Earnings Behaviour of Financially Distressed Firms: The Role of Institutional Ownership

Using a sample of 859 U.S. bankruptcy-filing firms over the period 1986–2004, we examine the earnings behaviour of managers during the distressed period by looking at sources of abnormal accruals prior to the bankruptcy-filing year. Results show that managers of highly distressed firms shift earnings downwards prior to the bankruptcy filing. We test and provide evidence in support of two potential contributing factors. First, top-level management turnover among distressed firms leads new managers to earnings bath choices during the distressed period. Second, qualified audit opinions exert pressure on managers to follow more conservative earnings behaviour during the distressed period. Evidence is also provided that the management of distressed firms with lower (higher) institutional ownership has greater (lesser) tendency to manage earnings downwards. Results also show that higher institutional ownership mitigates the negative abnormal returns of firms with top management turnover. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to examine whether institutional ownership relates to market reaction in conjunction with a top management turnover or a qualified audit opinion during the distressed period. Prior studies focused on the investigation of earnings management or institutional ownership (separately) during the distressed period, but did not examine if the effect of institutional ownership on earnings behaviour also influences subsequent returns. Thus, the results of this study should be of interest to analysts, standard setters and regulatory bodies since our results show that management turnover, qualified audit opinions and firm governance mechanisms affect the quality of earnings and the level of abnormal returns.     

Audit opinion and earnings management: Evidence from Greece

This study examines the relationship between audit opinions and earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals, for listed firms on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). We divide the qualified audit opinions into two categories: qualified for the going-concern uncertainty and qualified for other reasons. The results indicate that audit opinions are not related to earnings management. Client financial characteristics, such as profitability and size are determinants of the going-concern audit opinion decision. The decision of auditors to issue qualified opinions for other reasons is explained by the type of audit opinion issued in the previous year.     

Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China

We examine the causes and consequences of falsified financial statements in China. Using bivariate probit regression analysis, we find that firms with high debt and that plan to make equity issues are more likely to manipulate their earnings and thus have to restate their financial reports in subsequent years. We also find that corporate governance structures have an effect on the occurrence and detection of financial fraud. There are significant negative consequences to fraudulent financial statements. Restating firms suffer negative abnormal stock returns, increases in their cost of capital, wider bid-ask spreads, a greater frequency of modified audit opinions, and greater CEO turnover. We also find that firms located in highly developed regions suffer more severe consequences when they manipulate their accounts.     

The pricing of conservative accounting and the measurement of conservatism at the firm-year level

This paper analyzes the relation between equity prices and conditional conservatism and introduces a new measure of conservatism at the firm-year level. We show that the asymmetric properties of conservative accounting, the existence of non-accounting sources of information, and the properties of GAAP related to special items combine to generate a nonlinear relation between unexpected equity returns and earnings news (the shock to expected current and future earnings). Based on this model, we construct a conservatism ratio (CR) defined as the ratio of the current earnings shock to earnings news. CR measures the proportion of the total shock to expected current and future earnings recognized in current year earnings. Ranking firms according to CR, we show empirically that higher CR firms have more leverage, increased volatility of returns, more incidence of losses, more negative accruals, and increased volatility of earnings and accruals, consistent with the literature on conservative accounting.     

Auditor reporting and earnings management: some additional evidence

This paper investigates the reasons that lead to modification of auditors’ opinions. We revisit the conclusions of prior US‐based research on whether a modification highlights likely earnings management activities. Extending this research, we consider an alternate explanation that managers adjust accruals to report earnings that better predict future firm performance, which has the side‐effect of placing them in conflict with their auditors. Our study sample comprises all firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange over the period 1999–2003. Consistent with prior research, there is no evidence of earnings management leading to an audit opinion modification. However, we do show that firms receiving inherent uncertainty modifications (other than going concern) have greater persistence of earnings (accruals) relative to other firms. This is consistent with the proposition that managers have made policy choices in reporting current earnings, with which their auditors disagree, that will likely result in a greater ability to forecast the firm's future earnings.     

Why Do Canadian Firms Cross‐list? The Flip Side of the Issue

We investigate the relation between managerial incentives and the decision to cross‐list by comparing Canadian firms cross‐listed on US stock exchanges to industry‐ and size‐matched control firms. After controlling for firm and ownership structure characteristics, we find a positive association between substantial holdings of vested options held by CEOs prior to cross‐listing and the decision to cross‐list. Further, firms managed by CEOs with substantial holdings of vested options exhibit positive announcement returns and negative post‐announcement long‐run returns. CEOs of cross‐listed firms seem to take advantage of the aforementioned market behaviour, because they abnormally exercise vested options and sell the proceeds during the year of listing only when their firms underperform during the subsequent year. In addition, there is a positive relation between substantial holdings of vested options and discretionary accruals during the year of listing, consistent with the view that CEOs manage earnings to keep stock prices at high levels. Overall, these results have significant implications for the cross‐listing literature, suggesting an association between cross‐listing and CEO incentives to maximize CEO private benefits.     

Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?

Many dividend theories imply that changes in dividends have information content about the future earnings of the firm. We investigate this implication and find only limited support for it. Firms that increase dividends in year 0 have experienced significant earnings increases in years ?1 and 0, but show no subsequent unexpected earnings growth. Also, the size of the dividend increase does not predict future earnings. Firms that cut dividends in year 0 have experienced a reduction in earnings in year 0 and in year ?1, but these firms go on to show significant increases in earnings in year 1. However, consistent with Lintner's model on dividend policy, firms that increase dividends are less likely than nonchanging firms to experience a drop in future earnings. Thus, their increase in concurrent earnings can be said to be somewhat “permanent.” In spite of the lack of future earnings growth, firms that increase dividends have significant (though modest) positive excess returns for the following three years.     

审计师变更与盈余管理关系的实证研究--来自中国A股市场的经验证据

通过对2001～2003年A股上市公司的实证研究发现:审计师变更与公司可操纵应计利润的增长具有显著正相关关系,且两者关系在不同年度、不同前期审计意见的情况下有所不同.这表明,一方面审计师变更影响到后任审计师的独立性,即公司能够通过更换审计师实现盈余管理的目标;另一方面,对前期非标审计意见的公司,审计师采取了较为谨慎的做法,且伴随着监管政策的逐渐强化,后任审计师的独立性逐年提高.     

Determinants and implications of long audit reporting lags: evidence from China

Audit reporting lag is the single most important determinant influencing the timeliness of the release of financial statements. In this study, we first explore the determinants of audit reporting lags in China where the audit market for listed firms is dominated by non-Big 4 auditors. We then examine the implications of long audit reporting lags in subsequent years. We find that selected measures of audit risk and complexity, and auditor expertise are all associated with the length of audit reporting lags in China. Firms with long audit reporting lags are more likely to have the receipt of non-standard opinions in subsequent periods. There is also evidence that firms with extremely long audit reporting lags tend to have more restatements in the subsequent year. As prior research has not specifically investigated the consequences of long audit reporting lags in subsequent years, this study makes an important contribution to the literature in this area.     

审计意见的决定因素：来自中国上市公司的证据

利用中国上市公司和相应会计师事务所2001—2003年的综列数据,本文研究了审计意见和会计师事务所规模、上市公司的风险和盈余管理等因素之间的关系。本文发现有破产风险的、进行盈余管理的或小规模的上市公司更可能得到非标准审计意见。如果它们又是大会计师事务所的客户,则得到非标意见的概率更大。本文不支持合资会计师事务所的审计质量更高的结论。     

Distress risk anomaly and misvaluation

This paper examines the effects of misvaluation on the well-documented negative relation between distress risk and stock returns (distress risk anomaly). Findings indicate that distress risk is negatively related to subsequent stock returns only in the subset of the most overvalued stocks, which is consistent with mispricing explanations provided by prior studies. The distress anomaly disappears after controlling for mispricing effects. Further analysis reveals earnings management to be one possible cause for the overvaluation of highly distressed firms. The results are robust to alternative specifications of distress risk and mispricing measures.     

The Extreme Future Stock Returns Following I/B/E/S Earnings Surprises

We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time‐series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be “neglected” stocks with relatively high book‐to‐market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies.     

Earnings volatility,ambiguity, and crisis-period stock returns

Financial crises are marked by substantial increases in ambiguity where prices appear to decouple from fundamentals. Consistent with ambiguity-based asset pricing theories, we find that ambiguity concerns are more severe for firms with higher earnings volatility, causing investors to demand a higher ambiguity premium for such firms. While there is no relation between earnings volatility and stock returns under normal conditions, there is a significant negative relation between crisis-period stock returns and prior earnings volatility. The effect is stronger in firms with low institutional ownership and low analyst following, consistent with ambiguity concerns being greatest amongst firms with unsophisticated investors.     

Innovation,financial reporting quality,and audit quality

We examine the relation between innovation and financial reporting quality (FRQ) and the implications of audit quality for this relation. We first document a negative relation between innovation and FRQ. This result is consistent with greater earnings management at higher innovation firms, likely because of the more opaque information environment that gives managers the opportunity to act opportunistically. We then examine whether audit quality moderates the observed negative relation between innovation and FRQ because audit quality constrains managers’ opportunities to manage earnings. We find results consistent with the predicted moderating effect. Lastly, we verify that these findings hold in a difference-in-differences test designed around an exogenous event, state R&D tax credits.     

Overvaluation and earnings management

Consistent with Jensen’s [Jensen, M., 2005. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] agency-costs-of-overvalued-equity prediction, we find that overvaluation is statistically and economically related to subsequent income-increasing earnings management. This relation is robust to a series of tests that address potential endogeneity concerns, including omitted variable bias and reverse causality. The agency costs of overvalued equity are substantial. Overvaluation-induced income-increasing earnings management is negatively related to future abnormal stock returns and operating performance, and this negative relation becomes more pronounced as prior overvaluation intensifies. Among the most overvalued firms, those with high discretionary accruals underperform those with low discretionary accruals during the following year by 11.88% as measured by the three-factor alphas, and by 12.87% points as measured by industry-adjusted unmanaged EBITDA-to-assets ratio.     

Earnings management and corporate spinoffs

In this study we examine whether firms manage earnings before pursuing corporate spinoffs. Using a sample of 226 completed spinoffs between 1985 and 2005, we find strong evidence of pre-spinoff earnings management among parent firms involved in non-focus-increasing spinoffs. We also find higher levels of earnings management among parent firms that have a higher level of information asymmetry prior to spinoff announcements. Our regression results show a significant negative relation between income-increasing earnings management and the announcement period returns for non-focus-increasing spinoffs. In addition, a significant positive relation is found between income-increasing earnings management and the announcement period returns for focus-increasing spinoffs. The results suggest that income-increasing earnings management sends out negative signals about non-focus-increasing spinoffs but positive signals about focus-increasing spinoffs.     

Public Predisclosure Information, Firm Size, Analyst Following, and Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements

Abstract:   This study examines the effects of public predisclosure information on market reactions to earnings announcements. We develop an empirical measure of public predisclosure information impounded in price prior to earnings announcements by cumulating abnormal returns on public news release dates during the quarter. Consistent with prior literature, we document a negative association between this measure and market reactions to subsequent earnings announcements. Moreover, we find that after controlling for this measure, firm size and analyst following are significantly positively associated with market reactions to earnings announcements. Contrary to prior empirical evidence, our results suggest that, after controlling for actual predisclosure information impounded in price, market reactions to earnings announcements are greater in magnitude for larger, more widely-followed firms than for smaller, less widely-followed firms.     

Audit committee accounting expertise,expectations management,and nonnegative earnings surprises

We investigate whether accounting expertise on audit committees curtails expectations management to avoid negative earnings surprises. Controlling for the endogenous choice of an accounting expert, we find that firms with an accounting expert serving on the audit committee exhibit: (1) less expectations management to avoid negative earnings surprises; (2) less nonnegative earnings surprises through expectations management; and (3) more nonnegative earnings surprises that are less susceptible to manipulations of both realized earnings and earnings expectations. We find, however, that the inclusion of an accounting expert on the audit committee curtails expectations management only in the interim quarters. While Brown and Pinello (2007) find a greater magnitude of downward revisions in analysts’ forecasts in the fourth quarter, they also document a lower incidence of nonnegative earnings surprises. Together, this suggests that with an accounting expert, audit committees likely view the fourth quarter downward revisions as driven more by guidance than by manipulation, thus focusing on curbing only expectations management in interim quarters.     

The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation

Japanese firms report both parent-only and consolidated financial statements. Because of the unique business environment in Japan, there is a widely held view that parent-only data provides a better means for assessing the value of the entire firm. We find that both parent-only and subsidiary earnings are important in predicting future consolidated earnings. However, while stock prices accurately reflect the persistence of parent-only earnings, the Japanese stock market appears to underestimate the persistence of subsidiary earnings, causing a significant positive relation between changes in subsidiary earnings in year t and stock returns in year t +1. This relation between subsidiary earnings and future stock returns does not persist beyond year t 7plus;1. Taking a long (short) position in firms with large, positive (negative) changes in subsidiary earnings results in an average annual abnormal return of 7.06% with positive returns in 12 of the 13 years in the test period.     

Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications

The primary goal of this study is to evaluate the ability of the Cross-sectional Jones Model and the Cross-sectional Modified Jones Model to detect earnings management vis-à-vis their time-series counterparts by examining the association between discretionary accruals and audit qualifications. These two cross-sectional models have not been formally evaluated by prior research, and their use may offer certain advantages to investors and researchers over their time-series counterparts. A sample of 173 distinct firms with qualified audit reports and a matched-pair control sample with clean audit reports are used. Only the two cross-sectional models are consistently able to detect earnings management. One limitation of this study is that its findings merely indicate the superiority of the cross-sectional models vis-à-vis their time-series counterparts in an audit qualification setting, not validate either the former or the latter.