On revenue recycling and the welfare effects of second-best congestion pricing in a monocentric city

This paper examines congestion taxes in a monocentric city with pre-existing labor taxation. When road toll revenue is used to finance labor tax cuts, 35% of the optimal road tax in our numerical model does not reflect marginal external congestion costs, but rather functions as a Ramsey–Mirrlees tax, i.e. an efficiency enhancing mechanism allowing for an indirect spatial differentiation of the labor tax. This adds a quite different motivation to road pricing, since welfare gains can be produced even in absence of congestion. We find that the optimal road tax is non-monotonic across space, reflecting the different impacts of labor supply elasticity and marginal utility of income, which both vary over space. The relative efficiencies of some archetype second-best pricing schemes (cordon toll, flat kilometer tax) are high (84% and 70% respectively). When road toll revenue is recycled lump-sum, the optimal toll lies below its Pigouvian level. Extensions in a bimodal framework show that the optimality of using road toll revenue to subsidize public transport depends on the initial inefficiency in public transport pricing.     

Second-best policies for congestion externalities

This is the third in a series of three articles on the topic of congestion externalities. We use an urban general-equilibrium model to test the efficiency of several second-best policies for congestion externalities. The most efficient second-best policy is a program of land-use controls; the program generates a welfare gain of $3.38 per household per week. A unit tax on commuting is a less efficient policy, with a welfare gain of $1.15.     

Congestion,agglomeration, and the structure of cities

Congestion costs in urban areas are significant and clearly represent a negative externality. Nonetheless, economists also recognize the production advantages of urban density in the form of positive agglomeration externalities. The long-run equilibrium outcomes in economies with multiple correlated but offsetting externalities have yet to be fully explored in the literature. Therefore, I develop a spatial equilibrium model of urban structure that includes both congestion costs and agglomeration externalities. I then estimate the structural parameters of the model using a computational algorithm to match the spatial distribution of employment, population, land use, land rents, and commute times in the data. Policy simulations based on the estimates suggest that congestion pricing may have ambiguous consequences for economic welfare.     

Efficient Congestion Tolls in the Presence of Unpriced Congestion: A Peak and Off-Peak Simulation Model

This paper develops a congestion pricing model to examine efficient congestion tolls for an urban highway facility that resembles California State Route 91, the highway that has been subject to congestion tolls since December 27, 1995. Two lanes out of six (each way) are subject to congestion tolls, and the other four lanes are not. The simulation model combines the economic theories of second-best pricing of transportation facilities and peak-load pricing, and considers both welfare-maximizing and profit-maximizing cases. The simulation results show that the second-best peak period toll is quite low and that the welfare gains from the toll are modest compared to a regime in which all lanes are subject to tolls.     

The Henry George Theorem in a second-best world

The Henry George Theorem (HGT) states that, in first-best economies, the fiscal surplus of a city government that finances the Pigouvian subsidies for agglomeration externalities and the costs of local public goods by a 100% tax on land is zero at optimal city sizes. We extend the HGT to distorted economies where product differentiation and increasing returns are the sources of agglomeration economies and city governments levy property taxes. Without relying on specific functional forms, we derive a second-best HGT that relates the fiscal surplus to the excess burden expressed as an extended Harberger formula.     

Airlines’ strategic interactions and airport pricing in a dynamic bottleneck model of congestion

This paper analyzes efficient pricing at a congested airport dominated by a single firm. Unlike much of the previous literature, we combine a dynamic bottleneck model of congestion and a vertical structure model that explicitly considers the role of airlines and passengers. We show that a Stackelberg leader interacting with a competitive fringe partially internalizes congestion, and that there are various toll regimes that induce the welfare maximizing outcome, widening the set of choices for regulators. In particular, charging the congestion toll that would apply for fully competitive carriers and that ignores any internalization, to both the leader and the fringe, yields the first-best outcome.     

City size,network structure and traffic congestion

This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing the relationship between land use and traffic congestion by employing the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD). The MFD is an empirically observed relationship between traffic flow and traffic density at the level of an urban region, including hypercongestion, where flow decreases as density increases. This approach is consistent with the physics of traffic and allows the parsimonious modeling of intra-day traffic dynamics and their connection with city size, land use and network characteristics. The MFD can accurately measure the inefficiency of land and network resource allocation due to hypercongestion, in contrast with existing models of congestion. The findings reinforce the ‘compact city’ hypothesis, by favoring a larger mixed-use core area with greater zone width, block density and number of lanes, compared to the peripheral area. They also suggest a new set of policies, including the optimization of perimeter controls and the fraction of land for transport, which constitute robust second-best optimal strategies that can further reduce congestion externalities.     

Does public transit reduce car travel externalities? Quasi-natural experiments' evidence from transit strikes

One of the unanswered questions in the field of urban economics is to which extent subsidies to public transit are justified. We examine one of the main benefits of public transit, a reduction in car congestion externalities, the so-called congestion relief benefit, using quasi-natural experimental data on citywide public transit strikes for Rotterdam, a city with mild congestion levels. On weekdays, a strike induces travel times to increase only marginally on the highway ring road (0.017 min/km) but substantially on inner city roads (0.224 min/km). During rush hour, the strike effect is much more pronounced. The congestion relief benefit of public transit is substantial, equivalent to about 80% of the public transit subsidy. We demonstrate that during weekends, travel time does not change noticeably due to strikes. Furthermore, we show that public transit strikes induce similar increases in number of cyclists as number of car travelers suggesting that bicycling-promoting policies to reduce car congestion externalities might be attractive in combination with first-best congestion pricing.     

Traffic externalities in cities: The economics of speed bumps,low emission zones and city bypasses

This paper considers various policy measures that governments can use to reduce traffic externalities in cities. Unlike much of the available literature that emphasized congestion, we focus on measures that reduce pollution, noise and some accident risks. These measures include noise barriers, speed bumps, traffic lights, tolls, emission standards, low emission zones, and bypass capacity to guide traffic around the city center. Using a simple model that distinguishes local and through traffic, we study the optimal use of these instruments by an urban government that cares for the welfare of its residents, and we compare the results with those preferred by a federal authority that also takes into account the welfare of road users from outside the city. Our results include the following. First, compared to the federal social optimum, we show that the city government will over-invest in externality-reducing infrastructure whenever this infrastructure increases the generalized cost of through traffic. We can therefore expect an excessive number of speed bumps and traffic lights, but the right investment in noise barriers. Second, when implementing low emission zones, the urban government will set both the fee for non-compliance and the emission standard at a more stringent level than the federal government. Moreover, at sufficiently high levels of through traffic the urban government will prefer imposing a toll instead of implementing a low emission zone. Third, whatever the tolling instruments in place, the city will always underinvest in bypass capacity. Finally, if it can toll all roads but is forced to invest all bypass toll revenue in the bypass, it will never invest in bypass capacity. Although the paper focuses on non-congestion externalities, most insights also hold in the presence of congestion.     

Auto pollution and congestion in an urban model: An analysis of alternative strategies

Congestion and pollution externalities associated with automobile driving are examined for their effect on urban structure. A monocentric urban model which incorporates household preferences for both an unpolluted environment and for leisure time is presented, and used to evaluate alternative pricing and emissions policies on automobile use and their effects on city structure. Optimal tax gradients for driving are derived, and compared with second best cases of per mile taxes and no taxes. As externalities gradients become more nonlinear, the welfare gains from employing optimal taxes rather than a per mile tax are increased. The appropriate choices of an emission standard, highway capacity, and highway pricing policy must be made simultaneously and depend on household preferences.     

The general equilibrium effects of congestion externalities

This is the second in a series of three articles on the topic of congestion externalities. We use an urban general-equilibrium model to compute two types of cities: the market-equilibrium city, in which congestion externalities occur, and the optimum city. The optimum city has a more dispersed distribution of employment, and a more concentrated distribution of residence. If the population of the city is fixed, the optimum pricing of transportation generates a per capita welfare gain of $3.78 per week. If the population of the city is endogenous, the internalization of congestion externalities causes the city to grow.     

Road pricing with optimal mass transit

This paper considers the second-best policy problem that arises when auto travel is priced below its marginal cost and there is a substitute mass transit mode. Using analytical methods, a global comparison is made between the second-best levels of transit service and the fare and their first-best levels. The fact that the results are global permits an application to road pricing not possible with the local results of Kraus (2003).     

The Long-Run Effect of Economic Development Policy on Resident Welfare in a Perfectly Competitive Urban Economy

This paper argues that evaluations of economic development policy must consider the long-run effect on resident welfare. The paper uses comparative static analysis of a closed, urban economy with an explicit labor market, to investigate the effect of policies that stimulate economic activity. The paper finds that such policies do not necessarily raise resident welfare, because of the competition for land between firms and households. On the other hand, the paper does find that income transfers increase resident welfare. This model assumes, however, that the land, capital, and labor markets are perfectly competitive. Therefore, these results are based on the assumption that an urban economy is efficient.     

Resource balance, limited information and public policy

The U.S. Federal Government through its expenditure programs is having a major impact on all forms of pollution abatement. Total expenditures on Federal environmental programs amounted to $3.3 billion in 1972. A program of this magnitude can easily lead to waste and expenditures on conflicting goals unless carefully managed.

In a recent article in the Am. Econ. Rev. William Baumol examined the theoretical justification for and attacks on the Pigouvian tax and subsidy approach to controlling externalities. He concluded that while it is theoretically possible to control externalities through Pigou's procedure, the existence of multiple equilibrium and information requirements make it impractical. He proposes an alternate approach which changes the policy goal from maximization of social welfare to generation of acceptable levels of externalities. His goals differ drastically from those of the resource balance model presented by Kneese, Ayres and D'Arge of maximization of social welfare. This paper will combine the concept of resource balance with the goal of obtaining acceptable level of externalities at minimum cost in the presentation of a theoretical model that can be operationalized.

This paper proposes a general equilibrium method, utilizing the decomposition principle of linear programming, that will permit expenditures and regulations only on non-conflicting goals and includes a feedback mechanism for determining if a program is wasteful in relation to other programs. The model has five advantages over earlier proposals: (1) it is a general equilibrium rather than partial equilibrium model; (2) it is dynamic rather than static; (3) limited information rather than complete information is required for its implementation; (4) the model is heuristic rather than optimizing in the sense that policy decisions always increase the efficiency of pollution control, but because of the existence of uncertainty, they cannot be interpreted as maximizing social welfare; (5) the model incorporates multiple rather than a single policy tool.     

Optimal highway design and user welfare under value pricing

This paper investigates the optimal design of highways operated under a form of congestion pricing called value pricing. Value pricing involves dividing a highway into free and priced lanes so that in equilibrium the highway effectively operates at two levels of service, with those users placing a higher value on travel time savings selecting the faster, priced route. A tractable analytical framework is developed which allows analysis of equilibrium and welfare on value priced highways when users vary in their value of time. The model is used to characterize optimal toll and capacity policies, as well as investigate the fiscal implications of value pricing. The analysis concludes with results on how welfare changes induced by value pricing are distributed over the population of users when the government finances any funding shortfall through a non-discriminatory taxing mechanism. A realistic numeric example is used to illustrate how the model can be applied to evaluation of actual and proposed value pricing implementations.     

Innovation dynamics and fiscal policy: Implications for growth,asset prices,and welfare

We study the equilibrium implications of different fiscal policies on macroeconomic quantities and welfare by utilizing an endogenous growth model that matches asset pricing data well. The fiscal instruments of interest are (i) subsidies to R&D expenditure, consumption and capital investment, and (ii) cuts in labor and corporate tax rates. Our equilibrium analysis provides new insights on the interplay of innovation dynamics and fiscal policy. Importantly, we find growth and welfare to be inversely related when changing R&D subsidies. However, this depends on how well the model reproduces asset pricing dynamics. Moreover, only subsidies to capital investments and cuts in the corporate tax rate have the potential to increase both growth and welfare.     

The incidence of congestion and congestion tolls

In contrast with the enormous literature on efficiency aspects of congestion tolls, very little has appeared on their equity implications. Simulation is applied to a standard urban model to learn about the distributional aspects of an optimal toll, or the absence of one. Tolls are found to produce distributional changes which may overshadow their effects on allocative efficiency. In passing, the model is used to demonstrate that lagged supply adjustments to increases in the demand for suburban housing may be an effective, if second-best, alternative to congestion tolls.     

Land use externalities, open space preservation, and urban sprawl

Parcel data on residential land conversion are used to investigate how land use externalities influence the rate of development and modify policies designed to manage urban growth and preserve open space. Several “smart growth” policies are found to significantly influence land conversion, including a development clustering policy that concentrates development and generates preserved open space. In addition to directly affecting a parcel's hazard rate of conversion, this policy is found to affect neighboring parcels' conversion by generating a positive open space externality that hastens their development. The implication that the clustering policy could generate a more sprawled pattern of development is explored using spatial simulation.     

Search frictions,real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance

In this paper, we study the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme when the economy is subject to labor market imperfections characterized by real wage rigidities and search frictions. The US unemployment insurance financing is such that firms are taxed proportionately to their layoffs to finance unemployment benefits. Using DSGE methodology, we investigate how policy instruments should interact with labor market imperfections. It is shown that wage rigidities in a search and matching environment cause welfare costs, especially in the absence of an incentive-based unemployment insurance. This cost is mainly due to the distorting effect of wage rigidities which generate inefficient separations. We show that the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme – corresponding to the Ramsey policy – offsets labor market imperfections and allows implementation of the Pareto allocation. The second-best allocation brings the economy close to the Ramsey allocation. The implementation of the optimal policies clearly highlights the role of labor market institutions for short-run stabilization.     

Revealing transactions data to third parties: Implications of privacy regimes for welfare in online markets

We examine the effects of privacy policies regarding transactions (e.g., price/quantity) data on online shopping platforms. Disclosure of transactions data induces consumer signaling behavior that affects merchant pricing decisions and the welfare of platform participants. A profit‐maximizing platform prefers the disclosure policy that maximizes total welfare. Although this policy benefits sophisticated consumers, it harms unsophisticated (myopic) consumers. Consequently, the welfare effects of alternative privacy policies, data breaches, deceptive privacy policies, and opt‐in/opt‐out requirements can differ sharply, depending on the level of consumer sophistication and on other factors such as the prevailing status quo.