Publications and papers

America’s elementary and secondary educational system is faced with an inefficiency stemming from a basic problem associated with unobservability: moral hazard. In this case, the teacher (agent) has an incentive to exert less effort (given cost associated with more work) if the school district (principal) cannot distinguish between low student performance due to a lack of teacher effort and low student performance due low student quality (random variable). This research develops an optimal incentive scheme that guarantees the teacher a fixed payment, plus a variable payment that would be a function of teacher ‘action’ variables thereby reducing moral hazard.     

Teacher unions, teacher pay and student performance in India: A pupil fixed effects approach

This paper examines the relationship between teacher unionization, student achievement and teachers' pay using a cross-section of data from private schools in India. We use differences in student mark across subjects to identify within-pupil variation in achievement and find that union membership of the teacher is associated with reduced pupil achievement. We find no evidence this could be due to the unobservables not controlled for by this procedure. A school fixed effects equation of teacher pay shows that union membership raises pay and in this case too we find that remaining unobservables are unlikely to explain this outcome. We discuss the policy implications of the findings and show that the effectiveness of teacher credentials in improving teacher performance is linked to unionization.     

Does data matter? Statewide longitudinal data systems and student performance in the U.S.

Although many industries have benefited from advances in data-driven technology, education is making small steps in capitalizing on the huge potential of data systems. Since 2005, the U.S. Federal Government has been making large grants to help states build statewide longitudinal data systems (SLDS) with the goal of improving programme and teacher evaluation and engage in data-driven decision-making. We analyse whether the introduction of SLDSs improved student performance, measured using test scores for math and reading tests for 4th and 8th graders, as well as high school graduation rates. We find no effects of SLDSs on student performance up to 10 years from implementation. However, we find suggestive evidence that these systems may have long-run effects, emphasizing the long-run nature of educational data collection and policy analysis.     

International Differences in Student Achievement: An Economic Perspective

Abstract. International comparisons reveal large cross‐country differentials in average student performance. Although there is considerable public debate about these differences, their sources are hardly identified. Using school, teacher and student data from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the present paper attempts to explain what causes between‐country gaps in mathematics test score distributions. Following a three‐pronged strategy of micro‐level and cross‐country regressions as well as bilateral country comparisons, we show how these gaps are explained by differences in school, teacher and student characteristics, or financial resources devoted to the school system. Institutional characteristics, such as competition between schools and the composition of the faculty can also help to understand international differences in student achievement.     

Industrial actions in schools: strikes and student achievement

Many jurisdictions ban teacher strikes on the assumption that they negatively affect student achievement, but there is surprisingly little research on this question. The majority of existing studies make cross‐section comparisons of the achievement of students who do or do not experience a strike. They conclude that strikes do not have an impact. I present new estimates of this impact of strikes using an empirical strategy that controls for fixed student characteristics at the school cohort level, and a sample of industrial actions by teachers in the province of Ontario. The results indicate that teacher strikes in grades 5 or 6 have a negative, statistically significant impact on test score growth between grade 3 and grade 6. The largest impact is on math scores: 29% of the standard deviation of test scores across school/grade cohorts.     

How important are school principals in the production of student achievement?

As school leaders, principals can influence student achievement in a number of ways, such as hiring and firing of teachers, monitoring instruction and maintaining student discipline, among many others. We measure the effect of individual principals on gains in math and reading achievement between grades 4 and 7 using a value‐added framework. We estimate that a one standard deviation improvement in principal quality can boost student performance by 0.289 to 0.408 standard deviations in reading and math, while the principal at the 75th percentile improves scores by 0.170 to 0.193 relative to the median principal. Our results imply that isolating the most effective principals and allocating them accordingly between schools can have a significant positive effect on reducing achievement gaps.     

人权的正当性追问

在人权的正当性问题上,先验式人权论证、经验式人权论证和康德关于"人是目的"的哲学判断,都不具有充分的说服力。论证人权的正当性需要另辟蹊径。由于人权是一个关系性概念,人权的正当性需要从人与人的关系、从人类社会共同体的角度来阐明。尊重和保障人权是维系社会共同体存续的需要。     

面对高一新生数学教师应如何教

在＂面对高一新生数学教师应如何教＂这一问题上,教师要全面地了解初高中的教材,适时适度地补充内容;研究初中学生现有的知识基础,在教材处理上多下工夫;帮助刚刚生入高中的学生搭建好知识的阶梯,让学生不怕数学,不觉得数学难,帮助学生形成正确的数学观。     

DOES TEACHER QUALITY AFFECT STUDENT PERFORMANCE? EVIDENCE FROM AN ITALIAN UNIVERSITY

In this paper, we analyse whether the characteristics of university teaching staff matter with regard to students' performance and interest in the discipline. We use data on about 1000 students enrolled on the first-level degree course in business and economics at a medium-sized Italian university. Thanks to the random assignment of students to different teaching classes during their first year, we are able to analyse the effect that teachers with different characteristics, in terms of experience and research productivity, produce both on students' performance, measured in terms of the grades obtained at subsequent examinations, and on courses chosen. Our results suggest that teacher quality has statistically significant effects on students' grades in subsequent courses. These effects are also robust after controlling for unobserved individual characteristics. On the other hand, we find less clear evidence when relating teacher quality to student involvement with a subject. It emerges that research productivity does not produce a statistically significant effect on the probability of a student undertaking additional courses in a subject, while more experienced teachers have a negative impact. However, also this effect does not become statistically significant when we run separate regressions for different disciplines.     

高师生教师职业情感缺失与对策探讨

高师生教师职业情感缺失,这既有师范生自身的主观原因,也有客观原因。而教师职业情感是教师素养的重要构成部分,对教育工作起着极其重要的支配作用。师范学校应结合学校和学生实际,从设置教师教育课程、改革教学方式方法、阅读教育著作、组织学生活动、教师榜样作用、建设校园文化等多方面加强对师范生教师职业情感的培养。     

Reducing Teacher Moral Hazard in the U.S. Elementary and Secondary Educational System through Merit-pay: An Application of the Principal–Agency Theory

America’s elementary and secondary educational system is faced with an inefficiency stemming from a basic problem associated with unobservability: moral hazard. In this case, the teacher (agent) has an incentive to exert less effort (given cost associated with more work) if the school district (principal) cannot distinguish between low student performance due to a lack of teacher effort and low student performance due low student quality (random variable). This research develops an optimal incentive scheme that guarantees the teacher a fixed payment, plus a variable payment that would be a function of teacher ‘action’ variables thereby reducing moral hazard.

Do high grading standards affect student performance?

This paper explores the effects of high grading standards on student test performance in elementary school. While high standards have been advocated by policy-makers, business groups, and teacher unions, very little is known about their effects on outcomes. Most of the existing research on standards is theoretical, generally finding that standards have mixed effects on students. However, very little empirical work has to date been completed on this topic. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the effects of grading standards, measured at the teacher level. Using an exceptionally rich set of data including every third, fourth, and fifth grader in a large school district over four years, we match students’ test score gains and disciplinary problems to teacher-level grading standards. In models in which we control for student-level fixed effects, we find substantial evidence that higher grading standards benefit students, and that the magnitudes of these effects depend on the match between the student and the classroom. While dynamic selection and mean reversion complicate the estimated effects of grading standards, they tend to lead to understated effects of standards.     

The effects of cognitive ability and high school quality on college entry decisions: nonparametric estimation of parameters of interest

The decisions to attend college are analysed and nonparametric predictions compared to those obtained from the widely used logit model. The impacts of measured cognitive ability and proxies for high school quality on the decisions to attend college are examined for a sample of white and black males and females from the USA. Two different parameters of interest which isolate the effects of ability and high school quality on college entry decisions are described and estimated by ‘integrating out’ the effect of other covariates. It is found that measured cognitive ability is an extremely important determinant of college entry for all race and gender groups. At the same point in the ability distribution, blacks are more likely to select into college than whites, and females more likely than males of the same racial group. Proxies for high school quality such as teacher education, student teacher ratios, school enrolment and library size are shown to have little or no effects on the likelihood of college entry for all race and gender groups. Further, predictions obtained from the flexible nonparametric analysis are found to be quite similar to those obtained from the logit model, suggesting that simpler fully parametric binary choice models perform quite well as modelling college entry decisions.     

Individual teacher incentives and student performance

This paper is the first to systematically document the relationship between individual teacher performance incentives and student achievement using the United States data. We combine data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey on schools, students, and their families with our own survey conducted in 2000 regarding the use of teacher incentives. This survey on teacher incentives has unique data on frequency and magnitude of merit raises and bonuses, teacher evaluation, and teacher termination. We find that test scores are higher in schools that offer individual financial incentives for good performance. Moreover, the estimated relationship between the presence of merit pay in teacher compensation and student test scores is strongest in schools that may have the least parental oversight. The association between teacher incentives and student performance could be due to better schools adopting teacher incentives or to teacher incentives eliciting more effort from teachers; it is impossible to rule out the former explanation with our cross sectional data.     

A Statewide Assessment of Precollege Economic Understanding and DEEP

Effects of various student, teacher, and school system characteristics on levels of student economic understanding and learning during the 1982–83 school year are estimated using a stratified random sample of schools from around the state of Indiana. Particular attention is paid to a binary variable indicating which schools are participating in the Developmental Economic Education Program (DEEP).     

How and Why Has Teacher Quality Changed in Australia?

International research suggests that differences in teacher performance can explain a large portion of student achievement. Yet little is known about how the quality of the Australian teaching profession has changed over time. Using consistent data on the academic aptitude of new teachers, we compare those who have entered the teaching profession in Australia over the past two decades. We find that the aptitude of new teachers has fallen considerably. Between 1983 and 2003, the average percentile rank of those entering teacher education fell from 74 to 61, while the average rank of new teachers fell from 70 to 62. We find that two factors account for much of the decline: a fall in average teacher pay (relative to other occupations) and a rise in pay differentials in non‐teaching occupations.     

Test scores,educational opportunities,and individual choice

A model combining student preferences for college with university admissions decisions is estimated to provide information on the role of test scores in the determination of post-secondary educational opportunities in the U.S. In contrast to implications of much of the recent criticism of tests and their use, we find that scholastic aptitude test scores are more strongly related to student application and choice of college ‘quality’ than to college admissions decisions. In addition, although there is a substantial correlation between test scores and high school performance, we find that both post-secondary school preferences and ultimate opportunities are related as much to performance in high school as to test scores themselves. Although SAT scores certainly exclude some persons from schools, our findings indicate that they do not represent an overriding constraint on the college opportunities of high school graduates.     

How accountability pressure on failing schools affects student achievement

Although an emerging body of evidence has shown that the threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run, the extent to which these test score improvements are due to schools' manipulation of the accountability system has remained uncertain. In this paper, I provide two new strands of evidence to evaluate the relative importance of educational reforms and gaming behavior in generating test score gains by threatened schools. First, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits Florida's system of imposing sanction threats on the basis of a cutoff level of performance, I estimate medium-run effects on student test scores from having attended a threatened elementary school. Threat-induced math improvements from elementary school largely persist at least through the first 1 to 2 years of middle school, while evidence for persistence of reading improvements is less consistent. Second, I analyze the effects of sanction threats on various features of educational production, and I find that sanction threats raise school spending on instructional technology, curricular development, and teacher training. Both strands of evidence are consistent with a predominant role for educational reforms in generating test score gains by threatened schools.     

Incentives and teacher effort

Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of how much students learn in school, and how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of lively policy debate in both rich and poor countries. This paper examines how teacher incentives, both pecuniary and non‐pecuniary, correlate with teacher effort. Using school survey data from Lao PDR, we estimate measures of teacher effort, including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring outside of class hours, which are not the typical measures used in previous research. Estimation results fit well under the standard labour supply framework and indicate that greater teacher effort is associated with non‐pecuniary incentives such as more teacher autonomy over teaching materials and monitoring as measured by the existence of an active parent – teacher association and the ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, this paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous OLS‐probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision.     

Student demographics,school working conditions,and teacher mobility

I analyse how the inclusion of working condition data influences the estimated marginal effects of student demographics on teacher mobility. Using detailed administrative data on public schools, combined with unique data describing teachers’ perceptions of working conditions, I estimate a model characterizing the multinomial outcomes of teachers choosing to work at different schools. By comparing the estimated marginal effects of student characteristics with and without incorporating detailed working conditions, I find that excluding these additional data results in overestimating the effect of student characteristics on the probability a teacher moves to a different school, but has no influence on estimated effects for the probability of leaving teaching altogether.