电信主导运营商价格压榨的竞争效应

在纵向相关市场结构下,电信在位主导运营商的价格压榨行为是一种恢复纵向垄断市场势力和获取纵向一体最大化垄断利润的策略性行为,它会严重伤害下游市场的竞争,并降低社会总福利。在反垄断执法中,判定反竞争的价格压榨行为需要分析市场结构条件和进行竞争伤害检验,本文提出了基础的归因检验规则和具体的四种不同类型价格压榨检验方法。基于上述分析,对中国电信和中国联通网络接入价格歧视行为反垄断审查的结构条件和归因检验进行了分析,并认为不合理接入管制政策是价格压榨长期存在的重要原因。     

论垂直价格挤压下的接入定价规制

在自然垄断产业引入竞争的过程中,独占传输网络的纵向一体化垄断厂商可能对下游市场新进入者实施接入价格挤压。接入价格挤压从属于价格歧视。尽管一定条件下的接入价格挤压具有正向的竞争效应,但垄断厂商将具有同等效率或更高效率的独立厂商驱逐出市场则应该受到规制。接入价格规制包括政府直接规制定价和反垄断法间接规制定价。直接规制定价中整体价格上限较为可取,而反垄断法间接规制需要采用基于福利后果分析的合理推定原则,但从短期来看采用直接规制更有效率。最后提出了完善我国自然垄断产业接入定价规制的相关政策建议。     

《反垄断法》对汽车行业可能的影响

全国人大于去年通过了已经酝酿十三年之久的《反垄断法》，于今年8月1日实施。中国反垄断法律体系构建的主要目的应针对三类垄断行为：行政垄断、自然垄断企业垄断和在华跨国公司垄断。在对前两类垄断行为的规制语焉不详的情况下，其实就凸显出对在华跨国公司垄断行为的反制意图。另外，在规制滥用垄断地位实施限制竞争行为方面，《反垄断法》仍可能将对汽车行业产生多方面影响。     

跨国竞争对反垄断的抑制作用

跨国竞争的出现使各国的反垄断政策模式从结构主义转向行为主义。为了追求在国际市场竞争中的规模经济效应，各国纷纷放松了对垄断的管制。本文从垄断与竞争的相对性角度剖析了跨国竞争对当今各国政府反垄断的抑制作用及其原因，指出跨国竞争中的垄断是具有提高企业竞争力作用的，不应成为政府干预约对象。这对我们重新认识垄断在经济发展中的角色以及反垄断的目的具有一定的启示意义。     

自然垄断产业改革:走出分拆误区

时下,我国正兴起一场声势浩大的“伐垄”运动,以至有人称中国新世纪开年为“反垄断年”。反垄断是必要的,但关键是确定反垄断的什么方面,是反垄断结构还是反垄断行为。目前,理论界和政府部门都在大张旗鼓地主张自然垄断产业进行分拆式改革。对此,笔者心存疑虑,认为要慎重动用分拆措施,以避免自然垄断产业走入一拆了之的误区。1 自然垄断产业多为网络性产业,必须考虑其全程全网联合作业和统一兼容性质,决不能一拆了之电信、电力、铁路、邮政等产业,均属网络性产业,必须有一个完整统一的网络才能提供社会化的服务。     

监管：规避权力冲突——论电监会与反垄断执法机构的关系

作为电力行业的监管机构,电监会拥有对电力企业共谋、滥用市场支配地位等垄断行为进行监管的权力,这与反垄断执法机构的职权存在交叉。由于法律未明确电监会与反垄断执法机构的关系,两者在行使职权时可能产生冲突。因此,有必要明确两者关系。     

反垄断与规制政策研究的最新进展——“反垄断与规制政策:新问题与新方法”学术研讨会观点综述

本文对2012年"反垄断与规制政策:新问题与新方法"学术研讨会的主要学术观点进行了综述,包括反垄断立法与执法进展、语音网间互联结算政策、行业垄断与收入差距、合作研发的经济效应与反垄断政策、垄断行业服务质量规制、买方市场结构、多归属情形下产业间平台合作、电信重组中的单边效应、责任医疗组织反垄断、相关市场界定中的临界损失分析等反垄断与规制政策研究领域前沿问题。     

透视垄断与改革——关于认识垄断、打破垄断、防止垄断的断想

随着我国市场经济体制的不断完善和改革开放的进一步深化,垄断问题越来越受到人们的关注,打破垄断的呼声引起了社会的强烈共鸣。笔者认为,必须正确认识垄断问题,以明确电力体制的改革方向和改革重点,避免改革走入误区。一、有关垄断的基本问题——垄断是特定历史阶段的产物,是社会发展中的一种经济形态1、垄断的概念。垄断是指在市场交易中,商品生产厂商凭借自身的经济优势或超经济势力,对商品生产、商品价格、商品数量及市场供求状态实行排他性控制,以获得超额利润的经济行为。第一,垄断是市场主体在商品交易中的经济行为,不是行政行为或其…     

企业集团引发的反垄断难题

本文从企业集团的界定、性质和域外管辖权三个角度提出了其所引发的反垄断难题。本文的主要观点是企业集团作为一种企业间组织。兼有“企业性”与“市场性”二重属性：企业集团的“二重性”是导致企业集团垄断行为隐蔽性和复杂性的根本原因；处理企业集团的反垄断问题需要准确判断企业集团行为属性。本文通过案例研究．分析了美国和欧盟处理企业集团反垄断难题时的一些典型做法：提出了处理企业集团反垄断难题的基本原则。     

平台企业反垄断、数字经济创新与产业结构升级

发展数字经济须更好结合有效市场和有为政府。如何通过完善反垄断规制体系提升常态化监管水平，引导平台企业在高质量发展、科技创新、国际竞争中发挥积极作用，是各界关注的重要议题。本文构建了一个技术创新和产业升级同时内生的多部门动态一般均衡模型，刻画了数字产业和传统产业在市场竞争结构、数据利用效率和产业融合互促上的差别，研究了平台企业反垄断的重要条件。以促进数字经济创新、提升全要素生产率和加快产业结构升级为目标，对平台企业反垄断的必要条件是数字产业内部企业间的替代弹性高于平台企业与传统产业间的替代弹性，即数字产业内部企业垄断定价权低于平台企业垄断定价权。对平台企业反垄断的充分条件取决于平台企业的产出相对规模与数据相对利用效率，当平台企业产出相对规模高于特定阈值，或数据相对利用效率低于特定阈值时，政府应加强反垄断力度。如果平台企业利用数字技术显著改善了消费者福利，或反垄断政策难以有效增强数字产业竞争程度或降低平台企业垄断定价权，那么政府应谨慎使用反垄断监管，反之亦然。本文认为，应以优化法治监管环境、加快数字基础设施建设和发挥平台企业技术优势为重点，促进数字经济和实体经济深度融合。     

Mitigating Monopoly or Preventing Discrimination: Comparing Antitrust to Regulatory Goals in the Interstate Commerce Act

The Interstate Commerce Act and Sherman Antitrust Act were passed within 3 years of each other. Although regulation and antitrust both address market power, the ICA and Sherman Act had different objectives. After a minimal reference to just and reasonable prices, the ICA focused on preventing price discrimination in rail. No posited Sherman Act goal—inequality, consumer welfare, efficiency—is in the ICA. Priority of discrimination in the ICA, however, is predictable. Shippers would care less about absolute rates—which can be passed on to final consumers—and more about preventing rivals from gaining advantages through input price discounts.     

Correlation,causality, and all that jazz: The inherent shortcomings of price tests for antitrust market delineation

A substantial economics literature has developed in which price data have been relied upon to delineate antitrust markets by empirically implementing definitions offered by classical economists. The forces driving these price tests are not the same as those that give rise to market power, and therefore these price tests are likely to reach erroneous conclusions if used to delineate antitrust relevant markets. The price tests should be used with great caution, if at all.     

国有企业主导与行政性垄断下的价格合谋——“京沪空中快线”引发的若干思考

本文基于民航产业的价格同盟进行的模型分析和经验研究，在一定程度上解释了行政垄断和企业间合谋的关系。研究发现，在规制缺失或默许的条件下．包含惩罚方式的价格合谋是一个可行和可实施的机制安排，而寡头垄断和行政垄断的结合是诱发规制者干预价格竞争，最终形成所谓“价格同盟”的结构和制度条件。规制者和垄断国有企业关系的交织和错位下的反竞争行为，是未来《反垄断法》实施的主要障碍。     

Third‐Degree Price Discrimination and Consumer Surplus

This paper considers the effects of monopoly third‐degree price discrimination on aggregate consumer surplus. Discrimination is likely to reduce surplus (relative to that obtained with a uniform price), but surplus can rise under reasonable conditions. If the ratio of the pass‐through coefficient to the price elasticity at the uniform price is higher in the market with the higher price elasticity then surplus is larger with discrimination (for a large set of demand functions). The relatively high pass‐through coefficient implies a large price reduction in this market. With logit demand functions surplus is higher with discrimination if pass‐through is above 0.5.     

The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm's Valuation

EU antitrust investigations involve a sequence of events which affect the investigated firm's market value. We model these relationships and estimate their impact on firms' share prices. On average, a surprise inspection reduces a firm's share price by 2.89%, an infringement decision reduces it by 3.57%. The Court judgments do not have a statistically significant effect. Overall, we find that the total effect of the antitrust action ranges from ?3.03% to ?4.55% of a firm's market value. Fines account for no more than 8.9% of this loss, and we conjecture that most of the loss is due to the cessation of illegal activities.     

Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2017/2018

The Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission enforces competition law in the areas of antitrust, merger control, and state aids. This year’s article provides first a general presentation of the role of the Chief Competition Economist’s team and surveys some of the main achievements of the Directorate General for Competition over 2017/2018. The article then reviews: the Google Search (Shopping) case, the role of price discrimination in state aid cases; and the use of counterfactuals in merger cases where alternative transactions might have occurred absent the merger.     

Network effects and merger analysis: instant messaging and the AOL–Time Warner case

The AOL–Time Warner merger, announced in January 2000, was and still is the largest merger ever consummated. The merger plan was submitted to the FTC for antitrust review and to the FCC for license transfer review. The FTC approved the merger with conditions relating to open access. The FCC approved the merger subject to a condition (among others) that mandated interoperability for future (but not present) generations of AOL's popular instant messaging (IM) service, based on the potential leveraging of merger assets together with current IM network effects into market power in next-generation IM services. This condition was controversial and represents a new departure in antitrust analysis for industries imbued with network effects. This paper analyzes AOL's IM service and the ability to leverage merger assets into future market power in the context of the FCC condition; counter-arguments are considered and larger lessons for “new economy” antitrust are drawn from this experience and analysis.     

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No‐discrimination Constraint

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no‐discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour‐based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third‐degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.     

Contracts Versus Price Discrimination: Evidence From the SONJ Case

A feature of the Standard Oil antitrust case is that much of the case revolves around Standard’s selling lubricating oils to railroads. This paper explores the government’s theory that Standard’s rebates to the Pennsylvania RR represented price discrimination. Standard’s defense was an assertion that the lubrication contracts were relational contracts involving a service and that the behavior which the government labeled discriminatory represented persistent inefficient behavior on the part of the Pennsylvania system. Data from the trial and other sources are used to attempt to determine if the evidence presented at trial favors price discrimination or Standard’s inefficiency defense. This is done using data envelopment analysis to determine the inefficiency the Pennsylvania RR. However, in the end, most aspects of the case must be considered “not proven.”