Multinational Production, Absorptive Capacity, and Endogenous R&D Spillovers

Do R&D spillovers have an impact on whether firms choose to go multinational or not? We present a three‐stage Cournot duopoly model, which identifies under what conditions firms choose to service a foreign market through exports or localized production. The establishment of a foreign subsidiary improves the ability to learn from foreign R&D since spillovers are strongly moderated by geographical distance. We explicitly model the concept of absorptive capacity, where gains from spillovers are determined by own R&D investments. With exogenous R&D investments, the absorptive capacity effect contributes to increase the gains from going multinational when the firm is R&D‐intensive. However, if R&D investments are endogenous, only medium‐sized absorptive capacity effects will result in firms going multinational. Furthermore, higher spillover rates do not necessarily drive down R&D and profits for the multinational firm. This stands in contrast to models that ignore absorptive capacity effects.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

Domestic R&D,Foreign Direct Investment and Welfare

This paper provides a new rationale to examine the two‐way relationship between domestic research and development (R&D) and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as their impacts on domestic welfare. Our analysis is based on the strategic interaction in cost‐reducing investment decisions between domestic firms and a foreign firm, which is different from the common factors that are discussed in the literature such as spillovers and technology sourcing. Our results are as follows. We show that domestic R&D investment may either increase or decrease the foreign firm's FDI incentives. Further, depending on the marginal cost of domestic firms, domestic R&D incentives can always increase regardless of the effects of domestic R&D investment on the foreign firm's FDI decision. Finally, we find that domestic welfare improves under domestic cost reduction if the slope of the marginal cost of domestic R&D investment is sufficiently small.     

Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms

This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximising leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures. Introducing leadership also alters previous public pricing rules resulting in prices that may be either greater than or less than marginal cost depending on the relative number of domestic firms. Furthermore, entry of a foreign firm will increase welfare only when the relative number of domestic firms is small, but that share is shown to be larger than has been indicated without leadership. Unlike previous models, the influence on public profit of a foreign acquisition is ambiguous and is related to the relative number of domestic firms. Finally, the consequences of privatisation are shown, for the first time, to depend on the relative number of domestic firms.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and International Competition: A Welfare Analysis

This paper examines the welfare implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in international markets under imperfect competition. Based on a stylized model of an import‐competing duopolistic market, we show the feasibility of moving toward tariff reductions when both domestic and foreign firms launch CSR initiatives in that their payoffs include not only individual profits, but also the benefits of consumers. For the case where the foreign exporter unilaterally adopts the consumer‐oriented CSR as a strategy, there is a rent‐shifting effect because the foreign firm's payoff increases whereas the domestic firm's profit decreases. In response, the importing country's government raises its tariff on the foreign product. If, instead, the domestic firm adopts the CSR strategy unilaterally, the rent‐shifting effect disappears and both the competing firms’ payoffs increase. We further identify the conditions under which the CSR initiatives of the firms constitute the dominant strategy, leading to a Pareto efficient outcome at which the firms’ payoffs, consumer surplus, and social welfare are at their maximum levels.     

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND U.S. R&D SUBSIDIES: A QUANTITATIVE WELFARE ANALYSIS*

In the early 1970s U.S. firms were the uncontested world leaders in R&D investment in most manufacturing sectors. Later, led by Japan and Europe, foreign firms began to challenge American R&D leadership in many sectors of the economy. This period of increasing technological competition is contemporaneous with a substantial increase in U.S. R&D subsidies. What is the effect of the observed increase in international competition on U.S. welfare? How does foreign competition affect the optimal R&D subsidy in the United States, and, consequently, how far is this from the subsidy observed in the data? This article addresses these questions in a two‐country quality ladder growth model.     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyses strategic trade policy towards a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm's leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm's leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous‐timing game, we show that a simultaneous‐move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm's leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviours between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.     

Infrastructure,Multinational Affiliate Production,and the Pattern of Trade

In a two-country general equilibrium model with endogenously determined domestic and multinational firms, it is shown that public infrastructure development can have diverging implications for horizontal multinational affiliate firm production and trade, depending on the type of infrastructure invested in. Infrastructure investments with strong productive or local transport effects (i.e. schools or local roads) lead to greater domestic firm production and exports, fewer imports, and more foreign multinational affiliate firm production in the country making the investment. On the other hand, infrastructure projects that lower international trade and transaction costs (i.e. shipping ports or airports) lead to more domestic firms in both countries, a greater volume of bilateral exports in both directions, and less multinational affiliate production. Further, the effect of different types of infrastructure investment on income and welfare of the open economies is explored.     

Imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

This paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets, where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country. The impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects. The first is an output distortion effect, which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption. The second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input. When the level of privatization increases, a decrease in final good production lowers input demand, causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase. The third is a rent‐leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm. The rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production, causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline. Without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm, the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect. With foreign ownership, however, complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent‐leaking effect. We further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes (e.g., selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm).     

THE NUMBER OF FIRMS AND THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

Incorporating home firms' lobbying in a country into a third market model of oligopoly, this paper studies how such lobbying affects the government's strategic export policy scheme. We pay special attention to the home firms' lobby formation and its effect on domestic welfare. The home firms can organize a lobby more easily when the number of their rival foreign firms is larger than that of them, and/or when the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. The strategic export policy under lobbying cannot improve the domestic welfare, which depends on the number of firms, the government's concern about political donation and the level of socially wasted lobbying costs.     

外资研发与本地高技术企业创新能力间的关系——基于技术溢出的视角

将行业对外资开放程度、内外资企业间技术差距和本地企业的技术吸收能力纳入研究框架,利用1995—2010年我国13个高技术产业子行业的数据,建立动态面板数据模型,实证分析了外资研发的技术溢出与本地企业的创新能力之间的关系。结果表明:外资研发的技术溢出对本地企业的创新能力产生显著的正向影响,但与本地企业的自主创新投入相比,其影响相对较小;较高的外资开放度和较大的技术差距都会对外资研发的技术溢出产生不利影响,但外资研发的技术溢出是否存在主要取决于本地企业的吸收能力。     

Does foreign ownership matter?

The paper both compares productivity of Russian firms that have foreign direct investments with productivity of fully domestically owned firms and analyses spillovers from foreign‐owned firms to domestic firms. Foreign firms are found to be more productive than domestic ones, but productivity of the former is negatively affected by slow progress of reforms in the regions where they operate. It is also found that there are positive spillovers from foreign‐owned firms to domestic firms in the same industry, but negative effects on domestic firms that are vertically related to foreign‐owned firms. The stock of human capital in regions where foreign firms operate is one of the factors which help domestic firms to benefit from the entry of foreign firms.     

THE IMPACT OF TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICIES ON TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND SOURCING OF CHINESE FIRMS

How do trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) policies impact the decisions of firms in technology adoption (process vs. product innovations) and sourcing (internal vs. external and foreign vs. domestic)? We use a sample of Chinese firms to address this question. China's trade and FDI policies lead to different forms of internationalization: ordinary exports, processing exports, majority FDI, and minority FDI. We find that both exporting and FDI stimulate process innovation; ordinary exports, processing exports, and FDI have strong, weak, and no effects on stimulating product innovation, respectively. Exporting firms source technologies both internally through R&D and externally from foreign and domestic sources. FDI firms have a lower tendency of internal technology development and domestic technology sourcing, but a much higher tendency of foreign technology sourcing than exporting firms. (JEL F13, F23, O32)     

How to Increase R&D in Transition Economies? Evidence from Slovenia

The recent initiative of the European Union Lisbon Agenda to increase levels of R&D investment is addressed by studying the determinants of R&D investment in one of the recent EU entrants, Slovenia. Previous empirical literature—mainly cross‐sectional in nature—has tested the demand–pull hypothesis and found that overall R&D expenses may be driven by output demand. We use a panel of more than 150 of the largest Slovene firms over the period 1996–2000, modeling firms' R&D behavior within an error‐correction framework and estimating it in a system GMM specification. While we find that sales have a significant role in inducing R&D expenditures, we also show that the availability of internal funds and wage bargaining represent important factors determining R&D expenses. Moreover, firms owned by insiders (workers and/or managers) and/or firms with dispersed ownership (small shareholders) display higher R&D investments than firms owned by privatization investment funds or by other firms.     

Trade costs, wage rates, technologies, and reverse imports

Abstract .  This paper explores the effects of transport costs, tariffs, and foreign wage rates on the domestic economy in the presence of reverse imports, with special emphasis on inter-firm cost asymmetry in an international oligopoly model. To serve the domestic market, a foreign firm produces in the foreign country, while two domestic firms produce either at home or abroad. Surprisingly, an increase in the foreign wage rate may increase the profits of a firm producing in the foreign country. Even if all firms produce in the foreign country, an increase in the foreign wage rate may improve domestic welfare.     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

FDI spillovers in new EU member states

Using an unbalanced panel of firm‐level data in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, we examine the impact of foreign firms on domestic firms’ productivity. In particular, we try to answer the following research questions: (1) Are there any spillover effects of foreign direct investments (FDI), and if so, are they positive or negative? (2) Are spillover effects more likely to occur within or across sectors? (3) Are the existence, the direction and the magnitude of spillovers conditioned by sector and firm‐specific characteristics? Our findings show that FDI spillovers exist both within and across sectors. The former arise when foreign firms operate in labour‐intensive sectors, while the latter occur when foreign firms operate in high‐tech sectors. Moreover, we find that domestic firm size conditions the exploitation of FDI spillovers even after controlling for absorptive capacity. We also detect a great deal of heterogeneity across countries consistent with the technology gap hypothesis.     

高管职位特征、机构投资者治理与企业研发投入

以沪深A股非金融类上市公司为样本，检验高管职位特征（任期、薪酬）以及机构投资者治理对企业研发投入的影响。结果发现：高管职位特征对企业研发投入有显著正向影响，高管任期越长、货币薪酬越高，企业研发动力越强、研发投入越大。然而，在机构投资者有效监督的环境下，当高管任期越长、短期货币薪酬越高时，出于研发失败风险导致未来职业声誉受损和被替换风险的考虑，高管会倾向于规避风险，反而不利于企业研发。政策意义在于：董事会和股东应当将长短任期和薪酬机制有效结合，当研发失败导致业绩下滑时审慎地对高管作出处罚，解除高管层的后顾之忧，增强高管加大研发投入的动力。     

COMPETITION‐ACCELERATING PUBLIC INVESTMENTS*

We investigate the effects of infrastructure investments that reduce transport costs. We use a spatial model of Salop (1979). It is well known that the number of firms is excessive at free‐entry equilibrium (excess entry theorem). We find that the optimal investment level exceeds the ex post cost‐minimising level because investments accelerate competition and reduce the number of entering firms; resulting in the improvement of welfare. We also show that, in cases where the excess‐entry theorem is true, the desirable policy is the one accelerating, rather than restricting, competition.     

Location Choice of Multinational and Local Firms in Vietnam: Birds of a Feather Flock Together?

Vietnam enacted the Enterprises Act in 1999, leading to a sharp increase in the number of registered enterprises. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country continued to increase in the 2000s. Thus, this paper examines the location choice of multinational and local firms in Vietnam. We adopt the mixed logit model to conduct an empirical analysis of the possible interaction of neighbouring regions and attracting FDI. Using firm‐level data for the period 2000–2005, the results show that most provincial characteristics exert similar influences on foreign and domestic entrants, except for wage rates, which exhibit an opposing effect. The agglomeration of FDI entices foreign and domestic firms to locate in the same region, whereas the agglomeration of local firms is less relevant to the location choice of all firms. The spatial interdependence effect of attracting investment is particularly relevant to local entrants. Provinces with more foreign (domestic) firms reveal a complementary (competition) effect on the attractiveness of their neighbouring provinces.