Reducing Teacher Moral Hazard in the U.S. Elementary and Secondary Educational System through Merit-pay: An Application of the Principal–Agency Theory

America’s elementary and secondary educational system is faced with an inefficiency stemming from a basic problem associated with unobservability: moral hazard. In this case, the teacher (agent) has an incentive to exert less effort (given cost associated with more work) if the school district (principal) cannot distinguish between low student performance due to a lack of teacher effort and low student performance due low student quality (random variable). This research develops an optimal incentive scheme that guarantees the teacher a fixed payment, plus a variable payment that would be a function of teacher ‘action’ variables thereby reducing moral hazard.

义务教育学校绩效工资改革的经济学分析——基于委托—代理理论的分析框架

本文利用委托—代理理论,对义务教育学校绩效工资改革中教师行为和地方政府行为分别进行了分析。研究发现,绩效工资的最优设计是,工资函数中包含一个固定支付和一个可变支付,这样可以有效减少教师的道德风险行为;如果地方政府掌握了关于教师绩效方面较多的信息,并且改革的政治成本和管理成本较小时,将有利于绩效工资改革的推行。     

数量柔性契约下服务供应链的激励机制研究

本文研究了数量柔性契约下服务供应链的最优激励机制问题。运用连续工作表现的道德风险模型,构建了服务供应链激励模型,得出最优的激励转移支付,并详细分析了数量柔性契约下供应商需要努力的必要性条件、不同激励程度的机制设计以及不同谈判力要求下的激励机制控制等。研究认为:①在数量柔性契约中,只有特定需求分布的服务供应链才能提供有效的供应商激励机制;②最优激励机制存在一个震荡间断点;③可通过改变参数来调整激励程度并调整成员间的利润分配。     

Moral hazard,insurance claims,and repeated insurance contracts

Abstract The paper develops a simple model of repeated automobile insurance contracts, providing a framework for analyzing changes in aggregate insurance data in periods of changes that affect driver incentives. Experience rating of premiums gives drivers an incentive to exert effort to avoid accidents (ex ante moral hazard), and an incentive to hide accidents (ex post moral hazard). The empirical analysis, using data from the competitive insurance markets in Ontario and Alberta over a period of major legislative changes in Ontario, suggests that much of the recent decline in accidents in Ontario was due to an increased incentive to hide accidents.     

二级供应链中代理人的甄别与激励研究

文章分析了由一个制造商与一个分销商所组成的二级供应链中,既存在契约签订之前的逆向选择问题又存在契约签订之后的道德风险问题这一情况下,制造商对分销商的类型甄别及努力激励的机制设计问题。主要得到以下结论：①制造商可以通过努力收益分享的方式激励销售商投入最优的努力水平,进而规避道德风险行为。②制造商通过设计一组激励相容机制可以达到甄别分销商类型的目的,但必须支付给高销售能力分销商一定的租金。③高销售能力分销商的销量水平不存在扭曲,而低销售能力分销商的销量水平向下扭曲,其原因在于制造商降低给低销售能力分销商规定的销量就能够降低支付给高销售能力分销商的信息租金。文章从供应链中逆向选择与道德风险共存的角度对供应链委托代理关系进行研究,得出结论为供应链中的委托代理双方提供了一定的决策依据。     

The effects of pay regulation when agents are loss averse

This article analyses the effects of a regulatory cap on executive pay when the agent is loss averse. I use a principal–agent model with moral hazard in which a principal and an agent bargain over an incentive contract. I show that even a non-binding cap on the agent’s payments can have consequences for the bargained outcome and consequently for the effort the agent exerts.     

Resources and Student Achievement—Evidence from a Swedish Policy Reform*

A policy change is used to estimate the effect of teacher density on student performance. We find that an increase in teacher density has a positive effect on student achievement. The baseline estimate—obtained by using the grade‐point average as the outcome variable—implies that resource increases corresponding to the class‐size reduction in the STAR experiment (a reduction of seven students) improves performance by 2.6 percentile ranks (or 0.08 standard deviations). When we used test‐score data for men, potentially a more objective measure of student performance, the effect of resources appears to be twice as large.     

Teacher unions, teacher pay and student performance in India: A pupil fixed effects approach

This paper examines the relationship between teacher unionization, student achievement and teachers' pay using a cross-section of data from private schools in India. We use differences in student mark across subjects to identify within-pupil variation in achievement and find that union membership of the teacher is associated with reduced pupil achievement. We find no evidence this could be due to the unobservables not controlled for by this procedure. A school fixed effects equation of teacher pay shows that union membership raises pay and in this case too we find that remaining unobservables are unlikely to explain this outcome. We discuss the policy implications of the findings and show that the effectiveness of teacher credentials in improving teacher performance is linked to unionization.     

Progressive Taxation, Moral Hazard, and Entrepreneurship

This paper considers the general equilibrium and welfare effects of a linear progressive income tax with entrepreneurship and moral hazard. A competitive intermediation sector diversifies risk associated with entrepreneurial activity, but full risk consolidation is prevented by moral hazard. Since effort is not observable, risk bearing of entrepreneurs is required for incentive reasons. The extent of risk consolidation is endogenously explained. We find that a nonredistributive tax is neutral. A progressive tax always impairs entrepreneurship while the effect on welfare can be positive or zero, depending on the specification of moral hazard. Some results may also depend on the concrete formulation of preferences.     

Wealth Effects, Incentives, and Productivity

Comparative static effects of varying the wealth level of a risk-averse agent in a moral hazard setting with limited liability constraints are investigated. There are two principal opposing effects of increasing wealth: the incentive effect, which allows stronger punishments for poor performance, thereby encouraging higher effort; and the preference effect, which reduces the agent's effort incentives owing to income effects in the demand for leisure. It is shown that optimal effort levels are initially constant, subsequently increasing and eventually decreasing in wealth. Hence agents with intermediate wealth levels are the most productive.     

努力不足、过度冒险与金融高管薪酬激励

次贷危机后人们普遍将金融高管薪酬激励不当视为引起危机的重要原因之一,并提出了相应的薪酬改革原则和方案,那么如何理解金融高管薪酬激励的特点及这些改革举措呢?本文依据金融中介的基本职能(通过收集信息和积极监督进行资产组合投资)和(投机性)金融资产的泡沫特性,认为金融高管的薪酬激励需要同时考虑诱导努力和风险控制,当面临经理可以同时控制努力水平和资产选择的双重道德风险时,由于资产选择对努力的替代效应,线性激励会导致无关性结果即激励强度与努力水平无关,造成努力不足,而投机性资产的泡沫性进一步强化了这种效应,并诱发经理的过度冒险行为,即使存在良好治理的董事会时也是如此。各种薪酬改革措施和监管政策讨论需要同时解决努力不足和过度冒险这两个基本问题。     

Trade liberalization, heterogeneous firms and the soft budget constraint

We analyze the interaction between the soft budget constraint (SBC) and international trade by placing Segal’s (1998) SBC model within Melitz’s (2003) framework of international trade with heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms. As in Segal’s model, SBC may result in moral hazard. The opening to international trade adds another sort of inefficiency. Some firms that would have become exporters in the absence of SBC choose to apply low effort and not export in order to extract a subsidy from the government. This effect takes place when the trade costs are sufficiently low. Overall, however, trade liberalization reduces inefficiencies generated by SBC. The number of firms subject to moral hazard SBC decreases, aggregate effort level increases and aggregate profits lost due to SBC-induced sub-optimal effort decline as trade costs decrease.     

Incentives and the structure of teams

This paper studies the relationship between moral hazard and the matching structure of teams. We show that team incentive problems may generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities in the production technology. Second, we analyze how complementarity in the underlying technology affects the matching predictions arising due to moral hazard. We find that (i) even when the production technology is strongly complementary, the incentive problem may lead to formation of negatively sorted teams; (ii) as the degree of complementarity increases, the optimal matching structure may switch from positive to negative, solely due to the need to provide incentives.     

商业医疗保险中垄断型定点医院的动态激励机制设计

定点医院道德风险的控制问题以及对定点医院激励机制的设计问题是我国乃至全球医疗保险风险管控过程中的大难题.针对这一问题,利用委托代理理论的分析思路和数理方法,建立了一个以赔付率作为内生变量的动态激励机制模型;得出了一个具有可行性的激励合同;然后,通过引入另一个可观测变量在赔付率较高的情形下和在赔付率较合理的情形下分别对该合同做了改进;同时也给出了一套适宜于垄断型医疗服务市场的激励机制的设计方法.     

Individual teacher incentives and student performance

This paper is the first to systematically document the relationship between individual teacher performance incentives and student achievement using the United States data. We combine data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey on schools, students, and their families with our own survey conducted in 2000 regarding the use of teacher incentives. This survey on teacher incentives has unique data on frequency and magnitude of merit raises and bonuses, teacher evaluation, and teacher termination. We find that test scores are higher in schools that offer individual financial incentives for good performance. Moreover, the estimated relationship between the presence of merit pay in teacher compensation and student test scores is strongest in schools that may have the least parental oversight. The association between teacher incentives and student performance could be due to better schools adopting teacher incentives or to teacher incentives eliciting more effort from teachers; it is impossible to rule out the former explanation with our cross sectional data.     

团队生产、集体声誉和分享规则

集体行动问题是契约与组织理论关注的核心主题,而"搭便车"或团队道德风险的存在使得这一问题难以得到令人满意的解决方案.本文为解决团队内部的道德风险难题提供了一种新的思路:一个团队为了向市场显示对自己有利的产出信号,会提供高于静态博弈的联合努力水平,从而形成一种集体声誉.这种集体声誉可以用于补贴团队内部由于"搭便车"造成的效率损失,从而缓解"预算平衡约束"和"激励相容约束"之间的矛盾.本文的分析表明,当集体声誉租金足够大时,通过适当的内部分享规则或者产权安排,不同类型的团队组合均可能实现一定程度的合作,从而缓解"搭便车"问题.     

On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach

We study the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach or other common structure. We present sufficient conditions under which the shadow value of simultaneously tightening the minimum payment and individual rationality constraints has a simple and intuitive expression. We then show how this expression can be used to perform comparative statics exercises in which we study (i) the effect of a change in the agent?s wealth on the well-being of the principal; and (ii) the effects of the outside option and minimum payment on the effort level optimally implemented.     

Taxation of uncertain business profits,private risk markets and optimal allocation of risk

In this paper we explore what happens if the government bears some of the risk through a profit tax when the risk sharing in the venture capital market is incomplete due to non-observability of effort and moral hazard. If the external equity investors can enforce exclusive contracts with the entrepreneurs, the risk relief through a profit tax will lead to too much insurance and too low effort as compared with a second best optimal solution. Bond and Devereux [Bond, S.R. and Devereux, M.P. (1995). On the design of a neutral business tax under uncertainty. Journal of Public economics, 58, 57–71.] show that a proportional profit tax would be neutral in the absence of moral hazard. In the presence of moral hazard we demonstrate that the tax may affect the risk shifting through the market, in which case the premise for the neutrality result will no longer hold.     

Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas

The implementation of nature conservation policy is often based on contracts between public authorities and landowners. In this article, we model incentive contracts in forest areas in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard when the conservation outcome is uncertain ex ante but observable ex post. The results show that agents who are likely to achieve a higher level of conservation should be offered a contract where transfers depend on the final outcome, with a bonus for a high ecological level of the forest. When conservation measures are correlated with forest management, we show that the contractual measures involve distorted transfers. We analyse the payment mechanisms used in France and Denmark in the context of the Natura 2000 policy. These mechanisms result in overcompensation and under-performance since they do not take the problem of moral hazard and natural variability into account.     

我国基本医疗保险制度的激励与监督机制——基于道德风险的分析

逐步在我国建立公平有效的基本医疗保障制度是当前医疗体制改革的首要目标.几年来,尽管我国在这方面取得了一定成绩,但为了防范广泛存在的道德风险,政府的不恰当措施却导致我国在医疗保险体制上出现了诸如门诊负担沉重、报销水平偏低、医疗成本控制过严和医疗保险基金挪用等严重问题.如何解决这些问题是本文研究的关键.我们从分析基本医疗保险的性质出发,集中论述了由共用资源和委托代理关系所引发的道德风险以及政府所面临的两难困境.最后,我们提出了相应的政策建议:政府应在放宽对参保人和医疗机构限制的基础上,通过构建合理的激励与监督机制来健全基本医疗保险体系.