The impact of state ownership on share price informativeness: The case of the Split Share Structure Reform in China

This study examines the impact of state ownership on share price informativeness using the unique setting of the Split Share Structure Reform in China. This reform abolishes the trading restriction on shares held mainly by state shareholders. In doing so, it renders state shareholders' wealth more sensitive to share price movements and decreases their conflict of interests with private shareholders. This change is expected to strengthen the corporate governance incentives of state shareholders and reduce the information asymmetry in Chinese listed firms. This prediction is confirmed through empirical evidence of increased share price informativeness among firms that are more sensitive to the impact of this reform, i.e. those with more state ownership or restricted shares. These findings imply that this reform benefits the information environment and minority shareholders in the Chinese stock market.     

Shareholding structure and corporate performance of partially privatized firms: Evidence from listed Chinese companies

Equity ownership in a listed Chinese firm can have as many as five different classes: state-owned shares, legal-person (LP) shares, tradable A-shares, employee shares, and shares only available to foreign investors, a phenomenon that is unique to the Chinese equity market. In this paper, we investigate whether and how the corporate performance of listed Chinese firms is affected by their shareholding structure. The sample consists of all firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) from 1991 to 1996. It is found that firm performance is positively related to the proportion of LP shares but negatively related to the proportion of shares owned by the state. Additional analyses indicate that firm performance increases with the degree of relative dominance of LP shares over state shares. Moreover, for the subsample of firms that do not have both state and LP shares, the return on equity (ROE) of firms with LP shares but no state shares is higher than that of firms with state shares but no LP shares by 3.84%, and this difference is statistically significant. On the other hand, there is little evidence in support of a positive correlation between corporate performance and the proportion of tradable shares owned by either domestic or foreign investors. These findings suggest that the ownership structure composition and relative dominance by various classes of shareholders can affect the performance of state-owned enterprise (SOE)-transformed and listed firms.     

Controlling Shareholders’ Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Natural Experiment in China

The split share structure reform removes a significant market friction in China's capital market by allowing previously non‐tradable shares to be freely tradable at market prices. Such a reform reduces the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the former now care more about stock prices. We find that state‐owned firms, but not non‐state‐owned firms, significantly increased their tax avoidance activities after the reform. We attribute this differential effect to the dual role of the government as state‐owned firms’ controlling shareholder as well as the tax claimant. Further, this effect is more pronounced for state‐owned firms that are more likely to be influenced by the government prior to the reform. Finally, the reform reinforces a positive association between tax avoidance and firm value. Overall, our study suggests that when controlling shareholders are more concerned about stock prices, state‐owned firms engage more in tax avoidance activities to enhance firm value.     

Valuation of restricted shares by conflicting shareholders in the Split Share Structure Reform

The recent Split Share Structure Reform launched by the government in the Chinese stock market terminates trading constraints on restricted shares. In exchange for the consent of freely traded shareholders, restricted shareholders offer them consideration mainly in the form of restricted shares. We estimate the implied discount of restricted shares to be 38.22% on average, which is in line with the empirical and theoretical findings in the literature, suggesting that the consideration is not systematically underpaid and the reform is fair at the market level. At the firm level, however, freely traded shareholders receive less consideration when their bargaining power is weaker. The impact of state shareholders on the size of consideration has been found to be non-monotonic. Consistent with the literature that state shareholders exaggerate the agency problem, they tend to exploit freely traded shareholders by offering less consideration when the latter's bargaining power is weaker. Meanwhile, state shareholders are under political pressure to carry out the reform as quickly as possible and to set a good example for other firms. They therefore refrain from offering underpaid consideration when their freely traded counterparts have strong bargaining power and are more capable of rejecting unfair schemes and substantially delaying the progress of the reform.     

Equity ownership segregation, shareholder preferences, and dividend policy in China

We investigate how listed Chinese firms pay different types of dividend to satisfy shareholders, different dividend preferences shaped by institutional factors such as share tradability and asymmetrical taxation. We find that the cash dividend level is significantly and positively related to the proportion of non-publicly tradable shares and this relation is mainly driven by legal person shareholders' preferences for cash dividends. In contrast, the stock dividend level is significantly and positively associated with the proportion of publicly tradable shares. These findings provide an empirical rationale for the current reform on the segregation of equity ownership rights in China.     

Share pledges,tone of earnings communication conferences,and market reaction: evidence from China

We investigate how share pledging affects firms’ disclosures and influences investors in Chinese stock market. The tone of firm disclosures when there are shares pledged by controlling shareholders is more positive than that of firms without them. Considering tone inflation motivation and ability simultaneously, we find share pledge risk has an inverted U‐shaped relation with tone. Investors react positively to tone in short‐run windows, and firms with controlling shareholders’ pledges have higher stock returns for earnings communication conferences. We identify an inverted U‐shaped link between margin distance of controlling shareholders and stock returns for earnings communication conferences.     

定向增发新股折扣率的影响因素及其与公司短期股价关系的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文分析了影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素,并研究了中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率对公司短期股价表现的影响。本文认为,影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素与外国不同,中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的高低与股东的身份有关,向控股股东及关联投资者定向增发新股的折扣率要低于向非关联投资者定向增发新股的折扣率。并且,中国上市公司定向增发新股的折扣率越低,投资者获得的超额累积收益率越高。本文运用中国证券市场定向增发新股的数据,对影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素及中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率对公司短期股价表现的影响分别进行了实证研究,实证研究结果证明了本文理论分析的结论。     

The Effects of Firm-Level Investability Sizes on Foreign Ownership in Indonesian Public Firms

This study investigates whether foreign investors investing in Indonesian public firms are basing their holdings on investability size, given other firms’ attributes such as dividend, liquidity, leverage, profitability, firm size, growth opportunity, and inter-industry factors. The analysis on this study is conducted using multiple regression analysis on the data that consists of free-float foreign ownership share in non-financial companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange over the period 2014–2015. It is found that foreigners prefer holding stocks in larger investability and firm sizes, higher dividends, and the consumer goods industry sector. Aside from well-established firm-specific determinants of the degree of foreign ownerships in the literature that foreigner invest more in shares of large firms in a particular industry sector with higher dividends, this study also provides evidence that foreign investors require widely available shares for their investment in a foreign country. Understanding the determinants of foreign investors’ preferences may provide valuable insights for policy makers and Indonesian firms in attempts to attract foreign investment to the stock market.     

THE EFFECTS OF STOCK SPLITS ON THE OWNERSHIP MIX OF A FIRM

This paper examines the relationship between stock splits and the ownership mix of firms. Previous studies suggest that firms issue stock splits to lower their stock price into an optimal range so small investors can more easily afford to buy round lots. The results of this paper show a positive relationship between stock splits and institutional ownership but no effect on the firm's number of shareholders. Thus, the percentage of shares owned by individual investors decreases after a stock split. The inverse relationship between institutional ownership and a firm's total assets suggests that small firms use stock splits to attract attention from Wall Street.     

OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES: THE VALUE FROM BUYING SHARES AT A DISCOUNT

This article shows that share repurchase announcements create value for shareholders when the shares of the industrial firm sell at a discount from the value of the underlying assets, even when shareholders and managers share full information about the firm's prospects and the firm's operating performance is not expected to improve. The value created by capturing the discount on the repurchased shares is a function of only two variables: the percentage discount prior to the announcement and the proportion of shares to be repurchased.
For a sample of 100 companies selling below net asset value, the authors report that the excess stock returns surrounding their announcements of open market repurchases are (significantly) positively associated with the authors' estimates of the value captured from buying shares at a discount. Moreover, the stock market's response to repurchase announcements by companies that are selling at a discount is considerably more positive than to announcements by firms selling at a premium.     

Stock‐Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation

Stock‐based compensation has been viewed as an important mechanism for tying managers’ wealth to firm performance, and thus alleviating the agency conflict between the shareholders and the managers when ownership is diffused. However, in a concentrated ownership structure, controlling owners are usually the management of the firm; they can engage in self‐dealing activities to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests. Yet, outside investors may anticipate the problem and discount the share price for the entrenchment behaviors they observe. In this study, we investigate how controlling owners trade off the benefits and the costs of using stock‐based compensation. Based on a sample of Taiwanese firms, our evidence shows that stock‐based compensation is negatively related to the agency problem embedded in a concentrated ownership structure. This relationship is evident among firms with more frequent equity offerings. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that controlling owners consider the negative price effects of stock‐based compensation and trade off these costs with the benefits of expropriating minority shareholders’ interests, particularly when firms seek more external equity capital. Our results hold after controlling for selection bias and share collateral by controlling owners.     

上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度绩效的实证检验

我国上市公司终极控股股东利用对上市公司的控制权,普遍通过非公平关联交易、违规信息披露、市场操纵等方式获取控制权私人收益,非法侵害中小投资者的合法权益。从上市公司股权结构等角度,通过逻辑回归分析,分别对股权分置改革时期、后股权分置时期中国上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度的绩效进行实证检验,这为制定保护中小投资者权益的政策提供了实证依据。     

股票全流通经济影响研究进展:述评与启示

股权分置改革后上市公司股票全流通对我国资本市场产生了一系列深远影响,一方面体现为对上市公司治理、企业业绩和信息披露有直接影响,另一方面体现为解禁和减持时产生的股东行为变化和市场反应。本文分别从这两方面对相关文献进行了梳理,并进行了回顾与述评,指出已有研究中的不足,并从股改方案追加补偿承诺、控股股东的长期行为变化、高管薪酬与业绩敏感度变化趋势等方面指出了进一步研究的方向。     

股权分置改革的盈余质量效应

股权分置改革后,股价直接决定了股东的财富,持有大量非流通股的控股股东有动机操纵盈余以最大化自身的利益。国有股权转让的限制,导致国有控股股东盈余操纵动机弱于其他股东。本文研究了股权分置改革对国有控股公司和非国有控股公司盈余质量的不同影响。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,非国有上市公司向上盈余管理程度显著提高,盈余持续性显著降低;而国有上市公司的盈余管理程度和盈余持续性都没有显著变化。本文检验了股权分置改革的成效,研究结论可为投资者的投资行为提供决策支持。     

Corporate governance and market segmentation: evidence from the price difference between Chinese A and H shares

This paper empirically examines whether the price difference between Chinese A shares, which are traded in the domestic market, and their matching H shares, which are traded in the Hong Kong market, can be explained by firms’ corporate governance characteristics. We find that the A- to H-share price premiums are higher for firms in which the controlling shareholders and corporate insiders have greater potential to expropriate wealth from outside investors. This result is robust when we use a variety of corporate governance variables specific to listed Chinese companies to explain the A-share price premiums and when we control for differences between domestic and foreign investors in required returns, degree of speculative trading, liquidity, information, and demand elasticity. Our findings highlight the important role of corporate governance in explaining the price difference in segmented stock markets.     

The effect of the split share structure reform on working capital management of Chinese companies

Before the introduction of the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) of 2005, a dual stock system characterized Chinese-listed firms. The states owned non-tradable shares and private owners held tradable shares. The dual system generated agency problems because state owners enjoyed all the rights reserved for tradable shares but escaped the stock market risk faced by non-state shareholders. Because executives of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) received rewards based on the book value of assets rather than the market price of shares, they had no incentive to maximize the share price. The SSSR led to the conversion of non-tradable shares to tradable shares, with two major implications: (1) the interests of government and private owners are now more closely aligned and (2) government agents of SOEs are now rewarded and punished based on a firm's market performance. Thus, the expectation is that government agents turn their attention to improving a firm's market performance rather than its book value during the post-reform era. We examine the impact of the SSSR on Chinese firms' investments in working capital. Based on 511 manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2011, we find that the SSSR is associated with significant reductions in working capital investments during the post-reform period. The reduced investment in working capital is associated with improved market performance of these firms.     

股权分置、控制权私人收益与控股股东融资成本

本文从我国证券市场的特点和上市公司治理结构的特点出发,分析了在股权分置下和存在控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占时股权融资活动对控股股东股权价值的影响,然后对融资成本的定义进行拓展,计量出我国上市公司控股股东的股权融资成本和债务融资成本,指出控股股东的股权融资成本远远低于其债务融资成本是我国上市公司存在强烈股权融资偏好的重要原因。     

Do foreign investors improve stock price informativeness in emerging equity markets? Evidence from Vietnam

Most of previous studies on stock price informativeness tend to focus on the context of mature stock markets while this issue is more acute in emerging equity markets where regulatory and institutional structure are weak. This paper examines the relationship between foreign ownership and stock price informativeness in Vietnam stock market. We utilize a data set covering firm attributes of non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange over the period 2007–2015. Employing different estimation techniques for panel data, the empirical results indicate that foreign investors improve stock price informativeness in Vietnam stock market. The finding from this paper confirms the important role of foreign investors in emerging equity markets.     

The price impact of foreign institutional herding on large-size stocks in the Taiwan stock market

This study constructs a panel threshold regression model to explore the price impact of foreign institutional herding of firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange during January 2000 to June 2008. Our panel threshold model is constructed to explore the price impact of foreign institutional investors?? herding in the Taiwan stock market after controlling the firm size. By examining the presence of threshold effect, this study analyzes whether firm size would obviously and asymmetrically affect the explanation for the effect of changes in foreign investors?? share ownership on abnormal returns. The empirical results of this study find the significant evidence of threshold effect which divides the stocks into large-size and small-size firms. It is found that foreign institutional investors in the Taiwan stock market tend to hold large-size stocks listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. There is an apparent increase in the subsequent abnormal returns on large-size stocks bought in bulk by foreign investors. The signals of changes in share ownership initiated by foreign institutional investors would reveal further information for improving the performance of asset reallocation decisions in Taiwan. The panel threshold model constructed in this paper well describes the price impact of institutional herding yet eschews the possibly subjective data snooping issue resulting from the two-pass sorting method as proposed by previous related researches.     

Shareholder composition,share turnover,and returns in volatile markets: The case of international REITs

The shareholder composition of listed property companies has changed from the fragmented, retail ownership, to more concentrated, institutional ownership over the past decade. In this paper, we first document significant variation in the composition of the shareholder base across the world's five largest listed property markets. We then examine the relation between the composition of the shareholder base and stock market performance and share turnover during the turbulent trading days of 2008 and 2009. By directly relating the shareholder base of firms to excess returns and turnover on these volatile days, we are able to isolate the importance of shareholder composition during periods when trading behavior is most likely to vary across different types of shareholders. We find that both large block holdings and high levels of institutional ownership decrease trading volumes and moderate stock returns; however, the effects largely occur when stock prices move sharply downward. Moreover, these effects are strongest when ownership concentration and institutional ownership exceed 25 percent. We also find that the disaggregation of institutional investors into distinct categories (banks, pension funds, advisors, etc.) increases our understanding of stock trading and share price dynamics of listed property companies.