Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and Equity Prices

This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value‐destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency.     

Liquidity mergers

We study the interplay between corporate liquidity and asset reallocation. Our model shows that financially distressed firms are acquired by liquid firms in their industries even in the absence of operational synergies. We call these transactions “liquidity mergers,” since their purpose is to reallocate liquidity to firms that are otherwise inefficiently terminated. We show that liquidity mergers are more likely to occur when industry-level asset-specificity is high and firm-level asset-specificity is low. We analyze firms' liquidity policies as a function of real asset reallocation, examining the trade-offs between cash and credit lines. We verify the model's prediction that liquidity mergers are more likely to occur in industries in which assets are industry-specific, but transferable across firms. We also show that firms are more likely to use credit lines (relative to cash) in industries in which liquidity mergers are more frequent.     

The Globalization Risk Premium

In this paper, we investigate how globalization is reflected in asset prices. We use shipping costs to measure firms' exposure to globalization. Firms in low shipping cost industries carry a 7% risk premium, suggesting that their cash flows covary negatively with investors' marginal utility. We find that the premium emanates from the risk of displacement of least efficient firms triggered by import competition. These findings suggest that foreign productivity shocks are associated with times when consumption is dear for investors. We discuss conditions under which a standard model of trade with asset prices can rationalize this puzzle.     

Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries

Using data on defaulted firms in the United States over the period 1982–1999, we show that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower amounts in present-value terms when the industry of defaulted firms is in distress. We investigate whether this is purely an economic-downturn effect or also a fire-sales effect along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny [1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343–1366]. We find the fire-sales effect to be also at work: Creditors recover less if the industry is in distress and non-defaulted firms in the industry are illiquid, particularly if the industry is characterized by assets that are specific, that is, not easily redeployable by other industries, and if the debt is collateralized by such specific assets. The interaction effect of industry-level distress and asset-specificity is strongest for senior unsecured creditors, is economically significant, and robust to contract-specific, firm-specific, macroeconomic, and bond-market supply effects. We also document that defaulted firms in distressed industries are more likely to emerge as restructured firms than to be acquired or liquidated, and spend longer time in bankruptcy.     

Which workers get insurance within the firm?

Industry-level time series data suggest that low-skilled workers get less insurance within the firm than high-skilled workers. In particular, wages respond relatively more to productivity shocks in low-skilled industries than high-skilled industries. Our theory is that low-skilled workers get relatively less insurance from their firms because they have relatively lower displacement costs. Under limited commitment, lower displacement costs make the workers' outside options more attractive, and hence decrease the amount of risk sharing sustainable within the firm. Evidence on average displacement costs by industry support the theory's predictions.     

The Real Determinants of Asset Sales

I develop a dynamic structural model in which a firm makes rational decisions to buy or sell assets in the presence of productivity shocks. By identifying equilibrium asset prices, the model also examines the aggregate asset sales activity over the business cycle. It shows that changes in productivity, rather than productivity levels, affect decisions: Firms with rising productivity buy assets and firms with falling productivity downsize (“rising buys falling”). As such, industries in which firms have less persistent and more volatile productivity experience greater asset reallocation. Using plant‐level data from Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), I find strong support for the model's predictions.     

DOES FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY REDUCE INVESTMENT DISTORTIONS?

The average U.S. firm has less leverage than one would expect based on the trade‐off between tax shields and bankruptcy costs. We focus on firms’ financial flexibility and examine whether firms preserve debt capacity to reduce investment distortions in the future. We find that firms with high unused debt capacity invest more in future years than do firms with low unused debt capacity. Furthermore, firms that are reluctant to borrow in unconstrained periods are more likely to issue debt in periods in which access to capital markets is more constrained.     

The big picture: The industry effect of short interest

We examine whether industry-level short interest predicts industry stock returns and find that the former is negatively associated with the latter. Furthermore, this predictive ability is more pronounced in industries with higher information asymmetry surrounding firms, suggesting that either short sellers' access to private information or their superior information processing skills are important. We also find that this predictive ability is stronger when the short-sale constraint is more binding and when the economic condition is challenging. Overall, our results imply that short sellers' collective activities convey important industry information, leading to predictable and profitable industry portfolios.     

Capital and Labor Reallocation within Firms

We document how a positive shock to investment opportunities at one plant (“treated plant”) spills over to other plants within the same firm, but only if the firm is financially constrained. To provide the treated plant with resources, the firm's headquarters withdraws capital and labor from other plants, especially plants that are relatively less productive, not part of the firm's core industries, and located far away from headquarters. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm‐wide productivity increases. We do not find evidence of capital or labor spillovers among plants of financially unconstrained firms.     

Analyst Coverage and Intangible Assets

This study examines the relation between analysts' incentives to cover firms and the extent of their intangible assets. Because intangible assets typically are unrecognized and estimates of their fair values are not disclosed, absent analyst coverage firms with more intangible assets likely have less informative prices. Accordingly, we expect analysts have greater incentives to cover firms with more intangible assets and, thus, predict they have higher analyst coverage. As predicted, we find that analyst coverage is significantly greater for firms with larger research and development and advertising expenses relative to their industry, and for firms in industries with larger research and development expense. We also predict and find that analyst coverage is increasing in firm size, growth, trading volume, equity issuance, and perceived mispricing, and is decreasing in the size of the firm's analysts' brokerage houses and the effort analysts expend to follow the firm. These findings indicate that analyst coverage depends on private benefits and costs of covering a firm. We also test hypotheses related to analyst effort. We predict and find that analysts expend greater effort to follow firms with more intangible assets, after controlling for other factors associated with analyst effort. Our evidence indicates that intangible assets, most of which are not recognized in firms' financial statements, are associated with greater incentives for analysts to cover such firms, and greater costs of coverage. An open question is whether financial statement recognition of intangible assets could more efficiently provide information about such assets to investors.     

How do firms finance their investments?: The relative importance of equity issuance and debt contracting costs

This paper examines the financing decisions of firms in response to changes in investments and profits. We find that information frictions play important roles in firms' financing decisions. However, we find no evidence that asymmetric information about the value of a firm's assets causes equity to be used only as a last resort. Indeed equity is the predominant source of finance in situations, such as profit shortfalls, investment in intangible assets, and internally generated growth opportunities, where informational asymmetries and agency costs are likely to be high. We also find that firms respond asymmetrically to positive and negative profit shocks. In financing fixed assets, high asymmetric information firms use more short-term debt and less long-term debt, whereas firms with high potential agency problems use significantly more equity and less long-term debt and cash.     

The Industry Life Cycle,Acquisitions and Investment: Does Firm Organization Matter?

We examine the effect of industry life‐cycle stages on within‐industry acquisitions and capital expenditures by conglomerates and single‐segment firms controlling for endogeneity of organizational form. We find greater differences in acquisitions than in capital expenditures, which are similar across organizational types. In particular, 36% of the growth recorded by conglomerate segments in growth industries comes from acquisitions, versus 9% for single‐segment firms. In growth industries, the effect of financial dependence on acquisitions and plant openings is mitigated for conglomerate firms. Plants acquired by conglomerate firms increase in productivity. The results suggest that organizational forms' comparative advantages differ across industry conditions.     

Formal finance and trade credit during China's transition

Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, we find that poorly performing SOEs were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged access to loans via trade credit. While that could be consistent with the efficient redistribution of credit, it is more likely that these SOEs extended trade credit to prop up faltering customers that were in arrears. By contrast, profitable private domestic firms were more likely to extend trade credit than unprofitable ones. Trade credit likely provided a substitute for loans for these firms' customers that were shut out of formal credit markets. As biases in lending become less severe, the allocation of lending became more efficient, and the amount of trade credit extended by private firms declined. Our evidence implies that redistribution of bank loans via trade was not a major contributor to China's explosive growth.     

CEO Power and Firm Performance under Pressure

Are powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) more effective in responding to pressure from the economic environment? Concentrating decision‐making power may facilitate rapid decision making; however, the quality of decision making may be compromised, with severe consequences for the firm if a powerful CEO is less likely to receive independent advice or to have her decisions scrutinized. We empirically investigate the performance of firms with powerful CEOs when industry conditions deteriorate. We focus on industry downturns as these represent an exogenous shock to a firm's environment and on settings in which CEO power and access to quality information is likely more consequential: innovative firms, firms with relatively little related‐industry board expertise, firms operating in competitive industries, and firms operating in industries characterized by relatively greater managerial discretion. In each of these settings we find powerful CEOs perform significantly worse than other CEOs, suggesting contexts in which centralized decision making is potentially of greater concern.     

Economic exposure and hysteresis: Evidence from German,Japanese, and U.S. stock returns

Real exchange rate changes reflect terms of trade changes and macroeconomic shocks in productivity, aggregate demand, and interest rates. We show that German, Japanese, and U.S. excess stock returns vary directly with changes in the real terms of trade as well as with exchange rate changes induced by the macroeconomic factors. These results suggest that economic exposure is a global phenomenon. Although German, Japanese, and U.S. firms appear to adjust costs and productivity in response to economic exposure, there are indications that firms in all three countries suffer from hysteresis, an effect persisting after the initial cause is removed.     

Do Delaware CEOs get fired?

Critics have charged that state competition in corporate law, which Delaware dominates, leads to a “race to the bottom” making management unaccountable. We argue that Delaware corporate law attracts firms with particular financial and governance characteristics. We find that Delaware attracts growth firms in industries with more takeover activity. Delaware firms have smaller boards, and their directors are paid more and serve on more boards. In addition, Delaware firms attract greater institutional ownership. We also provide a bottom-line test of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis by examining forced CEO turnover. After controlling for differences in firm characteristics, we find that firms incorporated in Delaware are more likely to terminate CEOs. We also find that that termination decision is less sensitive to poor performance. Overall, we see no clear pattern supporting the “race to the bottom” hypothesis.     

Trade Credit Use as Firms Approach Default

Using a sample of distressed firms with information about suppliers, we document an average fall in the use of trade credit as firms approach bankruptcy compared to a control sample of nonbankrupt firms. However, we uncover a large degree of heterogeneity across suppliers. Suppliers facing high switching costs maintain their business ties with the distressed firms as they approach bankruptcy, and provide them more trade credit. Suppliers in concentrated markets provide temporary support to their clients. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that switching costs are fundamental to explain whether suppliers provide liquidity to their distressed clients or not.     

Trade secrets and cyber security breaches

We study the association between firms’ disclosures in Forms 10-K of the existence of trade secrets, and cyber theft of corporate data (which we refer to as “Breaches”). Prior academic research explaining occurrence of Breaches is scarce, and no prior study has focused specifically on Breaches that likely target trade secrets. We provide such evidence, and our use of Form 10-K contents related to trade secrets is a first step toward determining whether corporations actually attract Breach activity through their public disclosures. We find that firms mentioning the existence of trade secrets have a significantly higher subsequent probability of being Breached relative to firms that do not do so. Our results are stronger among younger firms, firms with fewer employees, and firms operating in less concentrated industries. By conducting a battery of additional tests, we attempt to go beyond merely establishing correlations to provide evidence whether such proprietary information can actually attract cyber attacks. Specifically, our results are robust to additional control variables, an instrumental variable approach, firm fixed effects, and a propensity score matching technique.     

Financial Distress and Corporate Performance

This study finds that highly leveraged firms lose substantial market share to their more conservatively financed competitors in industry downturns. Specifically, firms in the top leverage decile in industries that experience output contractions see their sales decline by 26 percent more than do firms in the bottom leverage decile. A similar decline takes place in the market value of equity. These findings are consistent with the view that the indirect costs of financial distress are significant and positive. Consistent with the theory that firms with specialized products are especially vulnerable to financial distress, we find that highly leveraged firms that engage in research and development suffer the most in economically distressed periods. We also find that the adverse consequences of leverage are more pronounced in concentrated industries.     

On the employment effects of productivity shocks: The role of inventories, demand elasticity, and sticky prices

Whether technological progress raises or lowers employment in the short run has been the subject of much debate in the recent years. We show that cross-industry differences in inventory holding costs, demand elasticities, and price rigidities potentially all affect employment decisions in the face of productivity shocks. In particular, the employment response to a permanent productivity shock is more likely to be positive the less costly it is to hold inventories, the more elastic industry demand is, and the more flexible prices are. Using data on 458 4-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1958-1996, we find statistically significant effects of variations in inventory holdings and demand elasticities on short-run employment responses, but less conclusive evidence pertaining to the effects of measured price stickiness.