“Big Bang” Accounting Reforms in Japan: Financial Analyst Earnings Forecast Accuracy Declines as the Japanese Government Mandates Japanese Corporations to Adopt International Accounting Standards

The mandated adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS) for Japanese corporations did not result in improved earnings that forecast predictability. These findings contradict the research findings of Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001). Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas’ (2003) research findings support the need for mandating the adoption of IAS. They found that Japanese managers were “manipulating” reported earnings by managing the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. Adoption of IAS decreases the availability of this practice and it was and is expected to increase disclosure and transparency. Increased disclosure and transparency are expected to decrease financial analyst forecast errors, which did not decrease for 139 firms examined in this study for the timeframe of 1999–2002. This research finding does not support the idea that adoption of IAS improves financial information used in decision making relative to forecasting earnings. Assuming that increased predictability indicates higher quality reported earnings and enhanced usefulness of financial information, the mandated adoption of IAS did not result in these. Assuming that adoption of IAS in Japan increased the level of transparency and disclosure by Japanese firms, which made it harder for Japanese firms to manage their earnings in order to meet the managerial earnings forecasts that these firms must make. Thus, after the adoption of IAS in Japan, forecast errors for managerial forecasts of earnings increased. This evidence is new to the literature.     

Optimistic bias in management forecasts by Japanese firms to avoid forecasting losses

Listed firms in Japan are effectively compelled to report management forecasts of sales, ordinary income, and net income along with actual earnings and sales each year. Prior studies report that Japanese managers tend to announce optimistic forecasts of earnings. We show that a large part (61.6%) of the overall optimistic bias in management earnings forecasts in Japan can be explained by loss forecast avoiding behavior of a small fraction (5.25%) of firms. Such behavior is caused in part by the view of the main bank and power group that the management forecast of earnings is the manager's earnings target. Our findings suggest that the Japanese stock market recognizes such loss forecast avoidance and accordingly discounts new information in management forecasts.     

Earnings Management Using Asset Sales: An International Study of Countries Allowing Noncurrent Asset Revaluation

Bartov (1993) demonstrates that US firms time asset sales to smooth income and affect debt/equity relationships. This study examines earnings management behavior through asset sales in countries that allow asset revaluation: Australia/New Zealand (ANZ) and the United Kingdom (UK). Earnings management behavior differs across these two country groups when their accounting rules differed prior to 1993, but is similar during the 1993–95 period when the UK implemented FRS 3 . The results also find that revaluer companies do not use asset sales to smooth income in ANZ nor in the UK after FRS 3 was implemented in 1993. UK revaluers (prior to FRS 3 ) and both countries' non-revaluers sell assets consistent with income smoothing.     

Asset Disposal as a Method of Real Earnings Management: Evidence from the UK

We examine asset sales as a method of real earnings management around the benchmarks of loss avoidance and last year's earnings. Evidence is reported of asset sales to boost or reduce earnings near the benchmark of last year's earnings. For the zero earnings benchmark our results are moderated by the opening balance of accruals: only firms with high levels of accruals use asset sales to boost earnings to avoid a loss and only firms with low levels of accruals use asset sales as part of a big bath. We suggest that firms with high accrual balances find it difficult to use additional income-increasing accruals but find it more convenient to write off accruals rather than sell assets to artificially reduce earnings. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are associated with reduced use of asset sales for gains and especially with reduced asset sales for losses. We ascribe this to IFRS introducing additional judgement and estimation in relation to the valuation of both long-lived and current assets on a recurring basis.     

Bank earnings management and performance reporting of comprehensive income

FASB’s ASU 2011-05 mandated that comprehensive income (CI) and other comprehensive income (OCI) be reported in performance statements (a single income statement or a separate statement of CI) rather than equity statements. Employing a difference-in-differences research design with ASU 2011-05 as the treatment, I find that presenting accounting information in different statements affects bank earnings management, specifically, presenting CI and OCI in performance statements (especially in single-statements with net income) reduces earnings management through selective sales of available-for-sale (AFS) securities in the banking industry. I also find that the influence of ASU 2011-05 is primarily on banks with high equity incentives in the CEO’s compensation package or less CEO job security. Additional analyses suggest that performance reporting of CI and OCI increases the predictive ability of realized gains and losses of AFS securities; however, banks may manage loan loss provision as a substitute strategy when they have to decrease selective sales of AFS securities.     

综合收益披露改革与管理层盈余操纵

基于综合收益列报改革契机,考察管理层盈余管理活动的新趋势和手段.结果显示:列报改革促使企业管理层大幅度增加应计盈余管理和销售异常现金流真实盈余管理活动,以达到业绩改善,弥补净利润和其他综合收益盈余信息透明度提高所带来的损失.针对以往通过出售有价证券结转损益进行盈余管理的企业,提出应加强其应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理中异常销售活动的监督.     

Incentives, Discretion, and Asset Valuation in Closed–End Mutual Funds

This paper studies earnings management using 363 closed–end mutual fund firm–years of data. Closed–end fund assets consist of unrestricted and restricted securities, and realized and unrealized income. While unrestricted securities are not subject to earnings management, restricted security values are largely discretionary. Managerial valuation of restricted securities is modeled as contingent on unrestricted returns relative to a performance benchmark. Four unrestricted performance regions are identified. Known multi–period compensation incentives become the basis for hypothesizing earnings management behaviors in the regions in the form of restricted security valuation. Across several benchmarks, the results are consistent with multi–period maximization rather than simpler single–period compensation maximization or income smoothing. Funds with extreme unrestricted performance show relatively larger income–decreasing earnings management, and funds with slightly–below benchmark returns show relatively larger income–increasing earnings management than those slightly above. These results clarify the relationship between complex earnings management behavior and managerial incentives.     

Asset sales and firm strategy: an analysis of divestitures by UK companies

This paper examines the financial causes and consequences of the decision to sell-off non-financial assets as part of a new or ongoing restructuring programme by UK non-financial companies between 1993 and 2000. We report that asset sales follow a period of declining operating returns and tend to occur in diversified companies with high levels of financial leverage. Stock prices respond positively to asset sale announcements. This arises due to improvements in operating returns and a decline in financial leverage and corporate diversification subsequent to the disposal. Our findings suggest that asset sales represent an effective operational response to a firm's poor financial condition. However, we also find that a manager's decision to sell assets is strongly influenced by the explicit threats to their control from lenders and competition from product, labour and takeover markets.     

R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds: New evidence on financing constraints and intangible investment

We examine the intersection between corporate divestitures of tangible assets and investment in intangible capital (R&D) to provide new tests for the impact financing constraints have on real activity. A positive R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds indicates binding financing constraints since cash inflows from tangible asset sales are negatively correlated with productivity shocks and not otherwise connected to intangible investment via non-financial channels. Using a variety of estimation approaches, we document a strong, positive link between cash inflows from fixed asset sales and corporate R&D investment, but only among firms most likely facing binding financing constraints. These results offer robust evidence that financing frictions impact the increasingly important yet understudied intangible corporate investments that drive innovative activity, and they highlight a previously unexplored but potentially valuable use of proceeds from fixed asset divestitures.     

Interaction between securitization gains and abnormal loan loss provisions: Credit risk retention and fair value accounting

This study investigates whether managers use asset securitization gains to substitute loan loss provision (LLP) management for earnings management, and, if so, whether the percentage of credit risk retained affects such a relationship. The literature provides evidence that managers have used securitization transactions to boost earnings. Using 2001?2014 data for a sample of bank holding companies, I find that managers use securitization gains and LLPs as partial substitutes and that earnings management from securitization gains grows at an increasing rate to substitute income increasing LLP management as the level of risk retention increases. These findings are consistent with the argument that the higher the level of risk retention, the greater the potential impact on achieving earnings targets, given banks’ exercise of discretion over securitization gains through estimation of fair value of retained interest. In addition, I document that the substitution effect between the two tools is non‐existent in the post‐SFAS 166/167 period. Taken together, the findings have timely implications for accounting standards by informing the effect of risk retention that I measure through earnings management techniques. Moreover, my findings provide additional support for improved disclosures on assets‐backed securities.     

Information in balance sheets for future stock returns: Evidence from net operating assets

In this paper, we show that the negative relation of net operating assets (NOA) with future stock returns first documented by Hirshleifer et al. (2004) applies to both net working and investing pieces of NOA, while it is mostly driven by asset NOA components. Predictability of returns is significant only for their unexpected parts (unrelated to past sales growth) and not uniform across different industries. We also find that only high (low) NOA firms with asset expansion (contraction) and weak (strong) background of profitable investments exhibit negative (positive) abnormal returns. Our evidence suggests that the NOA anomaly may be present due to a combination of opportunistic earnings management and agency related overinvestment.     

Does an item change trigger earnings management? Evidence from asset disposal income in China

We explore a unique regulatory change in 2017 in China that requires firms to move the non-current assets disposal income in the income statement from below the line of operating income to above it. We find that firms that have incentives to avoid losses conduct upward earnings management using the non-current assets disposal income after the regulatory change. We also find that this earnings management behaviour is more pronounced for firms in the growth and decline stages, and for firms with weak market competition power. In addition, such behaviour damages firm’s operating performance and innovation in the next year.     

Using Available-for-sale Securities to Smooth Earnings: Evidence from China

Utilizing a large sample of non-financial public firms in China from 2009 to 2016, we find robust evidence that non-financial firms smooth their earnings through realized gains and losses on available-for-sale (AFS) securities. This effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker internal and external corporate governance. Firms with an incentive to manipulate up their earnings are also less likely to smooth earnings through AFS securities. Moreover, firms with more accrual earnings management or real earnings management tend to smooth earnings to a greater extent through AFS securities. Firms smooth earnings only when their net income is positive or when net income is negative and the gains from AFS securities are large enough to offset negative earnings. We do not find supporting evidence for engaging in big bath earnings management through the realization of losses on AFS securities. These findings suggest that gains and losses on AFS securities allow non-financial firms to actively smooth their earnings. Last, the accounting standards amendments in 2017 that essentially disable earnings smoothing through AFS securities increase price efficiency.     

OPTIMAL CASH MANAGEMENT UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY

The cash management problem considered here is the management of a liquid assets portfolio, composed of cash and marketable securities. The policies of US corporations towards investing surplus cash as reported in published surveys are summarised and models for the management of cash and marketable securities as proposed in the literature are outlined. The optimal solution is then presented for a particular cash management problem, first introduced by Mao and Sarndal. The problem is how to manage a portfolio of cash and marketable securities in order to service a given debt schedule, where the amounts are known but the timing of the payments is uncertain.     

Voluntary disclosure of operating income

This study investigates whether New Zealand firms’ voluntary disclosure of operating income, which is also known as earnings before interest and tax, in the income statement is related to the investment opportunity set. New Zealand provides an ideal setting to examine this because New Zealand generally accepted accounting principles do not require the disclosure of operating income as an intermediate income number in arriving at net income (earnings) in the income statement. We hypothesize and find evidence that firms with high assets‐in‐place and high leverage are more likely to voluntarily disclose operating income/earnings before interest and tax. However, the assets‐in‐place finding is sensitive to alternative measures of the investment opportunity set.     

The Decision to Repurchase Debt

The authors examined the market reaction to announcements of 208 corporate offers to repurchase outstanding debt during the period 1989–1996. In most tender offers, debtholders receive either a fixed price or a fixed spread over a benchmark Treasury security, or a range of prices based on a Dutch Auction. In most cases, management cites as its main motive the desire to reduce leverage and/or interest expense. But such tender offers are also often—in fact, in 70% of cases—accompanied by consent payments intended to induce bondholders to vote to remove covenant restrictions. The authors found that tender offers are wealth‐increasing events, with positive average market reactions of almost 1.5%. But the means of funding has a major impact on the market reaction. Whereas tender offers financed with equity receive a neutral market response, those offers financed with the proceeds from asset sales are associated with equity announcement returns of 3.8%. What's more, shareholders respond positively to the removal of covenants, especially asset sale covenants, with abnormal returns averaging 11% in such cases. Before their offers, companies that tender for their debt tend to have less cash and more long‐term debt than comparable companies, and to have lower operating returns and to trade at a discount to their peers. But after the tender offer, assets increase, operating returns improve, and the tendering firms trade at a premium.     

Capital Structure and Assets: Effects of an Implicit Collateral

This paper analyses a firm's capital structure choice when assets have outside value. Valuable assets implicitly provide a collateral and increase tax shield exploitation. The key feature in this paper is asset value uncertainty, implying that it is unknown ex ante whether the equity holders ex post optimally sell the assets or re‐optimise the capital structure. Ex ante, more uncertain asset value decreases leverage, but not firm value, and selling the assets becomes less likely. Firms should tend to invest in assets whose value is less correlated to changes in earnings and, in addition, asset sales are less likely when this correlation is low.     

券商集合资产管理业务发展及监管对策探析

证券公司综合治理前资产管理业务极不规范。综合治理为券商集合资产管理业务规范发展奠定了制度基础,集合资产管理业务重获新生,得到了很大发展。本文着重分析了券商集合资产管理业务发展中存在的规模弱小、运行效率不高、产品销售存在制约、产品发行与投资主流和市场运行存在偏差、风险管理与产品创新不够等问题,提出了树立"逆周期监管"理念,放松管制,加强监管,拓展营销,鼓励券商进行业务创新等推动集合资产管理业务持续健康发展的监管对策。     

Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers

Open-end mutual funds face investor redemptions, but the sale of the underlying assets depends on asset managers’ portfolio decisions. If asset managers use cash holdings as a buffer to meet redemptions, they can mitigate fire sales of the assets. If they hoard cash in response to redemptions, they will amplify fire sales. We present a global game model of investor runs and identify conditions under which asset managers hoard cash. In an empirical investigation of bond mutual funds, we find that cash hoarding is the rule rather than the exception, and that less liquid bond funds display stronger cash hoarding.     

An analysis of factors influencing asset writedowns

This study investigates the magnitude of total asset writedowns for a random sample of Australian industrial companies. We adopt an income strategy approach in operationalising our magnitude of writedowns construct to consider the set of accounting policies and negative accruals potentially available to managers. Our focus is on the incentives for and constraints on management to make asset writedowns. We find that the magnitude of writedowns observed are associated with managers' incentives to writedown impaired assets that have declined in value, as well as the firm's capacity to absorb the financial statement effects of the writedown. The number of senior management changes found to be associated with greater writedowns in prior studies is also supported in this study when only writedowns taken to the income statement are considered. The quality of corporate governance mechanisms does not vary systematically with the magnitude of writedowns.