Buchanan on monetary constitutions

Buchanan’s reflections on monetary issues have been mostly neglected, despite their great interest both per se and for a deeper understanding of his general constitutional endeavour. We will thus propose a comprehensive assessment of Buchanan’s writings on this topic, focusing in particular on the different political models that have been developed to argue in favour of constitutional constraints on the governmental power to create money and on the implications that one can draw from our author’s monetary papers for the structure and the objectives of his constitutional discourse more generally.

Exchange and evolution

This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination, adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general “generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.      

Riker and Federalism

Forty years since its publication, William Riker’s Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (1964) remains one of the most influential volumes on the politics of federalism. However, in assessing Riker’s federal theory, scholars tend to focus on the specific hypotheses, the famous claim that the “military threat” constitutes a necessary condition for federal success, and upon rejecting the validity of that claim, by association, quickly dismiss the general theoretical argument. But Riker’s federal theory does much more for our understanding of federalism as a form of government than simply connect, rightly or not, federal success with the presence of a military threat. In the paper I argue that the most innovative feature of Riker’s analysis, defining for his contribution to the field and accountable for the emergence of new and original insights was the successful application for the first time of the principle of methodological individualism to institutional and constitutional analysis. Riker’s theory of federalism, when viewed in the context of his intellectual contribution to the studies of democratic institutions, is, indeed, the original point of departure. In the paper, I review Riker’s theory of federalism as embedded in and an integral part of his broader theory of democratic institutions, in order to highlight some of its merits that remained underappreciated until current research has generated the conceptual framework consistent with Riker’s insights. Second, I draw some implications from Riker’s theory for the contemporary challenges of federal constitutional design. For correspondence: filippov@artsci.wustl.edu JEL classification: H77, K1     

Stephen Hymer: Life and the Political Economy of Multinational Corporate Capital

This paper provides a short account of Stephen Hymer's lifeand (its link to) his contribution to the theory of the multinationalenterprise (MNE), but mainly the political economy of multinationalcorporate capital. It suggests that as concerns the theory ofthe MNE, Hymer's contribution has in effect predated most currentextant theory. His contribution to the political economy ofmultinational capital, the focus here, is less known, yet ofextraordinary insight and foresight. Hymer predates most importantdebates on what today is called ‘globalisation’and came up with analysis of the highest quality and predictionswhich in the main have stood the test of time. The chief limitationin Hymer's work stems from a tendency to emphasise the monopolyattributes of large MNEs, and the inefficiency and inequityof ‘multinational corporate capital’. In part becauseof this tendency, some of his later work involved predictionsthat did not necessarily and/or fully follow from his analyticalframework, were shaped by ‘ideology’ and were ofvarying agrees of accuracy. Despite limitations, Hymer's overallcontribution and impact fully deserves the almost ‘cult’status he has acquired in the history of economic thought andinternational business scholarship.     

Hayekian expectations: Theory and empirical applications

We show that the orderliness of market processes and outcomes, and hence the realization and coordination of individuals' plans, are dependent on the social environment in which individuals function. In specific, when atomicity and stable (social) rules are compromised in the case of Big Players, markets are less orderly despite the fact that individuals are behaving rationally.—The paper provides an account of individual rationality by generating a theory of expectations based on Hayek's cognitive theory. Hayekian expectations are coherent, competitive, and endogenous. This suggests that expectational analysis must take account of the context of constraint—the “environment” or what we call “filtering conditions”—within which individuals function and to which they must adapt. The paper provides a theoretical analysis of expectations at the individual level and shows that the particular behaviors stemming from those expectations require a specification of the rules governing social and market activities. We thank Karen Palasek, Don Boudreaux, Joe Cobb, Peter Boettke, and the participants of the Hayek 1993 Memorial Symposium in Freiburg, Germany for helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are ours.     

Competition and coordination in experimental minority games

This work presents experimental results on a coordination game in which agents must repeatedly choose between two sides, and a positive fixed payoff is assigned only to agents who pick the minoritarian side. We conduct laboratory experiments in which stationary groups of five players play the game for 100 periods, and manipulate two treatment variables: the amount of information about other players’ past choices and the salience of information regarding the game history (i.e., the length of the string of past outcomes that players can see on the screen while choosing). Our main findings can be summarized as follows: aggregate efficiency in the game is in most cases significantly higher than the level corresponding to the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, providing players with information about individual choices in the group does not improve aggregate efficiency with respect to when such information is absent. Displaying information about more rounds than just the previous one, on the other hand, seems to have a positive effect on aggregate efficiency. At the individual level, we find a stronger statistical relation between players’ current choices and their own past choices than between players’ choices and previous aggregate outcomes. In addition, the depth of the relation between present and past choices seems to be affected by the prompt availability of information about the game history. Finally, we detect evidence of a mutual co-adaptation between players’ choices over time that is partly responsible for the high level of efficiency observed.      

The theory of probability: A key element in Keynes' revolution

Keynes believed that the "general theory" would create a revolution in economics. The extent to which his prophesy was realized, in part, depends on the definition of "key elements" in the general theory itself. This paper presents one of the key elements that led Keynes to believe the general theory might indeed create such a revolution. This key element is his theory of probability. Keynes' theory of probability evolved over time and resulted in his employing two distinctly different theories of probability in the general theory—one, implicitly, the other, explicitly. The first was an objective degree of belief theory of probability that was implicitly employed in the general theory. The second was a subjective degree of belief theory of probability that Keynes explicitly developed in the general theory. A previous version of this paper was presented at the Forty-Fourth International Atlantic Economic Society Conference in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 9–12, 1997, in the session entitled, "Macroeconomic Theory and Aggregative Models."     

The multi-faceted covenant: The biblical approach to the problem of organizations,constitutions, and liberty as reflected in the thought of Johannes Althusius

Modern theories of politics have tended to emphasize either the individual or the state and have left little or no room for mediating institutions. In the postmodern epoch there has been a rediscovery of the complexity of the fabric of civil society involving more than merely the individual and the state. An appropriate systematic theory needs to be developed to accomodate this new understanding. A good starting point is that segment of political theory whose origins lie in biblical political thought. On the eve of the modern epoch at the end of the sixteenth century, an early political scientist, Johannes Althusius, developed his understanding of biblical political thought into a systematic theory of the polity, published asPolitica Methodice Digesta and in other works. Defining politics as “the art of associating men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating and conserving social life among them,” Althusius builds a politics based on communication or sharing of things, services and right (jus) through simple and private and mixed and public association including the family, the collegium, and the particular and universal public associations. His work emphasizes that all politics involves association, covenant and consent, and rejecting the idea of the reified state Althusius offers an important starting point for building a postmodern theory of political and social organization.     

Menger’s causal-realist analysis in modern economics

Carl Menger pioneered a unique theoretical research method which served as the foundation of the early Austrian school of economics. Menger’s causal-realist analysis was revived and formalized just before and after World War 2 by Ludwig von Mises as the “praxeological method.” Murray Rothbard, a student of von Mises’, utilized the method in formulating a comprehensive system of economic theory in his treatise, Man Economy, and State published in the early 1960s. Rothbard’s treatise became the foundational work for the “Austrian revival” in the 1970s. In this paper, we address several issues related to the role of Menger’s method in modern economics. First, ample evidence is adduced that von Mises and Rothbard each expressed a surprising ambivalence with respect to his own work in relation to the early Austrian school. Second, von Mises viewed Rothbard’s treatise as beginning a new epoch in economic theory. Third, contrary to the conventional view, a careful analysis of his treatise shows that Rothbard drew heavily on the contemporary neoclassical literature in developing his theoretical system and that his intent was never to set up a heterodox movement to challenge mainstream economics. Rather, his main aim was to consistently apply the praxeological method to rescue economics from what he considered the alien methodology of positivism, which was imported into economics after World War 2. Lastly, I will tentatively suggest that the term “Austrian economics” as the designation for the intellectual movement that coalesced in the early 1970s may now have outlived its usefulness. This term, which initially served an important strategic purpose in promoting the revival of the broad Mengerian tradition, may have come to obscure the meaning and importance of the praxeological research paradigm that Menger originated.     

当代新凯恩斯主义货币经济学的新发展

将垄断竞争和名义刚性假设引入MIU模型,新凯恩斯主义者建立了与AS-IS-LM模型简单线性形式相一致的一般动态均衡模型,实现了基于微观最优行为的动态一般均衡货币理论模型与适用于货币政策分析的线性宏观经济模型的统一,政策分析的重点转向政策目标和工具规则的统一.但是,在政策目标选择,通货膨胀的动态性和政策工具规则设定方面仍未达成共识.     

Cobden's stance on the currency and the political forces behind the approval of the Bank Charter Act of 1844

Contemporary scholars consider the banking legislation of the first half of the nineteenth century, to have inhibited the development of British industry, However, some doubts about this conception should have arisen due to Richard Cobden's stance on the currency question in general and on the Bank Charter Act of 1844 in particular. Cobden, who is usually viewed as a representative of industrial interests, was expected to oppose the Bank Act. However, he did not.

This paper attempts to show how can Cobden's views regarding monetary policy be reconciled with his stand as one of the most prominent leaders of industry at the time.     

The analytical preconditions for Keynes' theory of money

Evaluating Keynes' belief that the "general theory" would create a revolution in economics, depends, in part, on what defines the key elements of the general theory. This paper presents the analytical preconditions for one of these key elements, his liquidity preference theory of money. It is argued here that Keynes's liquidity preference theory of money was both a result of his own intellectual development and a theoretical necessity, given the rest of the theoretical structure of the general theory. Specifically, this paper argues that there were two analytical preconditions for the theory of money contained in the general theory. The first was Keynes' rejection of the quantity theory of money as the basis for conducting monetary policy, a theory he inherited from his English predecessors and he himself had embraced and to which he contributed earlier in his professional career. The second was his rejection of the neoclassical loanable funds theory of interest rate determination. A previous version of this paper was presented at the Forty-Sixth International Atlantic Economic Conference, Boston, MA, October 8–11, 1998.     

The Hayekian Puzzle: Spontaneous Order and the Business Cycle

In his early years, F. A. Hayek focused his research on the theory of capital and the business cycle. Later he turned to social philosophy and the theory of a spontaneous economic order. The two phases, it is argued in this paper, correspond to two basically incompatible research programs—general equilibrium theory vs. a theory of adapting, collective learning, and expectation formation. Hayek never reconsidered business cycle theory in the light of his later thought. The paper asks why and discusses what role cyclical fluctuations in aggregate economic activity may have to be play in the theory of spontaneous economic order.     

Brunner and Leijonhufvud: friends or foes?

Karl Brunner and Axel Leijonhufvud constantly pointed out the prominence of imperfect information in macroeconomic analysis. This paper argues that, despite strong oppositions related to their rival schools of thought, this emphasis on informational problems led them to adopt similar views on many theoretical and methodological issues. These issues encompass the perception of the economic agent in society, the theory of price inflexibility and unemployment, the role of relative prices, the importance of signal-extraction problems and the position within the Marshall-Walras divide.     

The “Cambridge” critique of the quantity theory of money: A note on how quantitative easing vindicates it

Through quantitative easing markets have been flooded with liquidity, but rather than inflation we have witnessed a general deflation because of the liquidity trap environment in which the banking system operated; this article revisits the arguments against the quantity theory in the “Cambridge” tradition of John Maynard Keynes, Richard Kahn, and Nicholas Kaldor, and defends their soundness and topicality.     

Endogenous uncertainty and the non-neutrality of money

Summary. We study some implications of the Theory of Rational Beliefs to monetary policy. We show that monetary policy in a Rational Beliefs environment can have an important effect on the characteristics of economic fluctuations. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria money is generically non-neutral unlike Rational Expectations Equilibria in which money is neutral and monetary policy is ineffective. Under Rational Beliefs Equilibria nominal prices and real output change not only in response to changes in the exogenous growth rate of money but also in response to changes in the state of beliefs. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria monetary shocks have real effects even when they are observed but are not fully anticipated. Furthermore, the non-neutrality of money results in a short run Phillips curve. When money “flutters, real output sputters” [8]. We show that Endogenous Uncertainty and the distribution of market beliefs are the major explanatory variables of such fluctuations. Under Rational Expectations monetary policy is ineffective because agents neutralize it by predicting correctly the effect of the policy. Under Rational Beliefs it is shown instead that inflation and recessions can be substantially aggravated by the distribution of market beliefs. Received: January 14, 2002; revised version: April 5, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Mordecai Kurz for his constant help and support. Most of the ideas developed hereby have been inspired by innumerable and fruitful discussions with him. I have also greatly benefited from helpful comments by Stanley Black, Luigi Campiglio, Carsten Nielsen and Ho-Mou Wu. I also received valuable remarks from participants at the V meeting of “The Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory” held in Ischia, Italy, on July 2-8, 2001, where an initial draft of the present work was presented.     

The individual and the market: Paul Samuelson on (homothetic) Santa Claus economics

Paul Samuelson often used the term “Santa Claus economics” for mathematical models with empirically unrealistic assumptions. I focus on one particular member of the Santa Claus family that Samuelson was very sceptical about: homothetic general equilibrium models (where all agents have identical homothetic preferences). I argue that Samuelson's concerns about these models provide insights into how he viewed the relationship between the individual and the market, a relationship that has implications for not only his economic theorising, but also his broader political–economic vision. His criticisms are also relevant to some ongoing debates within contemporary economic theory.     

不同货币理论:诸利率学派分歧之源浅探

不同学派利率理论问题的分歧，根源于其所依据的货币理论的不同。“古典”学派的实物利率理论源于其“两分法”货币理论；凯恩斯的纯货币利率理论源于其缺乏微观基础的货币经济理论；马克思以其科学的货币理论为依据，给予其资本利率理论以深刻的内涵。     

Sraffa,interdependence and demand: the Gramscian influence

The influence of Sraffa' early commitments to Gramscian Marxism on his subsequent economic analysis have been little investigated by Sraffa scholars. The discussion here argues for a philosophical connection. Specifically, it is argued that organicist ideas found their way into Sraffa's thinking about interdependence in his 1926 critique of Marshall, in his reported critique of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, and in his 1960 Production of commodities. In each instance, atomist views were challenged in an understanding of agent or sectoral interdependence that made use a single criterion for agent or sectoral autonomy: that such autonomy depends upon the fulfilment of identify conditions for the individuation of autonomous agents or sectors. It is suggested that Sraffa's thinking in this regard ses the attempted fulfilment of these conditions in neoclassical theory as self-contradictory, thus allowing the characterization of his thinking as a form of impossibility logic. This impossibility logic is contrasted to that of Arrow, in order to advance general propositions about Sraffa's understanding of demand.