Imperfect Competition, Information Heterogeneity, and Financial Contagion

This study examines how heterogeneity of private informationmay induce financial contagion. Using a model of multi-assettrading in which the three main channels of contagion throughfinancial linkages in the literature (correlated information,correlated liquidity, and portfolio rebalancing) are ruled outby construction, I show that financial contagion can still bean equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneousfundamental information. Risk-neutral speculators trade strategicallyacross many assets to mask their information advantage aboutone asset. Asymmetric sharing of information among them preventsrational market makers from learning about their individualsignals and trades with sufficient accuracy. Incorrect cross-inferenceabout terminal payoffs and contagion ensue. When used to analyzethe transmission of shocks across countries, my model suggeststhat the process of generation and disclosure of informationin emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financialcontagion (JEL D82, G14, G15).     

Competition and disclosure incentives: an empirical study of HMOs

I examine Health Maintenance Organizations' (HMOs) voluntary disclosure of product quality, which is not as complete as unraveling theories predict. After controlling for cost and demand factors, I find that HMOs use voluntary disclosure to differentiate from competitors, with lower disclosure rates in highly competitive markets. These findings are consistent with product differentiation, but challenge the intuition that competition should lead to more provision of quality information.     

Corporate risk management,product market competition,and disclosure

This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a model of market entry and shows that to prevent entry incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. In the resulting equilibrium, financial markets are well informed and entry is efficient. However, potential attempts for more transparency by additional disclosure requirements introduce a commitment device that provides incumbents with incentives to distort risk management activities thereby influencing entrant beliefs. In equilibrium, firms engage in significant risk-taking. This behavior limits entry and adversely affects the nature of competition in industries.     

Repurchasing Shares on a Second Trading Line

This paper studies a unique buyback method allowing firms toreacquire their own shares on a separate trading line whereonly the firm is allowed to buy shares. This share repurchasemethod is called the Second Trading Line and has been extensivelyused by Swiss companies since 1997. This type of repurchaseis unique for two reasons. First, unlike open market programs,the repurchasing company does not trade anonymously. Second,all transactions made by the repurchasing firm are publiclyavailable in real time to every market participant. This isa case of instantaneous disclosure which contrasts sharply withother markets characterized by delayed or no disclosure. Wedocument that the daily repurchase decision is statisticallyassociated with short-term price changes and the release offirm-specific news. We also find that repurchases on the secondtrading line have a beneficial impact on the liquidity of repurchasingfirms. Exchanges and regulators may consider the second tradingline an attractive share reacquisition mechanism because ofits transparency and positive liquidity effects.     

Liquidity-Based Competition for Order Flow

We present a microstructure model of competition for order flowbetween exchanges based on liquidity provision. We find thatneither a pure limit order market (PLM) nor a hybrid specialist/limitorder market (HM) structure is competition-proof. A PLM canalways be supported in equilibrium as the dominant market (i.e.,where the hybrid limit book is empty), but an HM can also besupported, for some market parameterizations, as the dominantmarket. We also show the possible coexistence of competing markets.Order preferencing—that is, decisions about where ordersare routed when investors are indifferent—is a key determinantof market viability. Welfare comparisons show that competitionbetween exchanges can increase as well as reduce the cost ofliquidity.     

Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics

Agency problems limit firms’ access to capital markets,curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual waysto mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment?We present a theory of a firm’s investment dynamics inthe presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financialcontracts. We derive results relating firms’ investmentdecisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure,and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasingin current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positivelyserially correlated over time (after controlling for investmentopportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems.(JEL G30, G31, G32, G35, D82, D86, D92)     

The Effectiveness of Regulation Fair Disclosure: Evidence from an Emerging Market

The effect of corporate disclosure in emerging markets is not clearly predictable because of the prevalent information leakage prior to disclosure. We empirically examine the effectiveness of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in reducing information asymmetry among equity traders in an emerging market. Specifically, we test whether fair disclosure activity is negatively related to the probability of informed trading (PIN). Multivariate tests on a sample of listed companies in Korea subject to Reg FD reveal the following: (1) more frequent disclosure under Reg FD is related to lower information asymmetry, and (2) this relation differs across the types of disclosure, with the effect of qualitative disclosures on the PIN being weaker than that of quantitative disclosures. Evidence also indicates that the negative association between fair disclosure activities and information asymmetry is more (less) pronounced for firms with poorer (better) information environments where selective information leakage is more (less) likely. The results are robust to sensitivity tests. Our findings have implications for disclosure regulations in emerging markets, given that the existing literature casts doubt on the effectiveness of corporate disclosure in such markets.     

The impacts of product market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures

This study examines how firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions are influenced by product market competition. Using separate measures to capture different dimensions of competition, I show that competition from potential entrants increases disclosure quantity while competition from existing rivals decreases disclosure quantity. I also find that competition enhances disclosure quality mainly through reducing the optimism in profit forecasts and reducing the pessimism in investment forecasts. Moreover, I find that the above association is less pronounced for industry leaders, consistent with industry leaders facing less competitive pressures than industry followers.     

Transmission of Information across International Equity Markets

This article provides evidence of information transmission fromthe United States and Japan to Korean and Thai equity markets.Information is defined as important macroeconomic announcementsin the United States, Japan, Korea, and Thailand. Using high-frequencyintraday data, I find a large and significant association betweendeveloped-economy macroeconomic announcements and emerging-economyequity volatility and trading volume at short time horizons.Previous studies’ findings of at most weak evidence oftransmission from developed to emerging economies may be dueto their use of lower frequency data and their focus on developed-economyfinancial market innovations as a proxy for information. (JELE44, G14, G15)     

Unintended consequences of compensation peer groups on corporate innovation

When companies select and use compensation peers to determine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, they create unintended peer effects on corporate innovation due to the similarities between these companies and their compensation peers in terms of product markets, CEO characteristics, and compensation schemes. After controlling for industry and geography peer groups, the findings confirm that the average innovation activity of compensation peers is a significant and distinct predictor of corporate innovation. Further analysis showed that (1) the peer effect is stronger in firms and compensation peers that pay their CEOs using long-term compensation, in firms with stronger labor market competition and board monitoring, and in peer companies that experience higher innovation competition and are closer to the median peer company in the peer group; (2) the obtained results are likely not attributable to the knowledge spillover mechanism and are more consistent with the peer pressure mechanism; and (3) the Securities and Exchange Commission's 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules may have generated peer effects.     

Competition among exchanges through simplified disclosure requirements: evidence from the American and Global Depositary Receipts

In this study, we address the ongoing debate as to whether the competition among the world's major exchanges through simplified disclosure requirements is justified. Companies from across the globe have a choice of cross-listing shares as either American or Global Depositary Receipts (ADRs and GDRs, respectively). The former are primarily listed on the US exchanges – NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX – whereas the latter are issued into non-US markets such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The GDRs listed on the LSE are subject to simplified disclosure requirements compared to their exchange-listed ADR peers that have to meet more stringent compliance standards. Proponents of the ‘light touch’ approach argue that firms cross-listing as GDRs are not subject to the higher reporting costs faced by ADRs yet still face similar valuation benefits. Those who challenge this approach argue that simplified disclosure requirements set by the LSE will ultimately be recognised by the market as ineffective, diverting traders from investing in GDRs. This study provides evidence that supports the LSE's ‘light touch’ approach and shows that the benefits of information risk reduction for ADRs and GDRs are comparable. The explanation for this finding is that the two avenues through which information asymmetry is expected to be resolved after cross-listing – disclosure and analysts – are substitutive and make equally important contribution to information risk reduction, eventually leading to similar cost of capital decline for ADRs and GDRs.     

Execution Costs of Institutional Equity Orders

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than on either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G19, G20, G23.     

Pricing to market with trade liberalization: The role of market heterogeneity and product differentiation in India’s exports

This paper studies the links between pricing to market (PTM) and trade liberalization using data for India’s exports (at the 4-digit level of classification) during the economic reforms period (1992–2005). We estimate a PTM model for exports to the G3 and three other emerging markets (Brazil, China and South Africa), distinguishing homogeneous from differentiated goods and correcting for changes in the level of protection faced by India’s exporters (import tariffs in destination markets), inflation and openness in the export destination market, a macroeconomic policy index partly reflecting changes in exporter’s costs, the share of the exporter in the destination market and the share of the product in the exporter’s total exports. We find that market heterogeneity changes the level of PTM, but PTM does not significantly differ between homogeneous and differentiated products. Indian exporters practice PTM by absorbing exchange rate changes into their mark-up in G3 markets, where they face tougher competition, but fully pass-through exchange rate changes in emerging markets. On the contrary, Indian exporters seem to be taking advantage of trade liberalisation in destination markets by marginally increasing exporter currency prices into emerging markets but not into the G3. However, in the case of differentiated goods, we find this effect of trade liberalisation for both G3 and emerging markets.     

Mandatory disclosure and learning from external market participants: Evidence from the JOBS act

This paper examines whether mandatory disclosure affects the extent to which firms learn from external market participants. Conventional wisdom suggests that mandatory disclosure should increase the total amount of information in financial markets. However, disclosure can also reduce investors' incentives to acquire and produce information. Using the JOBS Act to identify variations in disclosure requirements, this paper finds that firms with reduced disclosure requirements attract more informed investors and learn more from financial markets than those with stricter disclosure requirements. This learning is concentrated among firms that attract sophisticated investors, particularly those with industry expertise, and weakens once firms are forced to disclose more information. Overall, the results suggest that one benefit from regulators’ recent efforts to reduce U.S. firm disclosure requirements is an increase in firm learning.     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.     

Do Termination Provisions Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?

We provide new evidence on termination provisions and the takeoverbidding process. Our central contribution is a novel databasefrom Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents thataccurately measures the incidence of termination provisionsand the depth of competition in takeover deals. We show thatbiased data in prior research produced incorrect conclusionson the relation between termination provisions and judicialdecisions, bidder toeholds, and deal size. Our comprehensivedata also show that termination provisions are positively relatedto takeover competition. Our evidence is consistent with theinformation/commitment hypothesis in which termination provisionsdo not truncate bidding but instead culminate the takeover process.(JEL G34; K22; D44).     

Multidimensional Competition and Corporate Disclosure

In this paper, we argue that the influence product market competition exerts on disclosure is defined by the combined effect of the incentives and disincentives to disclose raised by the multiple competition dimensions. We distinguish between firm‐ and industry‐level competition measures, and we hypothesize that the former raises agency and proprietary costs, whereas the latter creates incentives to disclose either to fulfil the owners’ need for information to monitor managers or to deter the entrance of new competitors in the industry. Our research design allows for non‐monotonic relationships between competition and disclosure as well as for interactions between competition dimensions. Using a sample of US manufacturing companies, we gather evidence that is consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find an inverted U‐shape relationship between corporate disclosure and a firm's abnormal profitability, which is suggestive of firms being reluctant to disclose when they are underperforming (outperforming) their rivals because of the fear of unveiling agency conflicts (raising proprietary costs). Second, we observe a U‐shape relationship between corporate disclosure and industry profitability, although this U design evolves to approximate a rising function as the protection provided by entry barriers increases.     

Quote-based competition and trade execution costs in NYSE-listed stocks

This study examines quotations, order routing, and trade execution costs for seven markets that compete for orders in large-capitalization NYSE-listed stocks. The competitiveness of quote updates from each market varies with measures of the profitability of attracting additional order and with volatility and inventory measures. The probability of a trade executing on each market increases when the market posts competitive quotes. Execution costs for non-NYSE trades when the local market posts competitive (non-competitive) quotes are virtually the same (substantially exceed) costs for matched NYSE trades. Collectively, these results imply a significant degree of quote-based competition for order flow and are consistent with off-NYSE liquidity providers using competitive quotations to signal when they are prepared to give better-than-normal trade executions.     

Does the disclosure of internal control deficiency matter for accrual quality? Evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that are required to audit and disclose any internal control deficiency (ICD), this paper examines the effect of mandatory ICD disclosure on accrual quality (AQ) in China. We find that relative to voluntary ICD disclosure, mandatory ICD disclosure is associated with poorer AQ, as proxied by abnormal accruals, suggesting that the mandated disclosure of ICD effectively identifies financial reporting quality in Chinese firms. This relationship is enhanced by government control of firms (especially the central government) and by the intensity of government inspections and is stronger in undeveloped regional markets. The results are robust to the application of the PSM-DID method and use of different measures and samples. Our findings demonstrate the critical role of the mandated disclosure of ICD and improve our understanding of internal control mechanisms in emerging markets.     

Stock and Bond Return Comovement as a Different Way to Assess Information Content: The Case of Debt Covenant Violation Disclosures

We propose a supplementary way to assess the information content of a financial statement disclosure based on the comovement of asset returns in different markets in response to information that has price implications for both. The influence of a signal that strongly influences at least two asset markets measures a dimension of information content less clearly reflected in single‐market responses. We apply our method to debt covenant violation (DCV) disclosures. These are the outcome of a debt renegotiation when the covenant promises in a debt agreement to manage the agency costs of debt are broken. We find that stock and bond return comovement is highest one day before DCV disclosure and differs depending on whether the debt covenant is waived or not waived. We find that stock and bond return comovement in the days following a DCV disclosure decreases more for non‐waiver disclosures than for waiver disclosures. This supports the theory that a non‐waiver outcome shifts control rights and bargaining power to the creditors. Consistent with this theory, single‐market tests show that bonds with a non‐waiver disclosure versus a waiver disclosure earn positive excess returns following a DCV disclosure whereas the reverse is true for stocks.