evidence that tendering periods have increased since 2006; the year competitive dialogue was introduced. We do, however, observe a significant reduction in the time between appointment of preferred bidder and financial close post-2006. This suggests that competitive dialogue is effective in reducing the scope for negotiations by preferred bidders holding quasi-monopoly advantages.     

中国城市规模体系与城市发展战略*

过去30多年中国城市发展速度较快，然而究竟应该以何种规模的城市作为城市发展战略的重点始终存在争论。本文基于城市成本收益最优规模的罗伯特研究框架，利用中国143个城市数据采取分组估计方法进行检验，发现并不存在单一的最优城市规模。在此基础上，本文进一步利用齐普夫（ZIPF）法则和城市就业提供能力指数对中国现有城市规模体系进行研究，本文发现中国城市体系总体规模偏小且缺乏足够的就业提供能力。最后，本文根据相关研究结论提出符合中国实际的城市发展战略。     

Contestability, Complementary Inputs and Contracting: The Case of Harbour Towage

It has been argued that competitive tendering for contracts can be used to overcome problems of natural monopoly and to make markets 'contestable'. The recent Productivity Commission (2002) report into harbour towage in Australia noted the potential benefits of competition for contracts. Using the example of harbour towage, we investigate these claims when competitive tendering involves one segment of a vertical production chain. We show that direct customer contracting will not result in a perfectly contestable outcome if there is a complementary input provider with market power. We consider whether this situation improves when customers delegate the contracting process. Delegation only improves the outcome from the customers' perspective if the authority is able to receive side payments from the towage operators. Such side payments a priori would appear to be against the interests of the customers. We show, however, that side payments help the port authority to overcome the problems of market power, benefiting both the port authority and the customers. Further, these contracting outcomes are socially preferred to the unregulated outcome where port authorities and towage operators set prices and quality independently. This analysis sheds light and generally supports the Productivity Commission's recommendations.     

转换成本视角下互联网企业的创新竞争策略

在转换成本和网络效应存在下互联网产业通过产品创新活动争夺市场份额。某些“创新”的主要目的为排除竞争。互联网产业一个典型的发展过程是：企业依靠外部融资支撑的策略性创新，降低消费者向其产品转换的成本，争夺市场份额，并在投资约束的限制下走向合并，最终抬高了市场集中度。特别的，转换成本的存在让企业有动力通过事前控制转换成本的创新，争夺事后的市场势力，并且“收割”事后锁定的用户。     

Aligning Knowledge Strategy and Knowledge Capabilities

This paper outlines a framework that links knowledge strategy and knowledge capabilities in a similar way as prior studies for the more generic concepts of strategy and capabilities. Existing theory in knowledge strategy is fragmented and focused on competitive positioning. We utilize concepts of good strategic management and the theory of the firm to place knowledge strategy on a more theoretically sound basis. This expands knowledge strategy beyond competitive positioning to include internal organization and the boundaries of the firm. This expanded view of knowledge strategy is compared to a conceptualization of knowledge capabilities that focuses on different capabilities for internal, collaborative and competitive situations. Using this perspective highlights the interconnection between knowledge capabilities and knowledge strategy—they are often jointly determined. It also provides a basis for integrating competence- and knowledge-based views of the firm in an empirically testable model. Suggestions for further research are proposed.     

On the Optimality of the Competitive Process: Kimura's Theorem and Market Dynamics

This paper considers the optimality properties of a market economy in terms of three propositions that evaluate the outcomes of and the process of competition between a population of firms working within a given economic environment. We show that when firms differ in more than one competitive characteristic then competition does not select in general the most efficient firm nor does it always result in increases in the average efficiency with which resources are utilized. Drawing upon a theorem of Kimura, however, we show that competition has the property of maximizing the rate of change of the average selective characteristics in the population. We conclude that a more nuanced appraisal of the institutions of the competitive process is surely necessary. From an evolutionary standpoint, the outcomes of competition are always contingent on the nature of the selection environment and the characteristics of the whole population of firms that are being selected. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

On competitive balance in the group stage of the UEFA Champions League*

This article examines competitive balance in the group stage of the UEFA Champions League over the last two decades (1999/2000–2017/2018). Competitive balance is considered both before and after a competition. Have the groups been designed in such a way as to ensure similar levels of competitive balance ex ante? Have the demonstrated strengths (ex post competitive balance) of the different groups been similar over each season? What is the relationship between the competitive balance in the designed groups and that achieved in the same groups after the competition? Are the performance achieved in terms of ex post competitive balance similar to ex ante competitive balance levels? We found that, despite expectations, the groups' ex ante competitive balance was not homogeneous. Although ex ante competitive balance serves as a good predictor, on average, of ex post competitive balance, we observed significant differences at the levels of group and seasons. Therefore, it is possible to improve the design mechanism of the groups that make up the group stage of the champions so that they are composed homogeneously in terms of ex ante competitive balance.     

非农就业视角下城镇化对农业机械化的影响*

本文利用我国420个地级市2001—2013年的面板数据，借鉴城乡二元经济理论，研究城镇化对农业机械化的短期作用和动态影响。主要结论有：（1）资源的稀缺性决定了短期内城镇化和农业机械化之间是竞争关系，资源贫乏的中部地区面临着更加矛盾的抉择。（2）从动态来看，中国高速的城镇化进程降低了农业人口密度，农业生产条件的改变促进了农业机械化水平的提高。（3）当经济发展水平提高后，城镇化和农业机械化的短期竞争关系得到缓解，拉动作用减弱。本文的研究结论为更好地理解现行的乡村振兴战略和城镇化战略的关系提供了一个产业互动的视角。     

The competitive firm and the role of information about uncertain factor prices

This paper studies the role of information about uncertain input prices for a competitive firm. The production decision has to be taken when the price of an input factor is perceived as random. However, a signal is observable in advance, conveying some information about the future factor price. Transparency is linked to the informational content of this signal. The impact of a higher level of transparency is analyzed from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before the information signal is observed. The change of factor use, production amount and cost are determined by comparing the strength of the curvatures of total and marginal product. By contrast, ex ante profit always increases, independently of the shape of the production function.     

Home Care Reform in the Netherlands: Impacts on Unpaid Care in Rotterdam

The 2007 change in the law of home care for household help in the Netherlands concerns competitive tendering at municipal level. This has reduced quality and choice for care receivers. In this paper, I report from a small survey in the city of Rotterdam on the impact of the law change on unpaid home carers. The results show that the burden for unpaid carers has increased whereas the quality of paid care as perceived by the unpaid carers has declined. This calls into question whether the reform has met its objectives: improving participation of people with needs for household help and improving efficiency in service delivery.     

The Reform of Local Public Utilities in Italy

The Italian system of local public utilities has recently undergone an important reform process. The first round of reforms, introduced in the 1990s, represented a remarkable change in the social welfare function with regard to the management of local public utilities. The legislation was specifically designed to cut costs and reduce deficits. A second round of reforms, required by European directives, started around the mid-1990s. Several laws were passed introducing important innovations and regulating specific sectors: public transport; electricity; and gas. Article 35 of the 2002 Financial Law was the final step in a comprehensive reform of the whole local public utility sector. The main innovations of the Financial Law concerns liberalization. Article 35 states that the general rule for awarding service provision contracts is competitive tendering; the rationale is obviously that of competition for the market. The general rule as expressed by Article 35 is nevertheless limited during the transition period. In the long run, competitive tendering will become the normal way of awarding contracts for local public utility provision. Even if there are doubts that full competition will be introduced into the sector, liberalization does appear to be having an effect, forcing many local public utilities to become more efficient. The changes introduced have brought about a better and a more efficient system with a greater number of large size enterprises and on the average a more active management.
In the future, the liberalization process may come to a standstill due to an insufficient number of competitors. Strong public administrations are therefore needed to prevent opportunistic behaviour by private firms.     

基于平台包络视角的平台生态系统竞争优势构建路径研究

通过对美团的发展历程和平台包络路径进行案例研究，梳理平台企业向平台生态系统演化过程中，如何通过平台包络战略获取竞争优势。研究发现，生态系统情境中竞争优势的构建路径与传统企业存在差异，平台包络战略通过“以用户需求为起点，利用横向包络和纵向包络获取互补性资源，最终实现全系统协同”路径获取竞争优势；平台利用相同组件进行包络，促进供给端效率性协同产生，进而实现供给端范围经济；利用重合的用户群体进行包络，激发需求端价值性协同产生，从而实现需求端范围经济，并通过用户数据资源的积极共享与深度使用，实现全系统协同，最终完成竞争优势构建；平台发起包络战略的过程也是平台向平台生态系统演化的过程，其中横向包络助益平台扩大用户规模，推动平台演化进程。