Asymmetric information in late 19th century cooperative insurance societies

Between 1880 and 1930, cooperative insurance was the main source of illness, accident, and death insurance in the United States, Canada, and England. This paper tests for asymmetric information in cooperative insurance societies and examines how their pricing policies affected the profile of members. We find strong evidence that, unlike their modern substitutes, cooperative societies were able to overcome the asymmetry of information. Furthermore, as a consequence of non-actuarial pricing, our results suggest that workers deferred their membership until they were about 40 years old.     

What Are SEC Football Tickets Worth? Evidence from Secondary Market Transactions

Tickets to sporting events are highly differentiated—seat location, date and time of the game, and home‐team and opponent qualities make each ticket unique. Preferences also differ nontrivially across fans, all of which make the supplier's pricing problem complex. We examine strategies employed by Southeastern Conference (SEC) universities in pricing their football tickets and evaluate their effectiveness in extracting surplus from fans. We use hedonic analysis of data collected from online secondary market transactions to construct a synthetic season ticket, which we compare to prices actually charged by university athletic departments. We also compare quality premiums charged by universities for better seats with market evaluations of those quality differences.     

Do men and women discriminate against women for the same reason? Evidence from China

In this study, we examine whether men and women form gender discrimination for the same reason. To do that, we build an experimental Chinese labor market in which employers evaluate the productivity of workers who perform a real-effort task. Before evaluation, the employer observes the worker’s personal and group information. The personal information contains gender identity and a signal of productivity. The group information reveals the productivity distributions of some other male and female workers who do not differ in average productivity. However, it shows more male workers at the very top productivity levels and more female workers at the very bottom productivity levels in one treatment than in the other. According to the belief-based theory, there will be a greater degree of discrimination against female workers in the former. We find that, however, only male employers’ evaluations are well predicted by this approach. Female employers behave oppositely: their degree of gender discrimination is smaller in the treatment emphasizing men’s advantage in the tails of the productivity distributions. To explain female employers’ evaluations, we adopt the preference-based approach. Our findings suggest that employers of different genders can have different motivations for gender discrimination, and thus call attention to the theoretical foundation of gender discrimination and policy measures aimed at reducing gender discrimination.     

The value of banking relationships during a financial crisis: Evidence from failures of Japanese banks

Previous literature suggests that banking relationships can enhance the value of client firms in the presence of asymmetric information problems. Hence, severance of banking ties due to a bank failure can have adverse consequences for the clients of the failed bank. In this paper, we provide evidence on the value of banking relationships by examining the impact of three large bank failures in Japan on their clients and the clients of surviving banks. We find that, as in previous studies, the market value of customers of the failed banks is adversely affected on the date of the failure announcements. In addition, the effects are related to the financial characteristics of both the client firms and their primary banks. Firms that have greater access to alternative sources of funding experience a less severe adverse impact from bank failure announcements. Similarly, clients of banks that are more profitable, better capitalized, and have lower loan loss reserves suffer less from the failure announcements. However, we also find that these effects are not significantly different from the effects experienced by all firms in the economy. That is, the bank failures represent “bad news” for all firms in the economy, not just for the customers of the failed banks.     

Renting Goodwill in International Marketing Channels: An Analysis of Pricing Strategies and Bargaining Power

This paper investigates the pricing decisions of foreign manufacturers in international markets within a bargaining framework with asymmetric information and the rental of goodwill. The key findings are: first, the foreign manufacturer follows a mark-up pricing strategy in which its gross margin and the quality premium over the domestic product are shared with the importer. Second, a manufacturer–importer contract occurs only when the manufacturer’s bargaining power is within an admissible range which shrinks as transaction costs increase. Third, the domestic consumer will only purchase the foreign product if the importer’s goodwill in the domestic market is sufficiently large to signal quality. The paper contributes to the literature on exchange relationships between foreign manufacturers and importers.     

我国低保制度演进的经济学解析一个基于信息不对称的动态博弈模型

本文就城市低保制度建立以来,特别是"应保尽保"的要求提出以后,大量出现的骗保现象,建立了一个基于信息不对称的动态博弈模型.通过对模型中参数的讨论,对骗保的原因和政府采取的一些措施进行了相关评论.在实践中,基于公示制度,并引入"奖励邻里监督举报机制"的方法在一些地方取得了很好的效果.在本文的模型中,通过数理的方法证明了利用邻居的信息优势对申请低保者进行监督,可以保费节省、减少骗保的发生.最后,本文利用此模型尝试对经典的企业性质问题进行解释,提出物理位置的接近或专业领域的靠拢可以改善信息不对称的状况,从而达到节省交易费用,代替市场机制的目的.     

Wage Consequences of Rapid Tertiary Education Expansion in a Developing Economy: The Case of Thailand

In recent years, Thailand has experienced the emergence of “overeducated” workers as the supply of university graduates in Thailand has outpaced growth in high‐skilled employment opportunities. Using the 2007 to 2009 Thai Labor Force Survey, this paper quantifies the incidence of overeducation and estimates overeducation wage penalties among male university graduates. The results show that the incidence of overeducation is greatest among younger cohorts. Quantile wage regression results suggest that overeducation wage penalties for older workers capture the impact of unobserved low ability on wages. In contrast, persistent wage penalties of 11–26% across the wage/ability distributions for younger workers are consistent with structural imbalances in the Thai labor market. These imbalances make it difficult for university graduates to find jobs commensurate with their level of formal education and to achieve their full earning power. The wage penalties are especially large for new entrants into the labor market.     

An empirical analysis of contracting by Chinese firms

Why do firms use formal contracts or relational contracts with their business partners? The paper uses survey data based on a large number of Chinese firms to uncover some important factors for why and when formal contracts or relational contracts are used. This study identifies geographical location as an important factor in affecting Chinese firms' contracting decisions. We find that a firm is more likely to use formal contracts with its clients and suppliers if they are located in a city different from the firm's main business location. We also find that larger (smaller) firms tend to adopt formal (relational) contracts. However, while the number of clients has a negative impact on a firm's adoption of formal contracts with its clients, the number of suppliers has a positive impact on its adoption of formal contracts with the suppliers.     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

MIGRATION,SOCIAL NETWORKS,AND CREDIT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM PERU

We seek evidence of the causal relationship between migration, social networks, and the probability of receiving credit in a developing country where credit markets are weak and internal migration is common. Migrants may face binding asymmetric information constraints as they often lack collateral. Social networks can help mitigate these constraints. Conversely, migrants might face higher liquidity constraints and might, therefore, demand more credit than nonmigrants. The effect of migration on participation in the credit market is thus ambiguous. Compounding this, migration and credit may be jointly determined. We utilize rich data from Peru to establish the net effect of migration on credit and the role that social networks play in this relationship.     

Unionization,market structure,and economic growth

This article investigates the macroeconomic effects of unionization in a Schumpeterian growth model with an endogenous product market structure and a unionized labor market. The endogeneity of the market structure and the trade unionism of the labor market interact and jointly determine the equilibrium unemployment, firm size, number of firms, economic growth, and distribution of income between workers and firms. We show that unionization governs the distribution of income between workers and firms and the unemployment rate, but it does not give rise to any growth effect on the economy. In addition, unionization discourages potential entrants and hence decreases the equilibrium number of firms. These results echo the empirical observation in the sense that unionization raises unemployment and alters the distribution of income between workers and firms, but it does not give rise to a significant, real impact on the firms’ investment and the economy‐wide growth.     

The Impact of Early Commitment on Games Played: Evidence from College Football Recruiting

We use data on athletic scholarship acceptance decisions to show that high school football players signal their ability level by delaying commitment. Although colleges can obtain information about student athletes, National Collegiate Athletic Association regulations limit information flow, making private information an important component of the scholarship market. Using ordinary least squares, censored regression, and negative binomial estimation, we show that for a given observed ability level, committing to a scholarship offer early is associated with less playing time after acceptance. In one season and at a typical average early signing date, early‐committing athletes played in 0.21 fewer games per season, or about 4% of the average number of games played.     

Barriers to Skills Development in a Local Construction Labour Market

The literature on the construction industry suggests that the structure of labour markets in that industry sets up barriers to skills development. It is often suggested that 'employer engagement', leading to increased 'buy-in' into skills development, and investment by employers is the way to overcome these barriers. We present an example from a local labour market in South East England, with reference to an intervention in training ('Constructing Futures') that has brought private and public sector actors together. This example shows that employer engagement on its own is not sufficient to overcome the barriers created by the labour market structure. We suggest some essential measures to allow more workers to enter the industry and gain skills and reduce the skill shortages endemic to the industry in South East England.     

A Mismatch Made in Heaven: A Hedonic Analysis of Overeducation and Undereducation

In this paper, a hedonic pairing process is modeled in which some workers may be overeducated or undereducated as an equilibrium outcome of a dynamic labor market. Undereducated workers are those whose abilities and training permit them to move into a job with higher qualifications, whereas overeducated workers are highly qualified workers who select into lower-skill, entry-level jobs that provide the training (or signal) necessary for promotion. The empirical model shows that these pairing types cannot be directly identified in a cross section since all workers are exactly educated during a portion of their career. However, pairing types may be imputed by comparing predicted and observed qualifications of the worker and predicted and observed requirements of the firm. Using a rich cross section and a panel of British working-age males to identify the pairing types, we confirm the predicted career development patterns with regard to on-the-job training, promotion, and wages.     

Pricing, Sunk Costs, and Market Structure Online: Evidence from Book Retailing

While online consumers are less concerned than traditional consumersabout firm location, they may be more concerned about unobservablequality and, to signal this, online retailers rely more on advertisingthan traditional retailers. Imperfect price competition mayarise because of vertical product differentiation, incompleteconsumer awareness, and near-perfect information exchange betweenretailers. This paper evaluates alternative theories of competitionand market structure in online retailing. Advertising, productdevelopment, and revenue data for the online book market revealthat consumers respond to advertising and website spending ratherthan low prices. As the market size expanded, during 1997–2001,these endogenous sunk costs escalated and there was no majornew entry. Advertising-to-sales ratios and market-concentrationratios are much higher than for traditional bookselling. Usingprice and demand information for individual books over a numberof weeks, we find counter-cyclical and cross-sectional pricevariation inconsistent with perfect price competition.     

An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases.     

农村信贷市场的微观结构与策略履行

运行有效的借贷合约要处理好合约中的甄别、激励、监督与合约履行机制问题。由于信息获取、借贷合约设计与履行均要花费成本,则不同贷款人依据自身特征、信息禀赋状况等,对借贷合约中的甄别、激励、监督和合约履行问题实施不同的策略,这便构成了正规与非正规借贷合约的微观差异基础。其启示意义在于:将这两部门的比较优势综合起来,可以得出深化、整合农村信贷市场的策略。     

基于制度构成要素的公共管理制度创新研究

公共管理制度体系由正式约束、非正式约束和实施机制组成,公共管理制度创新必须综合考虑这三个要素的特征与功能。现阶段,应高度重视我国公共管理正式约束的创新作用,特别是正式约束的形成机制;应促进非正式制度的变革创新,使之与正式制度变迁相互协调。完善有效的实施机制是制度创新成功的关键。     

On Determinacy and Learnability in a New Keynesian Model with Unemployment

We analyse determinacy and stability under learning (E‐stability) of rational expectations equilibria in a new Keynesian model of inflation and unemployment, where labour market frictions due to costs of hiring workers play an important role. We derive results for alternative specifications of monetary policy rules and alternative values of hiring costs as a percentage of gross domestic product. We find that in general the region of indeterminacy and E‐instability in the policy space increases with hiring costs. Thus, higher hiring costs – consistent with European and South African “sclerotic” labour market institutions – seem to play an important part in explaining inflation and unemployment instability. Moreover, under lagged data‐based rules, the area where monetary policy delivers both determinacy and E‐stability shrinks. These rules also perform worse according to these two dimensions when hiring costs go up. Finally, under expectations‐based rules an additional explosive region is introduced. For South Africa, a rule based on current data – not unlike the original Taylor rule – works better than a forward‐looking rule.     

A panel data analysis of the formal-informal sector labour market linkages in South Africa

This study explores the labour market linkages between the informal and formal sectors, using the first four waves of the National Income Dynamics Study data. The main focus is on three groups of employed: worked in the formal sector in all waves; worked in the informal sector in all waves; moved between the two sectors across the waves. Only 27% of informal sector workers in wave 1 transitioned to the formal sector in wave 4; 38% remained in the informal sector while 33% had their status changed to either inactive or unemployed. The econometric analysis indicates that older and more educated individuals living in urban areas and coming from households with fewer old-age grant recipients are significantly more likely to work in the formal sector, whereas more educated white males are associated with a significantly greater likelihood of transitioning from informal to formal sector employment.