HOUSING WEALTH AND U.S. MONEY DEMAND: A PANEL ESTIMATION

This article estimates a panel model for U.S. money demand using annual state‐level data for the period from 1977 to 2008. We incorporate housing wealth in the demand‐for‐money function and find strong evidence of a relationship between a broad monetary aggregate and housing wealth. This finding is robust to the inclusion of variables measuring financial heterogeneity across U.S. regions. Breaking up the sample in two subperiods shows that panel estimates including housing wealth yield more stable coefficients than both time‐series estimates and panel estimates excluding housing wealth. We also show that the link between money and housing wealth predates the recent boom‐and‐bust cycle. (JEL E41, E52)     

The Welfare Effects of U.S. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment of Exports From China: An Empirical Inquiry *

This Study provides estimates of the elasticities of the U.S. import demand for Chinese goods and of China's export supply to he U.S. and China of granting Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff treatment for China's exports. In general, if Washington denies MFN status to Beijing, Sino-American commercial as well as political relations world be seriously harmed. [F13, F14]     

COMPETING EXPLANATIONS OF U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION IN THE 1990s AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Was the consolidation of defense industry in the 1990s driven by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) directives, or was it driven instead by the same forces that drove consolidation in many other sectors of the U.S. economy in the 1990s? To better understand the roles of DOD policy and economy‐wide forces in shaping the U.S. defense industry, we test for structural breaks in defense industry and spending data and compare our findings to those relating to other sectors and the general economy. We identify structural breaks in the defense‐related data in the early 1980s and throughout the 1990s, roughly consistent with changes in the U.S. economy, including broader merger trends. Overall, our results are more consistent with the view that economy‐wide factors drove defense industry consolidation, largely independent of the DOD policy changes that occurred early in the 1990s. (JEL E0, C2, H0)     

Tariff evasion and rules of origin violations under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement

Abstract Using product‐level data on trade between Canada and the U.S., this paper presents evidence of tariff evasion and violation of the rules of origin occurring under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). It shows that more imports go unreported at the destination country when tariffs are higher. Consistent with the tariff evasion hypothesis, this result implies that the trade creation effect of a free trade agreement may in fact be due to less underreporting. Further, this paper shows that the larger Canadian tariff preference margin for the U.S. is associated with more goods originating in third countries being transshipped through the U.S. territory for re‐export. The preference margin is also positively correlated with the value of excess imports from the U.S., which qualify for preferential treatment. Both results suggest the presence of persistent violations of CUSFTA’s rules of origin.     

FOREIGN ENTRY INTO U.S. SERVICE INDUSTRY BY TAKEOVERS AND THE CREATION OF NEW FIRMS

We study the relation between foreign entry in U.S. service sector industries and the revealed comparative advantage of the investing country using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis firm‐level data on all foreign takeovers and new foreign‐owned firms from 1998 to 2008. We find foreign acquisitions in the service sector are in industries of U.S. comparative advantage while new foreign firms are in industries of investing country's comparative advantage. This suggests that foreign acquisitions in the service sector are not directly related to foreign investors' competitiveness in the industry of investment. In contrast foreign investors in new service sector firms come from countries with a competitive edge in the industries of investment. We also find that foreign investors of new service sector firms are from Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries with a comparative disadvantage in royalties and trademarks. (JEL F21, F23, G34)     

BEN BERNANKE AND THE ZERO BOUND

From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money‐financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3%–4%. Yet, after U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke took more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero‐bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff's views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision‐making. (JEL E52, E58)     

Forecasting the probability of US recessions: a Probit and dynamic factor modelling approach

Abstract Quantifying the probability of U.S. recessions has become increasingly important since August 2007. In a data‐rich environment, this paper is the first to apply a Probit model to common factors extracted from a large set of explanatory variables to model and forecast recession probability. The results show the advantages of the proposed approach over many existing models. Simulated real‐time analysis captures all recessions since 1980. The proposed model also detects a significant jump in the next six‐month recession probability based on data up to November 2007, one year before the formal declaration of the recent recession by the NBER.     

WHAT DRIVES EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS? THE ROLE OF FDI IN CHINESE MANUFACTURING

Export competitiveness (XC) is a country's ability to compete globally through expanding export capacity and upgrading export sophistication. How does foreign direct investment (FDI) affect XC? This article studies the issue based on evidence from Chinese manufacturing. Using data on 21 manufacturing sectors for 31 regions over 2005–2011, we construct the XC index and its three composite indicators, following the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Four findings emerge from the estimates: (a) FDI is a key driver of China's export success; (b) China's absorptive capacity reinforces the effects of FDI through domestic learning efforts; (c) FDI seems to contribute more to export capacity than export upgrading, especially in labor‐intensive/low‐tech products; and (d) high‐tech FDI from the western world seems to be more conducive to export upgrading than low‐tech FDI from developing economies. (JEL F21, F23, O14, O53)     

Congested Export Spillover in China

This paper uses Chinese firm‐level data to investigate the possible nonlinear spillover caused by export congestion. We argue that there could exist an inverted‐U curve in terms of export spillover effect, resulting from the fact that once exporters become over‐agglomerated, export congestion is likely to cause negative export spillover. The estimation results support the hypothesis of an inverted‐U curve of export spillover effect. Further calculation shows that the degree of Chinese exporters’ congestion approximately ranges around 17–34% and demonstrates an increasing trend over time. The finding suggests that policies aimed at reducing export congestion such as industrial upgrading, improvement of firms’ efficiency and the current shift from export dependence towards domestic demand would be important for a more healthy development of China's exports in the future.     

MEASURING POVERTY USING BOTH INCOME AND WEALTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SPAIN

We study the correspondence between a household's income and its vulnerability to income shocks in two developed countries: the U.S. and Spain. Vulnerability is measured by the availability of wealth to smooth consumption in a multidimensional approach to poverty, which allows us to identify three groups of households: the twice‐poor group, which includes income‐poor households who lack an adequate stock of wealth; the group of protected‐poor households, which are all those income‐poor families with a buffer stock of wealth they can rely on; and the vulnerable‐non‐poor group, including households above the income‐poverty line that do not hold any stock of wealth. Interestingly, the risk of belonging to these groups changes over the life‐cycle in both countries while the size of the groups differs significantly between Spain and the U.S., although this result is quite sensitive to whether the housing wealth component is included in the wealth measure or not.     

The Dynamic Effects of the US Productivity Boom on Australia*

How has the USA's ‘new economy’ productivity boom affected Australia? We consider this question using a dynamic multisector growth model of the Australian and US economies. We find that productivity growth in the US durables sector generates small but important gains to Australia. We find that the transmission of growth is generated through increased export demand for agriculture. Consequently, the USA's productivity growth tends to favour Australia's traditional export sectors. Likewise, it increases the relative demand for less skilled labour in Australia and reduces the demand for more skilled labour and higher education.     

TARGETS IN THE TAYLOR RULE: INFLATION,SPEED LIMIT,OR PRICE LEVEL?

This paper explores the link between alternative targets in the Taylor rule and their empirical fit using real‐time U.S. macroeconomic data. We first study the stabilizing properties of the classical Taylor rule (inflation targeting, IT) and add either a price‐level target (PLT) or output gap quasigrowth target (speed‐limit targeting, SLT) in the context of the standard New Keynesian model. We demonstrate that, although only SLT has the same functional form as the optimal interest‐rate reaction function, both PLT and SLT stabilize the model macroeconomy against a cost‐push shock for a wide range of parameter values better than IT. We then estimate all three specifications using the Greenbook data. We find much stronger support for SLT than PLT and discuss pitfalls in estimating the latter that are present in existing literature. (JEL E52, E58)     

THE IMPACT OF MERGERS IN U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ON WHOLESALE GASOLINE PRICES

Starting in the mid‐1990s, the U.S. petroleum industry experienced a wave of mergers, several of them between large petroleum companies that were previously competitors. Using an econometric analysis of terminal city‐specific data, this study finds that the majority of the mergers led to higher wholesale gasoline prices in the United States in the mid‐1990s through 2000. (JEL L7, L13, L40)     

CAN SECRET INTERVENTION BE COMPATIBLE WITH A NON‐PROFITMAKING CENTRAL BANK AND A FUNDAMENTAL‐CONSISTENT TARGET?

The coexistence of secret intervention operations and “the signaling channel” (Mussa. The Role of Official Intervention, 1981) seems confusing. Vitale ( Journal of International Economics, 49, 1999, 245–267) resolves this puzzle by employing an asymmetric information framework and an assumption of a fundamental‐inconsistent target for the exchange rate. Ferré and Manzano ( International Journal of Finance and Economics, 14, 2009, 378–393) follow Vitale's microstructure framework and argue that the central banks' profitability motivation offers a rationale for their secret intervention even under a target consistent with the fundamentals. However, that the authority uses its superior information to obtain speculative profits through secret intervention in the market is not a typical goal for central banks. To theoretically explain the opaqueness in non‐profitmaking central banks' exchange rate policies, we employ a model of a central bank's optimization by considering that no bank really knows the exact fundamental rate and they take into account the possible bad consequences of announcing the intervention. We also show that, in passing the bank's private information to market participants, a bank's announcement of the intervention size is equivalent to revealing its target rate. (JEL E58, F39)     

SYNCHRONIZATION OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS BETWEEN GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES,EUROPE, JAPAN,AND OIL MARKET: CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME†

Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) with block exogeneity, this study examines the impacts of external shocks originating from the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the oil market as well as those of the regional shocks, on the oil‐rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), viewed as a prospective monetary union. It takes into account the implications of the shock impacts for selecting an appropriate common exchange rate arrangement. The SVAR variance decomposition and impulse response analyses strongly underscore the relative impacts of the global shocks over the regional ones. The findings imply that the world's two major currencies, the U.S. dollar and the euro, should figure highly in a GCC's common basket of currencies. Accordingly, a transitional movement to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement such as a basket peg may be desirable for these trade‐dependent economies in the long run, as is argued in the optimal currency literature for developing countries. (JEL E52, O52, C22)     

WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING TO AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY IN THE TWENTY‐FIRST CENTURY?

This paper extends earlier data series on aggregate concentration in the U.S. economy—the percentage of aggregate economic activity that could be attributed to the largest “X” companies—into the first two decades of the twenty‐first century. We find that there has been a moderate but continued increase in aggregate concentration since the mid‐1990s. This increase appears in data on employment and payrolls that have been compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, as well as employment and profits data that are drawn from the annual “Fortune 500” lists. This increase does not, however, appear to have raised aggregate concentration above the levels of the early 1980s. (JEL L10, L11, L19)     

ESTIMATED MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE U.S. STIMULUS BILL

This paper uses a multicountry macroeconometric model to estimate the macroeconomic effects of the U.S. stimulus bill passed in February 2009. The analysis has the advantage of taking into account many endogenous effects. Real U.S. output is estimated to be $554 billion larger when summed over the 12‐year period 2009:1–2020:4 (0.29% of the total sum of output). The average number of jobs is 509 thousand larger (0.37%). There is some redistribution of output and employment away from 2012 to 2015. At the end of 2020, the federal government debt is larger by $637 billion in real terms (the debt/GDP ratio is larger by 3.19 percentage points), which may increase the risk of negative asset‐market reactions. (JEL E17)     

“中国制造”对美国就业的拉动作用 ——中国制造业出口中“美国含量”的经验分析

本文旨在考察中国制成品出口对美国就业正向拉动作用的具体途径。使用OECD STAN按行业和终端用途分类的双边贸易数据库，本文计算了中国对美国制造品出口中来源于美国的中间产品成分，发现中国制成品中的“美国含量”随制成品技术含量的增加而增加，且随时间呈递减趋势。2006-2010年，全部制造业出口中“美国含量”平均为1%左右，其中高端制造业的“美国含量”平均为16%。在此基础上，利用美国就业需求矩阵中的就业-产出比率，笔者计算出同期中国出口制成品从美国进口的中间产品为美国创造了171万多个就业岗位。由此可见，中美两国贸易的发展对促进美国的就业具有正面积极的影响。     

China's export growth and the China safeguard: threats to the world trading system?

Abstract Is there evidence from China's pre‐WTO accession period that newly imposed U.S. or EU import restrictions deflect Chinese exports to third markets? We examine this question by drawing on a newly constructed data set of U.S. and EU product‐level import restrictions on Chinese trade imposed between 1992 and 2001, and we estimate their impact on Chinese exports to alternative markets. We find no systematic evidence that the import restrictions imposed during this period resulted in Chinese exports surging to third markets. To the contrary, there is weak evidence of a chilling effect on China's exports to third markets.     

DO UNIONS IMPACT EFFICIENCY?: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. MANUFACTURING SECTOR

This study investigates the impact of labor unions on productivity and technical inefficiency of the U.S. manufacturing sector, using state‐level panel data on 48 states from 1983 to 1996. The results indicate that while labor unions reduce firms' technical progress, they improve firm efficiency in utilizing the existing technology. The findings also suggest that the decline of unionization rate in the sample period impaired firms' technical efficiency by 2.4 percentage points. (JEL C33, C51, O51, J51)