Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?

In this paper, we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment. For that purpose, we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency. Because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous, we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data. Our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service, especially for low-educated and low-skilled workers. They also show that the search effort is more costly for low-educated women and low-skilled adult unemployed workers. This last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial, in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear.     

Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System during the 1980s

Abstract. This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore covers periods before and after the changes during the mid‐1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample containing administrative data for about 500,000 individuals. Since these data only partly reveal the unemployment duration in an economic sense, we use a narrow and a wide proxy for unemployment. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distribution of non‐employment durations for older unemployed. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs remained unchanged after the reforms. Our findings clearly show that many firms and workers used the more beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, for those workers who found and accepted a new job, we do not observe a prolongation of their search periods to a sizeable extent.     

Work incentive and other effects of social assistance and unemployment benefit policy in the Czech Republic

In this paper we provide an account of most of the passive labor market policies (unemployment compensation, social assistance, state social support and the pension system) in the Czech Republic during the 1990–1996 period. The eligibility requirements and benefit levels are described in great detail. Using Labor Force Survey data, we compare the characteristics of unemployed people receiving unemployment benefits with those receiving social assistance and those not receiving any benefits and we find significant differences in their characteristics. Finally, we provide an analysis of the work disincentive effects of the unemployment and social assistance benefits by comparing these benefits to market wages and by analyzing the effect of being in the system on the duration of unemployment of two cohorts of unemployed in 1994 and 1995. We find that social assistance benefits are fairly generous for low income families with more children, individuals with these characteristics have a higher probability of receiving social assistance and they tend to stay unemployed longer than those people with relatively fewer dependants. We conclude that the social assistance scheme seems to be having some disincentive effects for at least one group in the population.     

Fiscal Effects of Minimum Wages: An Analysis for Germany

Abstract. Against the background of the current discussion of statutory minimum wages in Germany, this paper analyzes the potential employment and fiscal effects of such a policy. Based on estimated labor demand elasticities obtained from a structural labor demand model, the empirical results imply that minimum wages in Germany will be associated with significant employment losses among marginal and low- and semi-skilled full-time workers. Even though minimum wages will lead to increased public revenues from income taxes and social security benefits, they will result in a significant fiscal burden, due to increased unemployment benefits and decreased revenues from corporate taxes.     

The employment effect of reforming a public employment agency

By how much does an increase in operating effectiveness of a public employment agency (PEA) and a reduction of unemployment benefits reduce unemployment? Using a recent labour market reform in Germany as background, we find that an enhanced effectiveness of the PEA explains about 20% of the observed post-reform unemployment decline. The role of unemployment benefit reduction explains just about 5% of the observed decline. Due to disincentive effects resulting from the reform, the reform of the PEA could have had an even higher impact on unemployment reduction if there had been less focus on long-term unemployed workers.     

Work incentives and other effects of the transition to social assistance: Evidence from the Slovak Republic

In this paper we investigate whether the potential disincentive effects of the Slovak benefit system have an actual meaning. Using data from subsequent labour force surveys we study the determinants of the outflow from unemployment to a job and the determinants of the outflow to out of the labour force. We find that single unemployed, highly educated unemployed and unemployed living in the capital Bratislava have higher exit rates both to a job and to out of the labour force. The characteristic with a distinctly different effect on both exit rates is the previous labour market position We also find that there are fluctuations in the hazard rate over the duration of unemployment. However, these fluctuations are not very informative. The direct indicators of the type of unemployment benefit do not affect the exit rates, neither do the indirect indicators like, for example, the presence of young children. Although there are potential disincentive effects in the Slovak benefit system we find no evidence that these potential effects materialise.     

Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

Labor market cycles, unemployment insurance eligibility, and moral hazard

If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits.     

Potential duration of unemployment benefits and labor market outcomes for older workers with health impairments in Germany

This research note estimates the causal effects of a cut in the potential duration of regular unemployment benefits for older workers in Germany on the labor market outcomes of individuals with health impairments. The analyzed reform is a natural experiment that allows a difference-in-differences strategy with treatment intensity. The results provide evidence for a significant decrease in the number of days in regular unemployment benefits and an increase in the number of days in employment. However, the results also suggest a significant increase in the number of days in unemployment (social) assistance, which are granted upon exhaustion of regular unemployment benefits.     

Measuring Search Frictions Using Japanese Microdata

This paper estimates individual‐level matching functions to measure search frictions in the Japanese labour market and presents the determinants of search duration. We employ administrative microdata that track the job search process of job seekers who left or lost their job in August 2005 and subsequently registered at their local public employment service. Our finding is that the matching function exhibits decreasing rather than constant returns‐to‐scale for job seekers and vacancies. We also find that after controlling for the benefits period, job seekers who lost their job involuntarily were more likely than those quitting voluntarily to exit from unemployment.     

Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?

Abstract. This paper explores how the introduction of an experience-rated system of unemployment insurance affects employment and welfare in a model where implicit contracts between firms and workers give rise to wage rigidities and unemployment. In the literature, it has been argued that experience-rated systems of unemployment insurance may reduce long-term employment as firms anticipate the higher costs of layoffs implied by experience rating. Our analysis shows that the introduction of experience rating may increase or decrease long-term employment but it unambiguously raises welfare.     

Unemployment Benefits and Entrepreneurship

Several recent empirical papers show that unemployment benefits crowd out nascent entrepreneurs. In the present paper provide theoretical support in favour of this interesting result. Over fairly general preference patterns we obtain a measure of the opportunity cost of entrepreneurs in the presence of unemployment benefits and derive conditions under which potential entrepreneurs suffer as unemployment benefits rise. We formulate a clear transmission mechanism in the labour market that links unemployment benefits to occupational choice for a group of risk‐averse individuals.     

Benefit duration and unemployment entry: A quasi-experiment in Austria

Apart from being an important aspect of job-search behavior of individuals, potential benefit duration can also have effects on unemployment entry rates. In this paper, the causal connection between the two is investigated for the case of Austria, using a quasi-experimental situation that arose following the enactment of a law that extended benefit duration for older workers in specific regions of the country. Unemployment entry is found to have risen between 4 and 11 percentage points due to the new law. Several robustness checks are presented to see if a causal interpretation of this result is possible. Preliminary analysis shows that this increase in unemployment entry can be best understood not as voluntary quits but layoffs by firms who want to get rid of high-tenured and expensive older workers.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*

This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.     

Reforming Social Welfare in Germany: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract. In this paper, the effects of social assistance reform proposals are discussed for the case of Germany using a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates a discrete choice model of labour supply. This allows us to identify general equilibrium effects of the reforms on wages and unemployment. The simulation results show that general equilibrium wage reactions mitigate labour supply effects and that unemployment in fact decreases. Wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The simulations indicate that major cuts in welfare payments are necessary to produce substantial employment effects.     

Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers*

While layoff costs in the U.S. are mostly due to experience‐rated unemployment insurance, layoff costs in European labour markets are primarily a consequence of employment protection laws. In this paper we compare the effects of experience rating and employment protection laws on employment and welfare in a model where unemployment arises due to efficiency wage setting and where labour turnover is inefficiently high. We show that a revenue‐neutral introduction of experience rating reduces labour turnover and increases employment and welfare. The introduction of employment protection laws may also reduce labour turnover but employment declines.     

Equilibrium unemployment as a discipline device when finding employment is costly

Abstract In this paper, we study a model that incorporates costly job search into an efficiency wage model. We show that the relationship between wages and detection rates is ambiguous in this framework. The model can generate a positive relationship, consistent with empirically reasonable values for unemployment rates, job finding rates, and employment duration.     

Unemployment dynamics in an OLG economy with public pensions

Pension benefits in old age establish a disincentive to save in youth, thereby yielding lower levels of capital stock and the wage rate. As a result, the trade union has an incentive to change the composition of its two targets: employment and the wage rate. This paper develops a model that includes employment effects of public pensions via capital accumulation and union wage setting. Within this framework, we consider how contribution rates to the pension system influence the level and time path of the unemployment rate. It is demonstrated that (1) a higher contribution rate results in a lower unemployment rate, and (2) the economy with a high (low) contribution rate experiences monotone convergence towards (oscillatory convergence towards or a period-2 cycle around) the steady state. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, and seminar participants at Osaka University for their useful comments and suggestions, and Masako Ikefuji and Hiroaki Yamagami for their research assistance. Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No.17730131), the Asahi Glass Foundation, the Japan Economic Research Foundation and the 21st Century COE Program (Osaka University) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.     

Unemployment duration and workers' wage aspirations in Spain

This paper examines unemployed workers' declared willingness to work for wages lower than the one adequate for their qualification. We analyze which personal and economic characteristics determine this willingness and how it changes along the individuals' unemployment spells. The main results are: (i) Young workers, less educated and those living in regions or times of high unemployment are more willing to accept reduced wages while married women with a working husband are much less willing to do so; (ii) Once the individual fixed effect is controlled for, the willingness to work for reduced wages increases with the duration of unemployment; (iii) Not having access to unemployment benefits increases the probability that initially unwilling workers become willing to accept reduced wages.