Market power,private information,and the optimal scale of pollution permit markets with application to North Carolina's Neuse River

We extend the analysis of optimal scale in pollution permit markets by allowing for both market power and private information. We characterize the total costs (abatement costs and damages) under market power and private information and compare them to total costs under competition. It is possible for both market power and private information to lead to lower total costs than competition, but generally the differences between the three market structures will be small. We also conduct an optimal scale analysis of nitrogen pollution from waste water treatment plants (WWTP) into North Carolina's Neuse River System. An economic model of damages and abatement costs is integrated with a hydro-ecological model of nitrogen flow through the Neuse. We determine the optimal number of trading zones and allocate the WWTP into these zones. Under the most likely regulatory scenario, we find cost savings of 1.55 million dollars per year under the optimal market design relative to the typical 303(d) regulation in which the WWTP are not allowed to trade.     

Who Wins from Emissions Trading? Evidence from California

Researchers and environmental policy advocates have raised questions regarding the distributional impacts of emissions trading programs, a.k.a. “cap-and-trade”. While previous research has been careful to identify the causal effect of emissions trading on emissions reductions (Fowlie et al. in Am Econ Rev 102(2):965–993, 2012, hereafter FHM), we argue that existing estimates of differential impacts on demographic groups have relied on unrealistic assumptions regarding pollution dispersion. In this paper, we estimate the emissions reduction due to the RECLAIM cap-and-trade program in Southern California following the identification strategy of FHM, but we relax the assumption of uniform dispersion surrounding point sources. We model the transport of effluents using a state-of-the-science dispersion model to determine the areas impacted by emissions from each source. Importantly, conditional on race and ethnicity, we find that higher income areas receive larger reductions in pollution under cap-and-trade. Furthermore, conditional on income (or poverty rates), we find that Blacks benefit while Hispanics lose relative to whites under RECLAIM.     

Productivity and Price Performance in the Privatized Water and Sewerage Companies of England and Wales

After its privatization in 1989, the water and sewerage industry of England and Wales faced a new regulatory régime and implemented a substantial capital investment program aimed at improving water and environmental standards. A new RPI+K regulatory pricing system was designed to compensate the industry for its increased capital costs, encourage increased efficiency, and maintain fair prices for customers. This paper evaluates how successful privatization and the resulting system of economic regulation has been. Estimates of productivity growth, derived with quality adjusted output indices, suggest that despite reductions in labor usage, total factor productivity growth has not improved since privatization. Moreover, total price performance indices reveal that increases in output prices have outstripped increases in input costs, a trend which is largely responsible for the increase in economic profits that has occurred since privatization.     

Coherence,Causality, and Effectiveness of the EU Environmental Policy System: Results of Complementary Statistical and Econometric Analyses

The spatial differentiation of input-based pollution fees should in theory decrease compliance costs in the case of nitrate pollution of water bodies from agriculture because both the damage and the compliance costs vary over space. However, the empirical evidence in the literature does not agree on the extent of the potential savings from differentiation. We address this issue in the case of France, using a mathematical programming model of agricultural supply (AROPAj). The modeling approach used accounts for the spatial diversity of nitrate pollution and the heterogeneity of farming systems. Our results reveal the efficiency gains from differentiating pollution fees among polluters and water bodies. For instance, firm-specific and water body-specific taxes represent respectively 5.8 and 32.5 % of farmers’ gross margin in terms of compliance costs, whereas a uniform policy at the river-basin district or national level leads to major economic losses and abandonment of the agricultural activity. These results stem from the lower tax rates faced by farmers in less polluted areas, for scenarios based on spatial differentiation. Our estimates suggest that realistic regulation via input-based pollution fees should be differentiated in order to significantly reduce the financial burden on farmers of conforming to predefined pollution levels. Some potential adverse effects related to input-based taxation and land use change call for additional fine-scale nitrogen pollution regulation (e.g. limitations on crop switching).     

Endogenous change and the economic theory of regulation

This paper extends the economic theory of regulation to include endogenous regulatory change. It outlines conditions under which endogenously rising deadweight costs of regulation can alter the policy equilibrium, even if those rising costs are fully anticipated. Within this framework, alternative wealth redistribution mechanisms can alter the equilibrium path if they bias interest groups' organization costs asymmetrically. The history of natural gas regulation is broadly consistent with this theory.     

Electricity wheeling and incentive regulation

This paper relates social contract regulation strategies to a particularly important comtemporary issue in energy regulation—electricity wheeling; we find that substantial gains in economic efficiency may be possible. First, social contracts give potential wheelers more monetary incentive than traditional regulatory procedures to provide wheeling services to interested third parties. Second, social contract regulation gives potential wheelers better incentives to measure marginal costs accurately. Third, under social contract regulation, wheelers have proper incentives to install efficient amounts of transmission capacity, thereby avoiding Averch-Johnson and other regulatory distortions that emerge in traditional regulation.     

Assessing the Impact of Formal and Informal Regulations on Environmental and Economic Performance of Brazilian Manufacturing Firms

This study investigates the impact of formal and informal regulations on environmental and economic performance of Brazilian manufacturing firms. We adopt a dual approach where production technology is represented by a cost function, approximated by a translog form. Pollution is considered as a negative by-product that can be modified trough using either formal regulation (inspections or sanctions) or informal regulation (community pressure). A simultaneous equation model is estimated by three-stage least squares on a sample of 404 industrial establishments located in the state of S?o Paulo, Brazil. We show that pollution abatement costs for the Brazilian manufacturing sector are different from zero which suggests that pollution emissions are affected by environmental regulation. We also demonstrate that environmental performance of firms is jointly affected by formal and informal regulation. Lastly, formal regulation is largely influenced by informal regulation and more specifically by community pressure.     

Corporate Expenditure on Environmental Protection

We examine the determinants of firm’s current environmental expenditure and firm’s capital investment in equipment for pollution control in Irish manufacturing industries using a Heckman selection model. The main determinants for the two types of expenditure are similar: larger, exporting and energy-intensive firms are more likely to spend. Being subject to environmental regulation also has an effect. Once the decision to commit resources has been taken, larger, older, foreign-owned, exporting and energy-intensive firms incur higher environmental expenditure. For the amount of capital investment only firm size and age play a role. This suggests that the economic and regulatory incentives in place are such that it is the largest and most polluting firms that do most to reduce pollution.     

Water pollution abatement by Chinese industry: cost estimates and policy implications

Factory-level data are used to estimate water pollution abatement costs for Chinese industry. Joint abatement cost functions are utilized which relate total costs to treatment volume and the simultaneous effect of reductions in suspended solids, chemical oxygen demand, biological oxygen demand and other pollutants. Tests of alternative functional forms suggest that a very simple (constant elasticity) model fits the data as well as a complex (translog) model, permitting sophisticated policy experiments with relatively simple calculations. From the results, the cost-effectiveness of current pollution control policy in China is analysed. Basic conclusions are (1) The benefits of stricter discharge standards should be weighed carefully against the costs. For the sample of 260 factories, a shift across the existing range of standards entails a present-value difference of US$330 million in abatement costs. (2) Emissions charges as low as US$1.00/ton would be sufficient to induce 80% abatement of suspended solids for cost-minimizing factories. Charges of US$3, US$15 and US$30 per ton would be sufficient to induce 90% abatement of TSS, COD and BOD. (3) The current regulatory system provides an economic incentive to abate by charging a levy on pollution in excess of the standard. However, the results suggest that changing to a full emissions charge system would greatly reduce overall abatement costs. For the 260 factories in the sample, the current overall abatement rate could be attained under a charge system at a reduced annual cost whose present value is US$344 million.     

Sustainability economics: Where do we stand?

Environmental economics, which is a branch of resource economics – the environment as a scarce resource – is essentially about market failures, the costs of pollution and pollution abatement, and the economics of regulation. Sustainability economics includes the problem of maintaining economic growth, while reducing pollution and/or its impacts, with special attention to the linked problems of energy supply (not to mention the supply other exhaustible resources), climate change and – most urgently – fossil fuel consumption. There is a need for integration of resource and environmental economics under a new rubric, sustainability economics.     

How efficient are national environmental standards? A benefit-cost analysis of the United States experience

This paper summarizes the results of the first systematic, geographically-specific efficiency assessment of the U.S. experience with national environmental standards and with alternative approaches to establishing those standards. This ex-post evaluation assessed the net benefits that resulted from EPA's regulation of conventional air and water pollutants from the pulp and paper industry between 1973 and 1984. The paper compares the benefit-cost efficiencies of the three dominant regulatory approaches: technology, ambient, and benefits. Unlike previous studies, which assessed benefits and costs on a national basis, the study estimates both costs and benefits on a facility-by-facility basis. The analysis shows how the efficiency of national environmental regulations can vary dramatically at local levels. The authors conclude that the technology-based standards for water pollution management failed as an efficient environmental strategy. The costs clearly exceeded the benefits in the aggregate, as well as in the specific in most situations. Benefits exceeded costs at only 11 of the 68 mills investigated. The ambient based standards for air pollution management succeeded as an environmental strategy in the aggregate, but succeeded in the specific for only one-third of the mills (22 of 60 mills). The benefits-based standards for air pollution management also succeeded in the aggregate as well as in the specific for about one-half of the mills. Benefits exceeded costs at 29 of the 60 mills investigated. The results of the study point to two major conclusions. First, a regulatory policy that is based on some measure of environmental results, either ambient-based or benefits-based, will be more efficient than a policy that ignores environmental results. Second, truly efficient policies for reducing environmental risks require pollution mitigation decisions that take into account local conditions. These include not only the changes in local ambient conditions, but also the number of people who will benefit from pollution reduction decisions. This latter conclusion suggests that national environmental standards per se may be inefficient.Dr. Luken is currently Senior Environmental Advisor to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna, Austria. He is on leave from the U.S. EPA where he was Chief of the Economic Analysis and Research Branch of the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (OPPE). Mr. Clark is President of Environmental Economics Associates of Traverse City, Michigan. He was formerly Chief of EPA's Cost and Economic Impact Analysis Branch in OPPE. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.     

Decentralization and local pollution activities: New quasi evidence from China

Traditional fiscal federalism theory holds that decentralization may improve the provision of public goods and services. However, the social welfare field with strong externalities may face different incentives and behavioural logics. This paper provides novel empirical evidence for the causal relationship between decentralization and local pollution. In this paper, we focussed on China's widely spread decentralization reform, which substantially expanded the economic and social management autonomy of county governments. Using the difference-in-differences method and a panel dataset from 1998 to 2007, we found that the reform would compel affected counties to loosen environmental regulation, adopt financial and fiscal policies that would actually support heavy-pollution industries' rapid economic growth. Overall, the reform led to a significant increase in local pollution, thus worsening the overall environmental quality. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis indicated that the reforms generated net gains in social welfare, but the substantial environmental costs cannot be ignored.     

Empirical evidence of advances in scrubber technology

Flue gas desulfurization (FGD) units have been employed at US power plants for approximately 25 years to control sulfur dioxide emissions. Although it might be hoped that FGD technology would have improved over that period, theoretical work (e.g., Downing and White [Downing, P.B., White, L.J., 1986, Innovation in pollution control, J. Environ. Econ. Manage., 13, 18–29], and Milliman and Prince [Milliman, S.R., Prince, R., 1989, Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control, J. Environ. Econ. Manage., 17, 247–265]) has shown that the type of regulation generally favored in the US (direct regulation of emissions levels) provides poor incentives for technological improvements. Data on the design, performance and costs of FGD units at coal burning plants in the US are used to estimate a model of FGD costs and tests are performed in an attempt to determine whether progress has occurred. Results suggest that no significant progress has occurred in abatement technology, although costs of operating particular units at plants to tend to decrease over the lifetime of the unit.     

打好“组合拳”：低碳政策工具协同对绿色技术创新的影响及机理研究

低碳政策工具是践行“双碳”战略的重要内容，如何以低碳政策工具协同推动经济环境保护双赢。采用中国内地30个省（市、区）（因数据缺失，未含西藏和港澳台地区）2010—2021年的面板数据，系统考察了低碳政策工具协同对绿色技术创新的影响及作用机理。研究发现，低碳政策工具协同显著激励了绿色技术创新，通过替代变量测试、倾向得分匹配、工具变量法进行稳健性检验，该结论依然成立，同时低碳政策工具协同对绿色技术创新的影响因地理分布差异、环境规制差异、环境污染程度差异而存在异质性。空间溢出效应分析可知，低碳政策工具协同对绿色技术创新存在正向空间溢出效应。调节效应分析可知，以GDP为主导的地方政府竞争在低碳政策工具协同与绿色技术创新的关系中存在负向调节作用。     

Standards and the regulation of environmental risk

We study regulatory design for a pollution-generating firm who is better informed than the regulator regarding pollution mitigation possibilities, and who chooses an unobservable action when employing a particular mitigation plan. We distinguish among performance, process, and design standards, and study the relative merit of each type of regulatory instrument. Relative to previous work on standards design, we emphasize technology and process verification. An optimal performance standard is relatively strict when regulator and firm preferences are congruent, but the regulator may prefer no performance standard at all if verification costs are sufficiently high. A process standard unambiguously increases expected surplus (relative to no regulation) in some environments, and otherwise improves welfare only when it is unlikely to generate a “bad” technology choice by the firm. A design standard can improve welfare if the regulator is sufficiently well informed about the technological possibilities for pollution control, but only when the firm’s private benefits from technology choice are sufficiently small.     

Technology adoption decisions under a mixed regulatory system of tradable permits and air pollution fees for the control of Total Suspended Particulates in Taiwan

By using a newly proposed tradable permit system built under the current air pollution fee regulation for the control of Total Suspended Particulates in Taiwan as an example, a mixed-integer non-linear programming model that minimizes the total regulatory costs of firms is applied to investigate how different permit trading ratios and the design of banking might affect firms’ technology adoption decisions and permit trading behavior. By incorporating binary variables in the model to represent firms’ decisions as to whether or not to install new control equipment, the results show that when the unit air pollution fee rate is higher than the firms’ abatement costs, the design of banking causes many firms to install new control equipment that results in an over-reduction of emissions. If no air pollution fee is imposed, the trading ratio plays a more important role than the reservation rate for banking in determining the firms’ emission reduction strategies under a pure permit trading scheme. While the conclusion from this study that uses a non-uniformly mixed pollutant as an example may hold only when certain conditions are met, the framework can be applied to other uniformly mixed pollutants through parameter changes without any limitation. In addition, the modeling technique presented here offers policy-makers a very convenient approach to empirical analysis.      

Shadow prices, environmental stringency, and international competitiveness

Empirical tests of the relationship between international competitiveness and the severity of environmental regulations are hampered by the lack of pollution abatement cost data for non-U.S. countries. The theory of the firm suggests that environmental stringency can be measured by the difference between a polluting input's shadow price and its market price. We make a first attempt at quantifying such a measure for two industries located in nine European OECD countries. Overall, we provide (i) a new approach to measure cross-country regulatory differences in that we use a theoretically attractive measure of industry-specific private compliance cost, and (ii) empirical estimates that are an attractive tool for researchers and policymakers who are interested in examining how economic activity is influenced by compliance costs.     

基于环境规制视阈的企业环境责任缺失分析

改革开放以来,中国经济飞速发展,取得了举世瞩目的成就。但伴随着我国工业化进程的不断推进。环境问题的严峻性也越来越突出。企业是环境污染的主要来源者,这是企业典型的负外部性行为。由于环境资源的公共物品属性和企业典型的经济理性,使得企业并不会有效内化环境污染所带来的外部成本。这是企业环境责任缺失的表现,也是市场失灵的结果。这需要政府的介入,实施环境规制。但政府并非是完美的,在环境规制过程中出现企业与政府的互动和政府行为的外部性等现象,这也是地方放政府“经济理性”的表现。其互动结果使得企业与地方政府之间形成所谓的“利益集团”．地方政府成为企业环境污染的保护伞,这是企业环境责任缺失的深层次原因,从而进一步造成环境责任的缺失。     

USING OXYGENATED FUELS TO MITIGATE CARBON MONOXIDE AIR POLLUTION: THE CASE OF DENVER

Using alternative fuels to reduce air pollution has received considerable interest lately. Recently, the Denver metropolitan area initiated a program requiring the use of oxygenated fuels so as to reduce carbon monoxide air pollution. This paper documents the environmental and economic impacts of the first year of the Denver program. In addition, it compares the costs of using oxygenated fuels with those of other policies that could be implemented so as to reduce carbon monoxide air pollution.     

Pollution and corporate valuation: evidence from China

Environmental pollution brings severe challenges in the context of a high growing economy of China. Pollution events bring serious ecological cost to the environment, direct costs from sanction, and reputational damage to the listed firms. We study the market reaction to 145 pollution events in China during Jan 2008 and Feb 2015. We find that the 2-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of pollution events are significantly negative, which shows the disciplining effect of the stock market on the listed firms. In addition, pollution events with sanctions have lower CARs than otherwise, which are heterogeneous among different sanction types such as shutting down, fines and rectification. Finally, water pollution has lower CARs than other pollution types. We find that direct economic loss is an important reason for the negative market reactions to pollution events.