Aggregate implications of indivisible labor, incomplete markets, and labor market frictions

We study the impact of tax and transfer programs on steady-state allocations in a model with search frictions, an operative labor supply margin, and incomplete markets. In a benchmark model that has indivisible labor and incomplete markets but no trading frictions we show that the aggregate effects of taxes are identical to those in the economy with employment lotteries, though individual employment and asset dynamics can be different. The effect of frictions on the response of aggregate hours to a permanent tax change is highly nonlinear. There is considerable scope for substitution between “voluntary” and “frictional” nonemployment in some situations.     

Optimal taxation and welfare benefits with monitoring of job search

In order to investigate the interaction between tax policy, welfare benefits, the government technology for monitoring and sanctioning inadequate search, workfare, and externalities from work, we incorporate endogenous job search and involuntary unemployment into a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. In this setting, the government faces a trade-off between boosting employment of low-skilled agents and raising work effort of high-skilled workers. If sanctions for inadequate search effort can be targeted at high productivity types for whom it is socially optimal to search, the government can afford to levy higher labor taxes on marginal workers without discouraging these agents from seeking work. This allows for lower marginal taxes on work effort of agents with a job. In contrast to workfare, job externalities in the private sector raise marginal tax rates, as the government attaches more importance to boosting employment of low-skilled workers.     

Optimal taxation and redistribution in an OLG model with unemployment

This paper concerns redistribution via nonlinear income taxation in an overlapping generations model with two ability-types. We assume that the wage rates are determined by bargaining between unions and firms, meaning that the equilibrium is characterized by involuntary unemployment. We show that the policy instruments that are used to calculate the marginal labor income tax rate for each ability-type give rise to intertemporal tax base effects. In addition, since the relationship between the employment and the capital stock implies intertemporal production inefficiency at the second best optimum, imperfect competition in the labor market may itself justify capital income taxation.      

Is Prescott right? Welfare state policies and the incentives to work, learn, and retire

This paper bolsters Prescott’s (Fed. Reserve Bank Minneap. Q. Rev. 28(1):2–13, 2004) claim that high taxes are responsible for lackluster labor market performance in Continental European countries. We develop a life-cycle model with endogenous skill formation, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous retirement. Labor taxation distorts not only labor supply, but also education and retirement decisions. Actuarially unfair pensions further exacerbate labor tax distortions on retirement. Education subsidies can nevertheless cushion the adverse impact of taxation on skill formation. Feedbacks between education, labor supply, and retirement are important. The model is simulated with realistic behavioral elasticities that are consistent with microeconometric evidence. If, besides labor supply, also learning and retirement are endogenous, the uncompensated (compensated) elasticity of the tax base equals 0.46 (0.85), which is more than twice as large as the standard uncompensated (compensated) labor supply elasticity of 0.18 (0.40). Furthermore, life-cycle interactions between education, working, and retirement are quantitatively important and the interactions raise all behavioral elasticities substantially. For example, the uncompensated labor supply elasticity increases with one-half due to life-cycle interactions (to 0.26). We demonstrate that low European labor supply can be fully explained by taxation without relying on unrealistically high labor supply elasticities. Reducing labor market distortions, cutting benefit levels, lowering tax rates, and making (early) retirement actuarially more fair, therefore, boosts labor supply, delays retirement, and stimulates skill formation. In addition, high education subsidies are needed in large welfare states to offset explicit and implicit tax burdens on human capital investment.      

Environmental policy,pollution, unemployment,and endogenous growth

The paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with pollution externalities and a labor market distorted by union monopoly power and by taxes and transfers. We study the optimal second-best pollution tax and abatement policy and find that a shift toward greener preferences will tend to reduce unemployment, although it will hamper growth. We also find that greater labor-market distortions call for higher pollution tax rates. Finally, we show that a switch from quantity control of pollution combined with grandfathering of pollution rights to regulation via emission charges has the potential to raise employment, growth, and welfere without damaging the environment.     

企业所得税的劳动需求效应--基于中国工业企业面板数据的研究

本文利用1998~2013年中国工业企业数据库的221万条企业面板数据,采取静态面板模型和动态面板模型,考察了企业所得税对企业劳动需求的影响。在基于生产函数推导出企业所得税对企业劳动需求的影响机理后,以企业职工人数和企业所得税有效税率等变量构建回归模型,用工具变量集解决内生性问题。实证结果表明,降低企业所得税有效税率会增加企业劳动需求,尤其对劳动密集型企业的劳动需求影响最大。因此,为了促进就业,应进一步降低企业所得税税率,并对劳动密集型企业给予特别的企业所得税优惠待遇。     

Taxes and stabilization in contemporary macroeconomic models

The role of proportional and procyclic labor income taxes for automatic stabilization with stochastic productivity is analyzed in a contemporary macroeconomic model based on imperfect competition. The importance of short-run nominal wage rigidity for the effectiveness of progressive taxes on labor income for stabilizing output and raising household welfare is examined in a model that yields complete analytical solutions with stochastic output shocks. Increasing the procyclicity of labor income tax rates raises welfare with and without rigid nominal wages in the model economy. With fully flexible prices and wages, a positive covariance between the distortionary tax rate and productivity reduces the volatility of production and employment. This effect disappears under nominal wage rigidity, although progressive taxation can still raise welfare by reducing the distortion caused by a proportional labor tax. With rigid nominal wages and flexible consumer goods prices, payroll taxes levied at rates that rise with output can serve as automatic stabilizers. JEL Code E62 · H20     

On taxing capital income with income shifting

We examine a linear capital income tax and a nonlinear labor income tax in a two-type model where individuals live for two periods. We assume that taxes are paid only in the second period in which the agents receive both labor and capital income and may shift income from labor to capital. The two types of individuals may differ with respect to wage rate and initial resource endowments. In the absence of income shifting, endowment variation motivates a capital income tax which would not exist where there is pure wage rate variation. In the latter circumstance, income shifting would indeed establish a case for a capital income tax while adding variation in resource endowments would ambiguously affect the case. The asymmetric information case for a capital income tax must be traded off against distortionary effects not only on savings, but also on labor as an agent may earn labor income which is reported and taxed as capital income.      

A positive analysis of labor-market institutions and tax reforms

In this paper, we investigate the structure of the “Laffer curve” for taxes on labor and other factors of production, under different institutional frameworks of the labor market. Using a Cobb–Douglas production technology allows us to characterize important properties of the “Laffer curve” in terms of the wage share for a competitive labor market, the monopoly union model, the right-to-manage approach, the insider-dominated union, and efficient Nash bargains simultaneously. In this way, we are able to highlight the menu of factor tax systems, and thus of potential tax reforms available to a government, without perfect knowledge of the mechanism of the labor market. In particular, we show that the employment-maximizing tax system features a constant energy tax, while the energy mini-/maximizing tax system features a constant labor tax. We also illuminate to what extent these results must be modified if we either employ a CES production function, or if we allow for an endogenous reservation wage.     

Education policies and optimal taxation

This paper studies the design of education policies in a setting in which optimal redistributive labor taxation is available. It is usually argued that the crucial parameter to guide education policy is the complementarity of education and ability. This is true only when labor supply is fixed or when income taxes are not allowed. I show that, if labor supply is endogenous and if the government can tax income in a nonlinear way, the crucial parameter is how the education elasticity of wage changes with ability. Taking the elasticity criterion into account, education subsidies are optimal in cases in which, under the complementarity criterion, education taxes would be optimal. To do this, I use an asymmetric information setting that motivates nonlinear taxation of income and education. JEL Classification H21 · H23 · H52 · I28     

Taxes, benefits, and careers: Complete versus incomplete markets

An incomplete-market life-cycle model with indivisible labor makes career lengths and human capital accumulation respond to labor tax rates and government supplied non-employment benefits. We compare aggregate and individual outcomes in this individualistic incomplete-market model with those in a comparable collectivist representative-family model with employment lotteries and complete-insurance markets. The incomplete- and complete-market structures assign leisure to different types of individuals who are distinguished by their human capital and age. These microeconomic differences distinguish the two models in terms of how macroeconomic aggregates respond to some types of government supplied non-employment benefits, but remarkably, not to labor tax changes.     

促进我国城乡就业统筹发展的税收政策

本文从乡镇企业安置农村剩余劳动力就业的视角,客观评价了税收政策对乡镇企业就业的影响,提出了促进农村剩余劳动力就近非农就业的税收政策建议。     

Natural Resource Management and Economywide Policies in Costa Rica: A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Modeling Approach

A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to tracethe effects of government policies on Costa Rican forests inthe presence of incomplete markets. The results indicate thatcorrecting the market failure would, as expected, reduce deforestation.More interestingly, in the presence of the market failure, loweringthe tax on unskilled labor reduces deforestation because peoplegain employment in other parts of the economy. Taxation of otherproduced goods changes the incentives for deforestation. Forexample, a tax on agricultural products elevates the relativeprice of capital and shifts resources away from the capital-intensiveindustrial sector toward the agricultural and forest sectors;as a result, such a tax increases deforestation.     

Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections

Taxing internationally mobile factors of production has been dismissed as an inefficient means of raising tax revenue. This paper addresses the question of whether it is efficient to tax capital at source when labor markets and the taxation of lumpsum income suffer from imperfections. Four reasons for taxing capital are identified: (i) institutional constraints rendering any taxation of profit income infeasible; (ii) market power in the demand for labor; (iii) market power in the supply of labor if it increases with the employment of capital; (iv) unemployment benefits that are not tied to net real wages. It is argued that the case for taxing capital is not particularly strong. By reinterpreting capital as energy the results are applicable to the discussion about ecological tax reforms.     

Labor tax reform, unemployment, and search

A key obstacle to reducing payroll taxes in many industrialized and transition countries is the direct revenue loss to the government that it implies. This paper studies a simple and practical labor tax reform of reducing a payroll tax and increasing a progressive wage tax that keeps the marginal tax wedge unchanged. Such a strategy increases employment, reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, and increases public revenue as long as workers do not have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations. Moreover, welfare rises if workers’ bargaining power is sufficiently large to exceed a critical value determined by the second-best Hosios condition.      

Disappearing routine jobs: Who,how, and why?

We study the deterioration of employment in middle-wage, routine occupations in the United States in the last 35 years. The decline is primarily driven by changes in the propensity to work in routine jobs for individuals from a small set of demographic groups. These same groups account for a substantial fraction of both the increase in non-employment and employment in low-wage, non-routine manual occupations observed during the same period. We analyze a general neoclassical model of the labor market featuring endogenous participation and occupation choice. In response to an increase in automation technology, the framework embodies a tradeoff between reallocating employment across occupations and reallocation of workers towards non-employment. Quantitatively, we find that this standard model accounts for a relatively small portion of the joint decline in routine employment and associated rise in non-routine manual employment and non-employment.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

On‐the‐Job Learning and News‐Driven Business Cycles

This paper proposes a new channel of on‐the‐job learning to explain the positive comovement between consumption and employment following good news about future productivity. The new recruits can generate an additional stream of output production in all future periods, and the firm's labor demand is thus characterized by the forward‐looking property. Therefore, the firm is motivated to hire more new recruits in advance in response to good news about future productivity. Once the increase in labor demand is greater than the decrease in labor supply caused by the income effect, the coincident rise in consumption and employment can be driven by the news shock. When such a channel is paired with investment adjustment costs and the endogenous capacity utilization rate, this paper provides a plausible explanation for simultaneous booms in current consumption, investment, output, and employment to match the empirical evidence under the news shock.     

Optimal taxation and OECD labor taxes

We derive simple expressions for optimal labor taxes under different assumptions about government bond markets. We use these to examine OECD labor taxes, estimate the excess burden of taxation and assess the ability of optimal tax models to match the data.Optimal labor taxes are driven by: (i) a term reflecting Ramsey considerations which makes labor taxes vary positively with employment and (ii) a martingale component, reflecting the excess burden of tax, which shows persistent responses to shocks to the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Under complete markets (when governments can issue a full set of contingent securities) only the first factor is relevant. We find substantial evidence that incorporating incomplete markets into the optimal taxation model is critical for empirical success. However, we find strongest support for the martingale component and only weak evidence for the Ramsey component.     

Fiscal Policy and Occupational Employment Dynamics

We document substantial heterogeneity in occupational employment dynamics in response to government spending shocks in the United States. Employment rises most strongly in service, sales, and office (“pink-collar”) occupations. By contrast, employment in blue-collar occupations is hardly affected by fiscal policy. We provide evidence that occupation-specific changes in labor demand are key for understanding these findings. We develop a business-cycle model that explains the heterogeneous occupational employment dynamics as a consequence of composition effects due to heterogeneous employment changes across industries and occupation-specific within-industry employment shifts due to differences in the short-run substitutability between labor and capital services across occupations.