总经理继任对创新可持续性的影响——兼论产品市场竞争与期望绩效反馈效果的调节效应

创新活动具有较高调整成本,因而保证创新可持续性对中国企业发展意义重大。以2006-2014年A股制造业上市公司为样本,分析了总经理继任对创新可持续性的影响,并考虑了产品市场竞争和期望绩效反馈的情境效应。实证结果显示:总经理继任对创新可持续性具有负向影响;产品市场竞争越激烈,总经理继任对创新可持续性的负向作用越强;当企业实际绩效低于期望绩效时,产品市场竞争的负向调节作用更为显著;然而,在实际绩效高于期望绩效的情况下,产品市场竞争的负向调节作用被减弱。     

地区市场异质性、研发投入对企业创新绩效的影响

基于规模以上制造业企业面板数据,利用面板数据固定效应模型,分析研发投入、地区市场异质性对企业创新绩效的影响,以及地区市场异质性在研发投入影响企业创新绩效上的调节作用。结果表明,研发投入对企业创新绩效有显著正向影响,地区市场规模对企业创新绩效有显著负向影响,地区市场竞争程度对企业创新绩效也有显著负向影响;地区市场规模在研发投入对创新绩效的影响关系上有显著负向调节作用,地区市场竞争程度也有显著负向调节作用。     

知己彼，方谋合：创新绩效反馈对企业研发合作的影响

绩效反馈在企业行为决策中发挥重要作用。基于2010—2020年中国A股计算机、通信和其它电子设备制造业上市公司样本数据,探讨创新绩效反馈(以创新结果测度的细化绩效反馈)对企业研发合作的影响,以及企业研发强度对两者关系的调节作用,进一步比较上述影响在不同性质企业(国有企业与非国有企业、家族企业与非家族企业)中的异同。结果发现：历史、行业创新绩效期望落差对企业研发合作具有负向影响,历史、行业创新绩效期望顺差对企业研发合作具有正向影响。企业研发强度正向调节历史、行业创新绩效期望落差与企业研发合作间的负相关关系,正向调节历史、行业创新绩效期望顺差与企业研发合作间的正相关关系。在拓展性分析中,与非国有企业相比,国有企业创新绩效期望顺差对研发合作的正向影响更显著,其落差的负向影响也更显著。与非家族企业相比,家族企业创新绩效期望顺差对研发合作广度的正向影响更显著,对研发合作深度的影响较小;家族企业创新绩效期望落差对研发合作广度的负向影响更显著,对研发合作深度的负向影响较小。结论具有明确的企业创新活动指向性,有利于丰富企业研发合作决策情景。     

经营期望落差是否促进了企业探索性创新

经营期望落差是大部分企业可能面临的问题，但这种情况能否激发企业探索性创新尚无定论。以2013—2018年A股制造业高新技术企业数据为样本，对企业经营期望落差与探索性创新关系，以及产品市场竞争和技术多样性对于二者的调节效应进行检验。实证结果表明：经营期望落差往往会抑制企业探索性创新；产品市场竞争、技术多样性在经营期望落差和探索性创新间起显著负向调节作用，即促进经营期望落差状态下企业探索性创新；产品市场竞争和技术多样性之间存在联合情境效应，相比于低强度的市场竞争，激烈的产品市场竞争更能增强技术多样性对于经营期望落差和探索性创新关系的调节作用。结论对于深入理解业绩落差与探索性创新之间的关系，探究企业创新策略选择制约因素具有一定意义。     

政府调节如何影响企业创新绩效

利用我国2006—2011年制造业上市公司数据,实证研究了企业内部、行业以及区域三维结构下,政府调节对企业创新绩效的影响。结果表明,政府出资比例对企业创新绩效具有显著正向影响,行业异质性与区域异质性对政府出资比例影响企业创新绩效具有调节作用;国家政策支持力度和行业国有化程度对政府出资比例影响企业创新绩效具有显著的负向调节作用;企业所在区域市场化程度和政府市场调控能力对政府出资比例影响企业创新绩效均具有比较显著的正向调节作用,且市场化程度对行业政策支持具有负向再调节作用,对行业国有化程度具有正向再调节作用。研究结论对于政府根据行业特质以及区域特质,有效整合直接政府调控以及间接政府调控,提高企业创新绩效具有指导意义。     

政府调节如何影响企业创新绩效——基于中国制造业上市公司面板数据的实证分析

利用我国2006—2011年制造业上市公司数据,实证研究了企业内部、行业以及区域三维结构下,政府调节对企业创新绩效的影响。结果表明,政府出资比例对企业创新绩效具有显著正向影响,行业异质性与区域异质性对政府出资比例影响企业创新绩效具有调节作用;国家政策支持力度和行业国有化程度对政府出资比例影响企业创新绩效具有显著的负向调节作用;企业所在区域市场化程度和政府市场调控能力对政府出资比例影响企业创新绩效均具有比较显著的正向调节作用,且市场化程度对行业政策支持具有负向再调节作用,对行业国有化程度具有正向再调节作用。研究结论对于政府根据行业特质以及区域特质,有效整合直接政府调控以及间接政府调控,提高企业创新绩效具有指导意义。     

开放式创新模式选择与首次创新绩效关系研究

探讨了开放式创新模式、制度合法性对企业取得首次创新成果的影响机制。结果发现,内向型与外向型模式都能促进创新绩效提升,但企业国际化程度对其具有不同程度的调节作用;国际化程度负向调节内向型与创新绩效的关系,正向调节外向型与创新绩效的关系;制度合法性距离对内向型、外向型开放式模式与创新绩效关系均具有负向调节作用。     

制度、技术及商业社会资本与新创企业创新绩效:环境动态性的调节作用

文章利用浙江省158个新创企业样本数据进行检验发现,不同类型社会资本对新创企业创新绩效具有截然不同的影响效应:技术社会资本对新创企业创新绩效有显著的正向影响,商业社会资本对创新绩效有显著的负向影响,制度社会资本对创新绩效没有显著影响。同时,技术动态性对制度、商业社会资本与新创企业创新绩效之间的关系具有显著的正向调节作用;相反,竞争强度对商业、技术社会资本与新创企业创新绩效之间的关系具有显著的负向调节作用。     

负向绩效期望差距是否促进了企业研发投入与营销投入

基于企业行为理论，以2010-2017年中国沪深A股上市企业为样本，探讨负向绩效期望差距影响企业研发投入与营销投入的机制差异，以及媒体关注度对上述关系的调节作用。结果表明，①随着实际绩效和期望目标间负向差距的扩大，企业研发投入和营销投入大幅度显著增长，且营销投入增长幅度更大；②来自行业和资本市场的负向绩效期望差距对两者的影响大于历史负向绩效期望差距的影响，且行业压力和资本市场压力对研发投入、营销投入的影响显著不同；③当绩效不佳企业受到的媒体关注度更高时，负向绩效期望差距对企业研发投入和营销投入的促进作用更强。     

企业家背景特征对科技型创业企业绩效的影响

以创新投入为中介变量、股权结构为调节变量,构建了企业家背景特征与科技型创业企业绩效之间关系的理论模型。基于254家科技型创业企业上市公司数据,采用多元回归分析方法对研究假设进行了实证检验。结果表明：企业家年龄对科技型创业企业绩效具有负向影响,教育水平、专业背景、职能背景均对科技型创业企业绩效具有正向影响;创新投入在企业家年龄、教育水平、专业背景和职能背景与科技型创业企业绩效之间具有部分中介作用;股权结构对企业家年龄与创新投入之间的关系具有正向调节作用,对职能背景与创新投入之间的关系具有负向调节作用;股权结构对企业家年龄、职能背景与科技型创业企业绩效间关系的调节作用通过创新投入的中介实现。     

Profit persistence and stock returns

This article attempts to assemble further empirical evidence on the relationship between the product and the financial market. Drawing back on work in industrial organization, we analyse the relationship between profit persistence and factor-adjusted stock returns looking at about 2000 listed US firms over the last 34 years. While the relationship between (current, lagged and unexpected) profits/earnings and returns has been extensively analysed before, to our knowledge this is the first study to look at the relationship between stock returns and profit persistence. We interpret profit persistence as a result of market competition and innovation of the firm. It is shown that firm-specific long-run profit persistence after correction for other additional economic fundamentals of the firm has a positive impact on four-factor adjusted returns and a negative impact on their volatility.     

Corporate governance structure and product market competition

This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm’s corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager’s stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager’s stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm’s product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.     

市场竞争、经理人激励与上市公司舞弊行为——来自中国证监会处罚公告的经验证据

中国上市公司控制权市场、经理人市场和经理人激励对舞弊行为影响的检验结果表明,在控制权市场竞争中只有第二大股东的制衡力量对舞弊行为起到显著的抑制作用,经理人市场的竞争程度与公司舞弊行为显著负相关,不成熟的经理人市场使得经理人的声誉机制和报酬激励机制都难以发挥抑制舞弊行为的作用。治理上市公司舞弊行为的更好路径是优化经理人的选任机制和竞争机制,而不是仅仅强化其激励。     

Can open innovation improve firm performance? An investigation of financial information in the biopharmaceutical industry

Over the past decade, open innovation has seemingly become the dominant approach for revitalising a company’s innovation process. Can open innovation improve firm performance? This study optimises the measures for open innovation based on existing literature and by considering the actual situation in China. We draw conclusions from an analysis of 516 annual reports and data from Wind of 172 biopharmaceutical companies from 2013 to 2015. Result indicates that open innovation strategies have different effects at different times: (1) Inbound open innovation has a negative impact on short-term (1–2 years) firm performance, but an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship will develop after about 3 years. (2) Outbound open innovation has a negative impact on short-term firm performance, but leaves a positive effect in the long run. Therefore, enterprises should maintain a moderate inbound open innovation level and improve the degree of outbound open innovation to improve long-term performance.     

Competition,R&D and innovation: testing the inverted-U in a simultaneous system

To address the relationship between innovation and competition we jointly estimate the opportunity, production, and impact functions of innovation in a simultaneous system. Based on Swiss micro-data, we apply a 3-SLS system estimation. The findings confirm a robust inverted-U relationship, in which a rise in the number of competitors at low levels of initial competition increases the firm’s research effort, but at a diminishing rate, and the research effort ultimately decreases at high levels of competition. When we split the sample by firm types, the inverted-U shape is steeper for creative firms than for adaptive ones. The numerical solution indicates three particular configurations of interest: (i) an uncontested monopoly with low innovation; (ii) low competition with high innovation; and (iii) a ‘no innovation trap’ at very high levels of competition. The distinction between solution (i) and (ii) corresponds to Arrow’s positive effect of competition on innovation, whereas the difference between outcomes (ii) and (iii) captures Schumpeter’s positive effect of market power on innovation. Simulating changes of the exogenous variables, technology potential, demand growth, firm size and exports have a positive impact on innovation, while foreign ownership has a negative effect, and higher appropriability has a positive impact on the number of competitors.     

Does market competition promote innovation efficiency in China’s high-tech industries?

ABSTRACT

Despite extensive discussion about the relationship between market competition and innovation performance, the impact of market competition on the innovation efficiency of high-technology industries in a transitional economy is still unclear. The article is based on panel data of 17 subsectors of China’s high-tech industry spanning the 2001–2016 period. Using stochastic the frontier analysis model, we empirically test the impact of market competition on two-stage innovation efficiency from the perspective of the industry. The results indicate that market competition and firm scale have positive and significant effects on the efficiency of two-stage innovation, the effects of industry export intensity and government intervention on R&D efficiency are negative, but the effects are different for the efficiency of the commercialisation of technology. Based on the results of the empirical analysis, this paper compares the trends and the differences between R&D efficiency and commercialisation efficiency, and then uses cluster analysis to reclassify China’s high-tech industries into three categories, thus revealing the disconnect and imbalance within China’s high-tech industries. At the end of the article, we present some possible policy recommendations.     

THE DECISION TO HIRE MANAGERS IN MIXED MARKETS UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION*

This paper analyses the decisions of firms as to whether or not to hire managers when there is a public firm competing with a private firm in the product market. It is shown that under Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods both firms hire managers. This is in contrast with the result obtained under Cournot competition, where only the private firm hires a manager. Moreover, welfare is lower if both firms hire managers than if neither firm does. In contrast, under Cournot competition welfare is greater if both firms hire managers.     

Biased managers as strategic commitment: The relative profit approach

This paper analyzes a duopolistic model wherein each firm׳s owner can hire a biased manager for strategic reasons. We focus on the situation wherein each firm׳s owner evaluates the performance of her/his manager on the basis of her/his relative profit, which is equal to the weighted sum of her/his absolute profit and the absolute profit of her/his opponent firm. We show that in both price-setting and quantity-setting competitions, the owners of the two private firms employ aggressive managers rather than absolute profit maximizing managers regardless of the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance. Furthermore, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, as the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance increases, we show that the firms׳ owners tend to hire more aggressive managers when the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance is sufficiently low, whereas in both the price competition and the quantity competition, the firms׳ owners tend to hire less aggressive managers otherwise. Thus, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, the type of each firm׳s manager is not monotone with respect to the degree of each firm׳s relative performance. Thus, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, we find that the change in the optimal type of manager hired by each firm is non-monotone against the change of competitiveness in the market with the increase in the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance.     

高技术企业多元化战略对创新持续性的影响——动态能力的调节作用

基于资源基础理论和持续创新内生机制，利用435家高技术企业2010—2018年面板数据，对多元化战略对高技术企业创新持续性的影响进行探究。结果表明，产品多元化与创新持续性呈正U型关系，技术多元化对创新持续性具有正向促进作用，产品多元化与技术多元化协同效应对创新持续性具有负向影响；动态能力强化了产品多元化与创新持续性之间的正U型关系，并正向调节技术多元化与创新持续性之间的关系。在动态能力调节作用下，高技术企业产品多元化与技术多元化协同效应对创新持续性具有正向影响。     

Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

In this paper we analyse the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on firm performance. Our results show that product market competition has a positive and significant impact on performance. Concerning the effect of ownership concentration, we find a U–shaped relationship with performance. Firms with relatively dispersed and relatively concentrated ownership have higher productivity growth than firms with an intermediate level of ownership concentration. This correlation between concentration of ownership and productivity growth is not explained by the type of the controlling shareholder. Finally, product market competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other rather than to be substitutes. Competition has no significant effect on performance for the firms with ‘poor’ governance; on the contrary, it has a significant positive effect in the case of firms with ‘good’ corporate governance. JEL classification: D24, G32, L1, P2.