TAXES ON PAYROLL, REVENUES AND PROFITS IN THREE MODELS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Variations in company taxes are analysed for a right-to-manage model, an efficient bargaining setting and a seniority approach. Taxes cannot be shifted forward by the risk-neutral firm. Alternative income and bargaining power are allowed to vary with taxes. Employing asymmetric Nash solution it is found that changes in a payroll, revenue or profit tax can have differing implications for labour demand curve models and efficient bargaining solutions. This distinction might provide a novel basis for empirical work. Variations in bargaining power and-within a labour demand curve setting-the union's objective function do not change results.     

Coordination versus flexibility in wage formation: a focus on the nominal wage impact of productivity in Germany,Greece, Ireland,Portugal, Spain and the United States

Wage coordination between countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) aims at aligning nominal wage growth with labour productivity growth at the national level. We analyse the developments in Germany, the EMU’s periphery countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain along with the United States over the period 1980 to 2010. Apart from the contribution of productivity to nominal wages, we take into account the contributions of prices, unemployment, replacement rates and taxes by means of an econometrically estimated nonlinear equation resulting from a wage bargaining model. We further study the downward rigidities of nominal wages. The findings show that in past times of low productivity, price inflation and reductions in unemployment still put significant upward pressure on nominal wage growth. The periphery countries are far from aligning nominal wage growth with productivity growth. German productivity is a major wage determinant, but surely not the only one. Within the context of a free bargaining process between employers and labour unions, policy-makers can effectively use the replacement rate to steer the nominal wages outcome.     

Understanding wage determination in a multi-level bargaining system: a panel data analysis

This article presents an estimation of the elasticity of actual wages to industry-level collective bargaining thereby quantifying empirically the role of industry-level bargaining on wage determination. For this purpose, we use a unique employer–employee panel dataset covering the entire Belgian employment population over 9 years (1998–2006). Like several other European countries, e.g. Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, Belgium has a relatively centralised wage bargaining system, with the industry level playing the most important role. Regression results confirm that wage increases collectively decided at the industry level are, on average, fully passed on to individual wages. In addition to industry-level bargaining, we are interested in the supplementary wage increases granted at the firm level, referred to as wage drift or wage cushion in the literature. Our estimates show that wage drift is affected by company size, by the economic performance of the industry and to a much lesser extent by labour market tensions as measured by the local unemployment rate. Interestingly, our results show that industry-level bargaining also takes most of these features into account.     

R&D INVESTMENTS AND SEQUENTIAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS*

This paper analyses how the structure of wage bargaining affects R&D investment by firms that increases the productivity of labour in a Cournot duopoly. We find that total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. Thus sequential wage negotiations reduce the incentive for firms to innovate and affect the productivity of labour. When wage negotiations are sequential the productivity of labour is greater (lower) in the follower (leader) firm than when negotiations are simultaneous. We also obtain that for same parameter values it is possible for the firm with the lower productivity to end up paying a higher wage than the firm with the higher level of labour productivity.     

Trade tariff,wage gap and public spending

This paper studies the interplay between wage gap and government spending in a small open economy facing a shock in trade policy. We consider a specific factor model with an export sector, which uses skilled labour, and an import-competing sector, which uses unskilled labour. We find the conditions under which there exists an inverse (direct) relation between trade liberalization (protection), which increases (decreases) the skilled-unskilled wage gap, and the level of government expenditure. We also show how either an unbalanced distribution of political bargaining power, or tariff revenue co-financing public spending may break this inverse relation. Moreover, the direct relation between tariff protection and public goods provision can be strenghtened by progressive taxation and weakened by regressive taxation.     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

Country characteristics and the incidence of capital income taxation on wages: An empirical assessment

This paper examines the incidence of corporate income taxes on wages using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics for 13 OECD countries. Within a wage‐bargaining framework, our econometric analysis shows that a substantial share of the corporate tax burden is shifted from capital to labour. However, the magnitude of this shift is influenced importantly by country characteristics affecting the process of wage determination, such as the degree of capital mobility, a country's relative influence over the world price of output and trade unions’ strength.     

Wage Determination Regimes and Pay Inequality: A comparative study of Latin American countries

The relationship between the degree of centralization of wage setting and labour market outcomes, generally discussed with reference to advanced OECD countries, is explored in this paper through the comparative analysis of eight Latin American countries, focusing on the effects of centralization on wage inequality. It is argued that the greater the decentralization of wage setting, the larger will be wage dispersion. The article starts with the presentation of the analytical model, and continues with the empirical study. This is divided into two parts. In the first, a number of institutional factors that contribute to define 'wage determination regimes' (collective bargaining structures; state intervention in wage setting; and union rights that determine union strength) are discussed, stressing the specific traits of centralization within Latin America, and the selected countries are scored in terms of those factors. In the second, the magnitude of wage dispersion across manufacturing industries is examined, and the resulting ranking of countries is contrasted with their ranking in terms of the institutional factors. It is concluded that, with some caveats, the degrees of centralization of bargaining structures and of wage inequality appear to be inversely associated, reproducing in the Latin American region the pattern found in OECD countries.     

Flat income taxation,redistribution and labour market performance

A flat tax rate on labour income has gained popularity in European countries. This article assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the smallest distortions to employment. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. The model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked, labour force participation, skill formation, wage bargaining between unions and firms and a wide variety of institutional details. The simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the Netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained. Only flat tax reforms that reduce redistribution will raise employment. This finding bolsters the notions from optimal tax literature regarding the equity-efficiency trade off and the superiority of nonlinear taxes to obtain redistributive goals in an efficient way.     

Labour Taxation in a Unionised Economy with Home Production

The impact of payroll taxes on unemployment and welfare are examined in a model with household production and union–firm wage bargaining. The analysis shows that unemployment typically falls as the payroll tax rate in the market sector for household substitutes (the service sector) is reduced. This holds even when the payroll tax rate in the non-service sector is raised in order to maintain a balanced government budget. Welfare improves with a reduced-service-sector payroll tax rate only if unions are equally strong and firms are equally labour intensive across the sectors.
JEL classification : E 24; H 21; J 22; J 51     

Market Rigidities and Labour Market Flexibility: An International Comparison

The effects of product and labour market rigidities on labour market dynamics are analysed using a panel of two-digit ISIC level data for seven OECD countries. As expected, employment protection was found to slacken labour market flows. Centralized wage bargaining also reduced the degree of job turnover, although a priori the effect of centralized wage bargaining on labour market flexibility is not clear. Industry subsidies have a positive impact on job reallocation by increasing job creation. The labour market dynamics are also compared in detail for two economies regarded as extremes in terms of regulations, the U.S. and Norway.     

Labour market outliers: Lessons from Portugal and Spain

Spain has the highest unemployment rate (22.2%) of any European Union country, Portugal one of the lowest (7.3%). Superficially, these countries share many labour market features: the toughest job security rules in the OECD, an apparently similar architecture of wage bargaining, and comparable generosity of their unemployment insurance systems, at least since 1989. We address the puzzle by examining Portuguese and Spanish labour market institutions, in particular job security, unemployment benefits and the system of wage bargaining. We then conduct empirical analysis of Spanish and Portuguese unemployment outflows and wage distributions, using micro data. We find differences in unemployment benefits (non-existent in Portugal until 1985, and less generous nowadays), differences in wage flexibility (wage floors by category established by collective agreements are set at a lower relative level in Portugal), and, in practice, higher firing costs in Spain. A key explanation of the difference in Portuguese and Spanish unemployment rates is the wage adjustment process. Generous benefit levels may have been necessary for the path Spanish unions took, but this was not the sole explanation of different wage setting in Spain and Portugal.     

Industry-Level Wage Bargaining: A Partial Rehabilitation—The German Experience

In order to reduce unemployment, it is often recommended that industry-level wage bargaining in Germany should be replaced by a more decentralized system. This paper provides a critical assessment of the current wage bargaining institutions and re-examines the case for a more decentralized system. Based on a theoretical model integrating Insider–Outsider aspects into the comparison, the uniformly superior employment performance of a decentralized wage bargaining system is questioned. We conclude that, rather than solely trying to decentralize wage bargaining, a promising policy option may be to improve the skills of the unemployed by efficient labour market policies and to foster institutional reforms such that wage bargaining takes account of the long-run employment consequences of wage setting.     

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.     

WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION THROUGH NON-COOPERATIVE BARGAINING

This paper investigates wage and employment determination by a group of workers or union and a firm, making use of the techniques of non-cooperative bargaining. Previous analyses have examined wage determination with an artificial restriction that employment is determined either before or after wage determination has occurred. Here, employment determination is made part of the bargaining process. With two variables being determined, there is bargaining with a variable pie and solutions correspond to equilibria without commitment. Two different notions of efficiency – exchange and pie efficiency – are relevant and serve to characterise equilibria. Multiple equilibria are shown to arise naturally once exchange inefficient proposals are possible. In all equilibria there is overemployment. Factors that restrict a firm's ability to alter the labour force during or after the wage-bargaining process are shown, paradoxically, to benefit the firm.     

Taxes,Strikes and Wages

A union and a firm bargain about wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. A two-period screening model is used to derive equilibrium wage demands by the union and to calculate measures of strike activity. Changes in wage demands and dispute probabilities due to alterations in various taxes are analysed. A more progressive income tax, a lower level of income taxes and higher payroll taxes reduce wages and strike activity. Hence, tax policy can be used not only to affect wages and employment, but lso to influence strike incidence.     

Economic reforms and labour markets: policy issues and lessons from Chile

Over the last twenty years sweeping reforms have deeply transformed the labour market in Chile. A visible outcome has been the reduction of Chile's rate of unemployment from 'European' to 'US' levels. Even though the political context makes this experiment special, are there economic lessons to be learnt? This paper concentrates on reforms to job security, on the decentralization of the wage bargaining process, and on the reduction in payroll taxes. It concludes that the reduction of payroll taxes (within the context of the social security reform), and the decentralization of bargaining increased labour market flexibility and contributed to the reduction of unemployment. On the other side, the analysis suggests that the reform on job security had no significant effect on the aggregate rate of unemployment.     

The net social wage in greece 1958-95

The object of this paper is to assess the net distributive impact of state expenditures and revenues on labour income in Greece for the 1958-95 period. This effect is measured by the net social wage defined as the difference between the total benefits received by labour from state spending and the labour taxes. We also discuss certain issues related to the empirical methodology employed in the present and similar studies and the way its inconsistent use has affected inter-country comparisons of the net social wage in the literature. Our empirical findings for Greece indicate that for the entire period no redistribution of income in favour of labour has taken place via the actions of the state. The average net social wage is very close to zero even though during the last decade we observe an increasing involvement of the state in the reproduction of labour. The positive net social wage of the few recent years coincided with high public deficits and appears to be a result of slow growth, high unemployment rates and compensation for the adverse developments for labour in the market distribution of income.     

Wage‐Setting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Networks

We analyse how union structures that differ in the degree of wage‐setting centralisation affect the pattern of R&D network formation. Within the context of a three‐firm industry, a central union that sets a uniform wage is shown to induce a partial R&D network that includes two firms but excludes the third. In contrast, we find that, under less centralised union structures, firms have incentives to form R&D networks with a larger number of alliances. This result is consistent with the stylised facts for industrialised countries: recent decades have seen an upsurge in R&D alliances along with labour market deregulation towards more flexible wage‐setting institutions.     

Unions, progressive taxes, and education subsidies

Progressive income taxes moderate distortionary wage demands by trade unions and thereby reduce unemployment, and at the same time underlie disincentives to acquire skills and decrease labour productivity. Governments can respond by combining progressive taxes with subsidies to investment in human capital. A system of generous education subsidies and steep progressive tax rates is more likely to emerge, the greater the market power of trade unions and the better the ability of governments to influence private education decisions. Empirical analysis for several OECD countries provides results consistent with these propositions. A policy mix of high education subsidies and relatively progressive income taxes is found in countries where union membership is significant.