From paper to plastic: Understanding the impact of eWIC on WIC recipient behavior

Evidence shows that the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) is underutilized. WIC enrolls 52.7% of eligible persons and participants claim a fraction of available benefits. Researchers suggest that people underutilize WIC because of the time needed to enroll in and use WIC and because participants may believe that, if others notice them participating in WIC, community members will stigmatize them. Recently enacted policies may reduce both time costs and potential for stigma associated with WIC. Congress mandated that, by 2020, all states disburse WIC benefits through an Electronic Benefits Transfer (eWIC) system. Given that eWIC reduces the time required for each transaction and and makes it more difficult to identify beneficiaries, we expect WIC redemptions to increase. In addition, eWIC might also increase the chance WIC recipients choose non-WIC foods for redemption increasing non-WIC expenditures. To measure the impact of eWIC on WIC redemptions and non-WIC food expenditures we analyze data on grocery expenditures of 11,887 WIC-participating households in one state over the period it implemented eWIC. We find that, after beneficiaries began redeeming WIC benefits through eWIC, spending on non-WIC eligible foods did not change but redemptions of WIC benefits increased.     

Outsourcing versus joint venture from vendor’s perspective

Even though many studies have discussed outsourcing contracts from the client’s perspective, little research has been done from the vendor’s perspective. In this paper, we consider a vendor’s outsourcing contract decision-making process, during which the market price and the vendor’s operation cost are uncertain. This paper develops real option models to investigate whether a vendor firm should sign an outsourcing contract from its client or establish a joint venture with this client. Our results show that, while the feasibility of an outsourcing contract to the vendor increases with a higher contract price offered by the client, the feasibility of a joint venture depends on market conditions. We also find that there are loss-by-acceptance regions, in which either an outsourcing or a joint venture contract is currently feasible to start, but a vendor may sustain a loss by accepting such a contract.     

RETAIL GASOLINE PRICE DYNAMICS AND LOCAL MARKET POWER*

Using monthly data from the 48 contiguous states (except Nevada) for the 1988–2002 period, it is shown that retail gasoline prices respond faster to wholesale price increases than to equivalent wholesale price decreases. Moreover, markets with high average retail‐wholesale margins experience a slower adjustment and a more asymmetric response. Since gasoline is the only variable input, average margins in a state likely reflect the degree of retail market power. This suggests that sticky prices and response asymmetries in the gasoline market are, at least partially, a consequence of retail market power.     

Market regulation of voluntary add-on contracts

This paper analyzes contract choices and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies when firms can offer voluntary add-on insurance for their products. We develop a model in which a base product can be sold together with a voluntary extended warranty contract that insures consumers against the risk of product breakdown. Some consumers do not pay attention to extended warranties before making base product choices, but overestimate the value of such warranties at the point of sale. Under retail competition, the consumers’ option to buy multiple base products can endogenously create a base price floor that may prevent firms from redistributing the full warranty profits via loss-leadership. Inducing competition in the warranty market weakly increases consumer welfare and weakly outperforms a minimum warranty standard, which can even reduce consumer surplus. The results are consistent with the effects of recent changes regarding extended warranty regulation by UK legislators.     

Auctions for Split-Award Contracts

The buyer of a homogeneous input divides his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers. He uses a sequential second-price auction to award a primary and a secondary contract. With a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole-source auction. The premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost. When entry is endogenous, we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price.     

Demand for coffee in Sweden: The role of prices, preferences and market power

There is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from Third-World countries. This issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices, preferences and market power influence coffee demand in Sweden. A demand function is estimated for the period 1968–2002 and used, together with information on import prices of coffee beans, to simulate an oligopoly model. This approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level. The maximum level of market power is found to be low, but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values. Moreover, the impact of a price decrease would be small because long-run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups. Hence, a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports.     

Barriers to real-time electricity pricing: Evidence from New Zealand

This paper studies the introduction of real-time electricity pricing in the New Zealand residential retail market to understand why its market share remained below 1.25%. We use rich panel data of all retail switches between 2014 and 2018 and an unexpected wholesale price spike to study adoption and attrition. Exploiting the staggered roll-out of real-time pricing in different locations we find that attrition decreases with experience. We also find that prospective adopters are present biased. The combination of these findings explains why adoption stalled and shows that wholesale price spikes pose a serious threat to widespread adoption of real-time pricing.     

Skilled Immigration,Innovation, and the Wages of Native‐Born Americans

The paper examines the effects of skilled immigration on wages that can be credited to immigrants’ contribution to innovation. Using both individual and state‐level datasets from the United States, we find a significant and positive effect of immigration on wages that is attributable to skilled immigrants’ contribution to innovation. Our results confirm previous findings that immigrants contribute substantially to the host economy's innovation, which is a major driver of technological progress and productivity growth. When we augment the analysis to an immigration–innovation–wages nexus, the results suggest that as the share of skilled immigrants in a particular skill group increases, the wages of both natives and immigrants in that group also get a positive boost. We also identify evidence in favor of a positive spillover effect of skilled immigrants on a state's wage level of all workers, including those who do not directly contribute to innovation.     

Liquidity constraints and the formation of unbalanced contests

We analyze the effects of future liquidity constraints on contestants’ investment in a dynamic contest model. Contestants invest in two consecutive contests to win a prize in each period. The loser of the first-period contest can be liquidity-constrained in the second period due to too little remaining wealth. The winner of the first contest can reinvest the prize in the second contest. We show that future liquidity constraints mainly affect the imbalance of the contest in the future but not today. Surprisingly, larger contest prizes decrease contestants’ future investments and amplify the imbalance of future contests. However, the contest organizer can reduce this imbalance by increasing the share of the prize money in the second contest.     

我国服装零售价格影响因素的实证分析

利用我国1999—2011年的年度数据,对服装零售价格及其影响因素:服装产量、国内外需求、出厂价格、流通成本首先进行单位根检验、然后建立多元线性回归模型。结果表明:服装出厂价格是影响我国服装零售价格的最主要因素,其次是国内需求,而流通成本的影响程度并不大。     

An Empirical Study of the Effect of Brand Proliferation on Private Label – National Brand Pricing Behavior

This paper investigates the competitive pricing interaction between national brand and private label food products, focusing on the effect of brand proliferation. IRI scanner data from 1991 and 1992 for 135 food product categories and 59 geographic markets are used. Empirical findings are grouped into three categories: i) price, promotion and competitive effects, ii) brand proliferation and entry deterrence, and iii) local market effects. Results indicate that both private label and national brand reaction functions are positively sloped and asymmetric. Successful private label penetration, as measured by total private label share, lowers the average price of national brands. The paper's central finding is that the impact of brand proliferation on market pricing behavior is multi-dimensional. First, an increase in the number of brands increases the ability of national brand manufacturers to raise price. Second, the effectiveness of a brand proliferation strategy depends upon the distribution of market share. The more concentrated the brand structure, the lower the market price of national brands. Thus, the net effect of brand proliferation strategies is dependent upon not only the number of brands, but upon the actual distribution of brand shares. Finally, local market conditions play only a small role in the competitive interaction between private labels and national brands.     

LICENSE AUCTIONS WHEN WINNING BIDS ARE FINANCED THROUGH DEBT*

We study an auction where two licenses to operate on a new market are sold and winning bidders finance their bids on the debt market. Higher bids imply higher debts which affects product market competition. When debt induces firms to compete more aggressively, retail prices are lower than in a model without debt, as are auction revenues. When debt induces firms to compete less aggressively, retail prices are higher than in a model without debt, and the effect on auction revenues is ambiguous. Net firm profits are always higher than in a model without debt due to endogenous credit rationing.     

考虑损失厌恶者参与的一对多型供应链回购契约研究

本文在多个相互竞争的零售商具有损失厌恶偏好的假设下，研究了单个供应商和多个零售商组成的二级供应链的回购契约协调模型，研究发现：相互竞争的零售商之间存在唯一的一组使其期望效用最大化的最优订货量和最优零售价格组合，并进一步论证了回购参数和损失厌恶程度及销售价格之间的关系，在此基础上，通过数值分析验证了回购契约的有效性。     

Quality differentiation and firms’ choices between online and physical markets

We study firms’ choices between online and physical markets with respect to product quality and competition, and examine consequences of transparency policies on price competition and market structure. We investigate two contrasting forces. First, since consumers cannot fully inspect an online product’s quality prior to purchase, conventional wisdom and some of the literature suggest that this attracts low-quality products to the online market (a pooling effect). On the other hand, the literature on vertical product differentiation indicates that a firm with a lower-quality product may prefer to reveal its product quality in the physical market because quality differentiation helps alleviate price competition (a differentiation effect). We show that an entrant firm with product quality lower than that of the offline incumbent may choose the physical market, whereas the entrant with a quality higher than the incumbent’s may sell online. More generally the two contrasting forces can give rise to a wide range of product quality—from low-end to high-end—in both markets.     

Commodity price inflation, retail pass-through and market power

When commodity prices rise, wholesalers and retailers of products derived from basic commodities respond by passing along at least a portion of the price increase to consumers. In this paper we examine whether firms respond differently to positive commodity price shocks than to negative commodity price shocks; that is, whether commodity price volatility alters market power. We exploit recent volatility in food commodity prices over the period 2007-2010 to investigate how commodity price shocks translate into market power in two different vertically-structured food product industries: potatoes and fluid milk. For potatoes, we find both wholesale and retail market power decreases (increases) during periods of rising (falling) commodity prices. Moreover, price-cost margins widen a substantially greater degree in response to negative shocks than margins narrow in response to positive shocks, indicating that commodity price volatility increases market power. For fluid milk, we find that market power likewise declines during periods of rising commodity prices; however, market power does not significantly change during periods of falling commodity prices, suggesting that commodity price volatility decreases market power.     

Any Willing Provider and Negotiated Retail Pharmaceutical Prices*

Any Willing Provider (AWP) regulations require insurers to allow health care providers network membership, eliminating an insurer’s ability to commit to a limited network of providers. We study the effect of AWP on prices negotiated between insurers and providers by exploiting the introduction of a regulation targeting retail pharmacies in the state of Maine. Using insurance claim level data and across state variation in exposure to the regulation, we estimate increases in negotiated pharmaceutical prices. Our results are consistent with AWP regulations’ reducing competition by inhibiting the ability of insurers to move demand across competing pharmacies.     

Market Share and Price Setting Behavior for Private Labels and National Brands

In this paper, we focus on the nature of demand and competitive response in the market for private label and national branded grocery products. Specifically,we employ less restrictive functional forms than usedin prior research. Specifically, we incorporateLA/AIDS demands and the corresponding price reactionequations to estimate consumer price sensitivities andsupply side price strategies for national brand andprivate label products. Oligopolistic priceinterdependence is explored further by specifyingbrand share, brand Herfindahl, and a measure of thestructure of the local retail markets in the supplyside relations to evaluate explicitly the impact ofmarket structure.In our empirical analysis, we estimate a system of market share and price equations simultaneously inorder to examine (i) the determinants of the demandresponse to pricing and promotion decisions and (ii)the determinants of private label and national brandpricing behavior. Using data for 143 food productcategories and 59 geographic markets, we develop amodel that captures the variation in privatelabel-national brand share and pricing acrosscategories and markets. Key findings include: (i)demand response to price and promotion is decidedlyasymmetric, (ii) price followship between privatelabels and national brands is positive, but notstrong, and (iii) markets characterized by highernational brand market share and higher supermarketconcentration tend to have higher prices forboth national brands and private labels.     

Proliferation of Brewers’ Brands and Price Uniformity in Canadian Beer Markets

In this paper, we study retail pricing in Canadian beer markets, where access to the liquor distribution system and the retail price list is restricted by government ownership and control of the system. We consider alternative explanations for price uniformity in the differentiated beer products market. While an analysis of retail beer price data from six Canadian provinces for a 10-year period shows that no single explanation of price uniformity strongly dominates the others, some of the results are consistent with menu cost and demand uncertainty theories of price uniformity.     

定价权约束下的经销商机会主义行为防范——转售价格维持的新解释

在电子商务和服务营销大行其道的今天,转售价格维持的经典理论依然囿于品牌内服务竞争的狭窄视野,对现实问题解释力不足。本文认为,企业采取RPM的动机,不是被动的避免销售服务市场失灵,而是更多地体现在掌握终端市场定价上。制造商掌握定价权有利于防范零售交易中机会主义行为,从而维护品牌商誉,树立消费者信心,同时也便于进取型企业积极展开市场价格竞争。     

Competition between multiple asymmetric networks: Theory and applications

This paper presents a tractable model of network competition with many firms, elastic subscriber demand, off-net price discrimination, call externalities, and cost and market share asymmetries. We characterize stability in expectations and equilibrium under firm- and market-level network effects. The model is applied to simulate the effects of termination rates, market maturity, and retail pricing strategies. We show that predictions based on duopoly models can be misleading, in particular concerning the effects of termination rates.