“PAY IT FORWARD” AND HIGHER EDUCATION SUBSIDIES: A MEDIAN VOTER MODEL

Since 2012, at least 24 states have considered legislation on Pay It Forward (PIF) models of higher education finance (which enable students to pay the price of college upon departure from an institution, as opposed to paying upfront tuition). This paper proposes a theoretical model of PIF policies within a framework in which voters belonging to different income groups vote over the level of subsidies to higher education. We analyze the impact of two types of potential PIF policies—a deferred tuition approach and an income share approach—on college access and on voting equilibria over subsidy levels. The results show that college access is enhanced by PIF policies. The equilibrium level of subsidies depends crucially on the pattern of income distribution, in particular on the relationship between mean income and the income of the median income group, and on whether higher education widens or narrows the distribution of income. We show that the equilibrium level of subsidies to higher education will not necessarily decline under PIF, and may increase in some circumstances due to changes in college access for low‐income groups. (JEL I22, I23)     

Subsidizing heterogeneous higher education systems

In many countries, there is an ongoing debate on the public funding of the higher education (HE) system. Our goal is to examine the theoretical justification for the establishment of HE institutions and analyze the self-selection of students under different policies of student subsidies. We study nonstationary equilibria of an overlapping-generation economy in a hierarchical education system. Given the capacity constraints of Universities, we explore the impact of adding new institutions, to be called Colleges, to the HE system, focusing on three issues. Given that Colleges are less productive and less selective than Universities: (a) Should the government establish Colleges? (b) Should the government divert funds from Universities to Colleges? On the basis of long-run economic growth considerations, we obtain positive answers to both questions. (c) Then, we compare several policies of student subsidies across the board. Our results suggest that much caution is needed in the implementation of student subsidies. Specifically, targeting subsidies to the highly-ranked students in each institution may distort their self-selection across institutions and downgrade the human capital accumulation in the economy. To offset this distortion in the demand for HE it may be useful to target subsidies to the low-ranked students in each institution. Our model also accounts for several stylized facts over time: (1) the increase in the number of institutions and students, (2) the decline in College admission standards, and (3) the decline in public budget per student and the corresponding increase in out-of-pocket student payments.     

Subsidizing public inputs

If production–cost savings associated with successful research and development are freely disseminated to other firms as soon as they are realized, too few resources may be allocated to this activity. Subsidies to this activity, a public input, can lead to optimal input use. The effectiveness of four alternative subsidy instruments in stimulating firms’ R&D spending are examined. Two are incremental subsidies and two are level subsidies. One of the incremental subsidies and one of the level subsidies crudely capture characteristics of incentive mechanisms used in many countries. A laboratory implementation of these instruments confirms that incremental subsidies are inferior to level subsidies.     

The more subsidies,the longer survival? Evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms

How do government subsidies affect firm survival? By using Chinese firm‐level data for 1998 to 2007, we show that, on average, there is a positive and significant impact of government subsidies on firm survival. We also investigate the heterogeneous effects of government subsidies with different intensities on firm survival, and find that moderate‐intensity government subsidies exert a positive impact on firm survival, while high‐intensity government subsidies increase the exit probabilities, the underlying mechanisms via subsidy‐seeking investment and innovation incentive weakening are supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, we explore the role of governance institutions in the subsidy–survival relationship, and find that the positive impact of government subsidies on firm survival is more pronounced in regions with better governance institutions.     

Specific vs Ad Valorem Strategic Export Subsidies with Taxation Distortion

This paper employs a model to compare the welfare between optimal specific and ad valorem export subsidies if the subsidy payment is financed by distortional taxation. It is found that the welfare under the specific subsidy regime is higher (lower) than that under the ad valorem subsidy regime if the social cost of taxation distortion is low (high). Moreover, the signs of the two optimal subsidies are also crucially dependent on this social cost. They are positive (negative) if the social cost is low (high).     

Tuition Fees for Higher Education and Intergenerational Mobility in China

This paper studies the impact of an increase in higher education tuition on intergenerational mobility in China. We develop a theoretical model for the parental decision about the investment on education of children to illustrate the impact from the perspective of borrowing constraint. We consider the Chinese college tuition and subsidy reform around 1986 as a quasi-natural experiment for identifying the policy effect of the reform on intergenerational educational mobility by using the data from the census of 2000 and the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS). We find that an increase in the education burden induced by the reform of college tuition has reduced intergenerational educational mobility, and it is more noticeable in regions with a relatively higher increment in the tuition fee. Our results are robust with consideration of the co-residence bias, government investment in elementary education, and the higher education expansion.     

Rethinking Hecs: Its Definition and Fiscal Role in Compensating for Non-deductibility of Tuition Fees

This paper develops a two period model of the higher education decision to determine the required return from higher education. It uses the model to calculate the proportion of full tuition costs which should be charged 'up front' under the Australian Higher Education Scheme (HECS), in order to compensate for the fact that such fees are not deductible against income for tax purposes. Because full tuition costs represent less than 11 per cent of the total costs of higher education, the ideal HECS ratio is relatively high, in the region of 0.7. The low relative importance of tuition costs means that fee subsidy schemes cannot possibly compensate for other distortions such as income tax progression which persist over the working life of graduates.     

An Analysis of FEE-HELP in the Vocational Education and Training Sector

The public vocational education and training (VET) system is one of the few areas in Australia's tertiary education system where students are required to pay upfront fees without access to loan assistance. These arrangements may lead to sub‐optimal educational outcomes to the extent that prospective students reject a VET education on the basis of short‐term financial constraints. In this paper we analyse some of the important issues related to the adoption of FEE‐HELP (a 2005 federal government financial instrument based on the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS)). It is argued that income contingent loans of this kind are associated with the advantages of both default‐protection and consumption smoothing. Using data from the first three waves of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, we examine various empirical issues associated with the adoption of FEE‐HELP in VET, including the extent of private salary returns to VET qualifications. As well, we explore issues related to the public subsidies inherent in the adoption of FEE‐HELP in VET, and illustrate the time periods involved in loan repayments for various assumptions concerning the size of the charge and the future income of VET graduates. Administrative issues are considered, as are the implications for the Commonwealth government with respect to potential subsidies associated with the design parameters. In the 2007–08 Federal Budget, the former government announced a small extension of the FEE‐HELP system into Australian VET, a reform consistent with improved tertiary funding arrangements.     

Financing Tertiary Education: An Examination of the Issues

The subsidies provided to the tertiary sector in Australia are more generous than those offered in most other advanced countries and most other industries. Evaluated using the criteria of economic efficiency, equity and consistency with the stated aims for the tertiary sector, these subsidies do not appear to be given for the right reasons. It can therefore be argued that there is justification for the imposition of tuition fees and for consideration of loans as a method of student finance. Overseas experience with loan finance is reasonably encouraging. Income contingent loans have been advanced as a viable means of perfecting the market for investment in human capital and as a form of profit sharing in which taxpayers share in both the costs and benefits of the educational investments of a nation's youth. Many standard arguments against loan finance, such as their disadvantaging lowincome groups and their constituting a negative dowry for female students, do not stand up to close scrutiny of the empirical evidence. The gradual introduction of a student loans scheme characterised by a high degree of income contingency, lengthy repayment periods, decreasing marginal tax rates per unit of debt, and moderate interest rate subsidies, appears to have considerable merit as a means of passing on to graduates part of the cost of the expensive service they now receive largely for free.     

VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.     

政府R&D补贴政策与企业创新决策间双向动态耦合与非线性关系*

本文以新常态下创新驱动的引擎产业——高技术产业为研究对象,通过面板向量自回归方法将政府的直接补贴、税收优惠与企业的资本、人员投入及创新收益同时纳入系统框架,研究政府R&D补贴政策与企业创新行为决策之间的双向动态耦合关系,然后基于动态面板门限回归研究企业创新收益与两类R&D补贴政策间可能存在的非线性关系,并以理论模型与经验研究相结合的方式分析直接补贴与税收优惠影响高技术企业创新的机理及作用效果。研究证实企业增加创新投入是提高创新收益的根本原因;R&D补贴对企业资本投入的“挤入作用”并不明显,但税收优惠能有效激励高技术企业在人员方面的投入;政府“低补贴、低优惠”的双低策略更有利于提高企业的创新收益。     

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF VALUING HEALTH INSURANCE ON LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INEQUALITY AND HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 COULD AFFECT THEM

A substantial part of the U.S. inequality literature focuses on yearly levels and trends in pre‐tax, post‐transfer cash income and its distribution over time and finds that median income appears to be stagnating, with income growth primarily coming at higher income levels. When we use data from the Current Population Survey for 1995–2008 and add the value of employer‐ and government‐provided health insurance coverage, not only does it increase the upward trend in the level of resources controlled by Americans, but also reduces the level of inequality in these resources and its upward trend. We then provide a highly stylized example of this broader income measure's value in capturing the impact of two key provisions of the Affordable Care Act of 2010—an expansion in Medicaid and the provision of subsidies to lower‐income families for purchasing private coverage on state‐run exchanges. Even though these incremental expansions build on existing systems of government‐provided health insurance, we find that the vast majority of the benefits would still accrue to the bottom three deciles of the income distribution when we include the value of employer‐ and government‐provided health insurance in our expanded yearly income measure. (JEL D31, H51, I14)     

Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies

We report the results of a field experiment conducted in conjunction with a mailed fundraising campaign of a nonprofit organization. The experiment is designed to compare the response of donors to subsidies in the form of matching amounts or rebated amounts. Matching subsidies are used by many corporations as an employee benefit; the US federal tax system encourages giving using a rebate subsidy by making donations tax deductible. The design includes a control group and two levels of subsidy of each type. Our main result is that matching subsidies result in larger total donations to charities than rebate subsidies, a result that is qualitatively similar to the lab findings. The estimated price elasticities for the matching subsidy are very similar to (and insignificantly different from) the lab experiments, while rebate subsidies lead to lower contributions in the field than in the lab. Since rebates in the field involve substantial lags and additional complications as compared with the “instant rebates” of the lab, this latter difference is not unexpected. The matching results are an important step in validating lab estimates of responsiveness to subsidies of charitable giving.

---

Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Optimal mixed taxation,credit constraints,and the timing of income tax reporting

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

政府补助、产权性质与定向增发

政府补助效果是学者高度重视的焦点话题。本文以政府补助为切入点，从一级市场、二级市场分别考察定向增发新股的定价效率以及定向增发收益背后的经济逻辑，并采用随机前沿分析法对2007—2017年间获得政府补助且实施定向增发新股的沪深A 股上市公司进行实证分析。结果发现：定向增发新股发行存在溢价现象，新股上市后也存在溢价现象，政府补助加剧了溢价程度，进而导致定价效率降低，且在国有企业中更严重；发行定价泡沫越严重，定向增发收益越高，同时政府补助对定向增发收益能产生积极影响，且在国有企业中更显著。路径检验结果发现：政府补助作用于定向增发收益可能依赖盈余管理、自主创新以及个股成长这三条路径。上述结果表明，政府补助可能被异化为操纵股价的隐形工具，导致政府补助效果“事与愿违”。     

Time-consistent subsidies to unlucky firms

This paper examines government subsidies that prevent unlucky firms from going out of business. Subsidies can save jobs and prevent an increase in unemployment insurance expenditures, but they modify the incentives of the firms to exert adequate effort. If firms expect to obtain help, they may not undertake enough effort to decrease the probability of needing help. The cost-minimizing government must therefore trade off the savings in unemployment insurance expenditures against the increased bill in subsidies to the firms. The analysis shows that this trade-off is significantly affected by the level of commitment of the government; if the government cannot commit to a future subsidy policy, the level of subsidies will be unambiguously higher, the level of effort by the firms lower, and the number of firms making losses higher than if the government could so commit.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets

This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.     

A utility-based analysis of the wage subsidy program

Because the poverty line is usually defined in terms of income, two families may be classified as having poverty-level incomes even though their hours of work and, therefore, their utilities may be very different. This paper compares a government income support program that defines the poverty line in terms of utility with several other support programs that define the poverty line in terms of income. Through the use of the wage solution of the indirect utility function, we find the amount of wage subsidy required to raise a subpoverty-line family to the poverty line as defined by the utility function. This subsidy is compared with wage subsidies based on directly observable quantities such as income.