共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 93 毫秒
1.
Annette Hofmann 《The GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review》2007,32(1):91-111
When risks are interdependent, an agent’s decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilities faced by others. Due to
these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring
marginal external costs or benefits conferred on others. This paper analyzes an insurance market with externalities of loss
prevention. It is shown in a model with heterogenous agents and imperfect information that a monopolistic insurer can achieve
the social optimum by engaging in premium discrimination. An insurance monopoly reduces not only costs of risk selection,
but may also play an important social role in loss prevention.
相似文献
Annette HofmannEmail: |
2.
An empirical assessment of the premium associated with meeting or beating both time-series earnings expectations and analysts’ forecasts 总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0
Nicholas Dopuch Chandra Seethamraju Weihong Xu 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2008,31(2):147-166
Recent research provides evidence of a market premium accruing to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. We find similar
results for our sample of firms. However, we also find a market premium for firms that meet or beat time-series forecasts,
and that the highest market premium accrued to firms that meet or beat both analysts’ and time-series forecasts. These findings
are supported by assessments of future financial performance over the next two subsequent years. Our findings are consistent
with the notion that when time-series benchmark is used in conjunction with analysts’ forecasts, investors obtain a more reliable
(i.e., less noisy) signal regarding whether firms have actually met or beaten market expectations.
相似文献
Weihong Xu (Corresponding author)Email: |
3.
Corporate voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash flow rights from control rights 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Kin-Wai Lee 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2007,28(4):393-416
We find that corporate voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with the separation of cash flow rights from control
rights. This result is consistent with the notion that as the separation of cash flow rights from control rights increases,
controlling owners have larger incentives to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders and low corporate disclosure
constitutes a mechanism to facilitate controlling owners in masking their private benefits of control. The negative association
between voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash flow rights from control rights is less pronounced for firms with
greater external financing needs. This result suggests that for firms with high separation of cash flow rights from control
rights, those with greater external financing needs undertake higher firm-level voluntary disclosure to reduce information
asymmetry. We also find that the negative association between voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash flow rights
from control rights is less pronounced for firms that have a large non-management shareholder. Our result supports the role
of large non-management shareholder in mitigating agency problems associated with the separation of ownership and control.
相似文献
Kin-Wai LeeEmail: |
4.
Michael L. Ettredge Soo Young Kwon David B. Smith Mary S. Stone 《Review of Accounting Studies》2006,11(1):91-117
Our study assesses whether SFAS No. 131 improved disclosure about the diversity of multiple segment firms’ operations. We
find a post-SFAS No. 131 increase in cross-segment variability of segment profits, an increase in the association between
reported and inherent cross-segment variability, and an increase in association between reported variability and capital market
incentives to disclose. We interpret the results as evidence that SFAS No. 131 increased the transparency of segment profitability
disclosures, and as indicating SFAS No. 131 allowed firms depending more on external financing to disclose more about differences
in segment profitability.
相似文献
Michael L. EttredgeEmail: |
5.
Using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this paper examines the association between the choice of financial intermediary
and earnings management. We contend that with more stringent standards for certification and intense monitoring, highly prestigious
underwriters restrict firms’ incentives for earnings management to protect their reputation and to avoid potential litigation
risks, while firms with greater incentives for earnings management avoid strict monitoring by choosing low-quality underwriters.
Consistent with our predictions, we find an inverse association between underwriter quality and issuers’ earnings management.
In addition, we find that underwriter quality is positively related to SEOs’ post-issue performance, even after controlling
for the effect of earnings management. We also find that firms with low-underwriter prestige and high levels of earnings management
under-perform the most. However, the effect of underwriter choice on post-issue performance does not last long.
相似文献
Myung Seok ParkEmail: |
6.
Adverse selection is often blamed for the malfunctioning of the annuities market. We simulate the impact of adverse selection
on the consumption allocation of annuitants under alternative parameter values, and explore the resulting welfare implications.
We show that, for most parameter values, the welfare losses associated with equilibriums that are subject to adverse selection
correspond to a loss of wealth of around one percent in a first-best equilibrium. These losses are smaller than the corresponding
losses associated with equilibriums with no access to an annuity market by an order of magnitude of ten. The existence of
substitutes for annuities such as a bequest motive or a social security system intensifies the adverse selection but reduces
its welfare impact.
相似文献
Oded PalmonEmail: |
7.
Using the representative agent approach as in Kaplow (Am Econ Rev 82:1013–1017, 1992b), this paper shows that providing tax
deductions for the individual’s net losses is socially optimal when the insurer faces the risk of insolvency. We further show
that the government should adopt a higher tax deduction rate for net losses when the insurer is insolvent than when the insurer
is solvent. Thus, tax deductions for net losses could be used to provide an insurance for individuals against the insurer’s
risk of insolvency. These findings could also be used to explain why a government provides supplementary public insurance
or government relief. Finally, we discuss that, if the individuals are heterogeneous in terms of loss severity, loss probability,
or income level, providing a tax deduction for the individual’s net losses may not always achieve a Pareto improvement, and
cross subsidization should be taken into consideration.
相似文献
Larry Y. TzengEmail: |
8.
Fotios Pasiouras 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2008,30(2):187-223
This study uses a sample of 715 banks from 95 countries and two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) to provide international
evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision approaches on banks’ efficiency. We first use DEA to estimate technical
and scale efficiency. We then use Tobit regression to investigate the impact of several regulations related to capital adequacy,
private monitoring, banks’ activities, deposit insurance schemes, disciplinary power of the authorities, and entry into banking
on banks’ technical efficiency. We estimate several specifications while controlling for bank-specific attributes and country-level
characteristics accounting for macroeconomic conditions, financial development, market structure, overall institutional development,
and access to banking services. In several cases, the results provide evidence in favour of all three pillars of Basel II
that promote the adoption of strict capital adequacy standards, the development of powerful supervisory agencies, and the
creation of market disciplining mechanisms. However, only the latter one is significant in all of our specifications. While
the remaining regulations do not appear to have a robust impact on efficiency, several other country-specific characteristics
are significantly related to efficiency.
相似文献
Fotios PasiourasEmail: |
9.
This study investigates the influence of managerial incentives on the resolution of financial distress. Our model predicts
that when creditors and equityholders prefer different resolution methods, the likelihood of choosing Chapter 11 over private
renegotiation is related to the ownership structure of the distressed firm. Empirical test results using a sample of 81 voluntary
Chapter 11 firms and 65 private workout firms support the model’s prediction. We show that managerial ownership is positively
related to the incidence of Chapter 11 filing when there is conflict between equityholders and creditors over the choice between
Chapter 11 and a private renegotiation. Consistent with prior literature, we also find that the choice of resolution methods
depends on the extent of creditor holdout problems and the level of economic distress. We also performed the analysis of a
subsequent 5 years of post-distress performance for all sample firms. The majorities of firms that file for Chapter 11 lose
their independence and are either acquired or liquidated. However, more than half of firms in private workouts survived as
independent firms.
相似文献
Chuck C. Y. Kwok (Corresponding author)Email: |
10.
The Dynamic Impact of Macro Shocks on Insurance Premiums 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We develop a model that investigates the relation between insurance premiums and macroeconomic variables, including oil price,
interest rate, aggregate supply, and aggregate demand. We then use a multivariate structural vector error correction model
to distinguish the effects arising from permanent and transitory components of insurance premiums. Changes in the transitory
component indicate that our model captures key historical events. Although real shocks originating from oil price and aggregate
supply explain the behavior of insurance premiums well, we show that financial market shocks are the main driving force behind
the recent increasing volatility in insurance premiums in the U.S. market.
相似文献
Ying Sophie HuangEmail: |
11.
Durables like cars or houses are a substantial component in the balance sheets of households. These durables are exposed to
risk and can be insured in the market. We build a dynamic model in which agents have three possibilities to cope with the
risk exposure of the durable stock: (i) purchase of market insurance, (ii) buffer-stock saving of the riskless asset or (iii)
adjustment of the durable stock. We calibrate our model to the US economy and find a small role for market insurance.
相似文献
Winfried Koeniger (Corresponding author)Email: |
12.
We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.
相似文献
Fernando PenalvaEmail: Phone: +34-93-2534200 |
13.
We conduct an experimental test of a screening model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We first conduct
three sessions in which the proportion of high risk buyers is such that a separating equilibrium should exist. We then conduct
three more sessions in which the only change we make is decreasing the proportion of high risks such that the equilibrium
is now a pooling equilibrium. In both treatments, the observed behavior converges to the equilibrium prediction.
相似文献
Abdullah YavasEmail: |
14.
We provide an alternative explanation for the previous finding of analysts’ overreaction to extreme good news in earnings.
We show that such finding could be a result of analysts’ rational behavior in the face of high earnings uncertainty rather
than their cognitive bias. Extreme earnings performance tends to be associated with higher earnings uncertainty that generally
leads to more forecast optimism. Once this effect is accounted for, the univariate result of analysts’ overreaction to extreme
good news in earnings is subsumed, leaving only their underreaction in general.
相似文献
Jian XueEmail: |
15.
Chaur-Shiuh Young Liu-Ching Tsai Hui-Wen Hsu 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2008,30(3):297-314
This study examines the relation between controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control and financial restatements.
An analysis of a sample comprising 106 Taiwanese listed firms (53 restating firms vs. 53 non-restating control firms) shows
that financial restatements are more likely to occur when there is a greater divergence between controlling shareholders’
board seats control rights and ownership rights. We also find that the excess board seats control of controlling shareholders
is positively associated with the materiality and pervasiveness of financial restatements. Overall, these results suggest
that the entrenchment incentive from controlling shareholders’ excess control motivates firms to adopt aggressive accounting
policies.
相似文献
Hui-Wen HsuEmail: |
16.
Ronald C. Rutherford Thomas M. Springer Abdullah Yavas 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2007,35(1):23-38
Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive
a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium
market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency
problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence
for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same
geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price.
相似文献
Abdullah YavasEmail: |
17.
Bank Competition,Risk, and Subordinated Debt 总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0
Jijun Niu 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,33(1):37-56
This paper studies a dynamic model of banking in which banks compete for insured deposits, issue subordinated debt, and invest
in either a prudent or a gambling asset. The model allows banks to choose their level of risk after the interest rate on subordinated
debt is contracted. We show that requiring banks to issue a small amount of subordinated debt can reduce their gambling incentives.
Moreover, when equity capital is more expensive than subordinated debt, adding a subordinated debt requirement to a policy
regime that only uses equity capital requirements is Pareto improving.
相似文献
Jijun NiuEmail: |
18.
Home Equity,Household Savings and Consumption 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The home-owning family’s equity is a piggybank that can be broken open by borrowing. Each borrowing increases liabilities
and cash equally, initially leaving net wealth unchanged. When those funds are spent and cash balances fall, consumption increases
even as net wealth can decline. In a dynamic optimization, the marginal propensity to consume from net wealth is not always
positive and can be positively correlated with housing debt.
相似文献
P. ChinloyEmail: |
19.
C. Charles Okeahalam 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,33(3):147-162
I assess the impact of bancassurance on the price of retail financial services. I find that service fees in a product bundle
increase less than proportionally to the number of services; that an increase in the number of clients in each product bundle
market reduces fees by 1.5%; that the degree of competition in the markets of each bundle also reduces fees; that premium
products have higher average costs; and finally, that cross-holdings reduce prices by about 5% and bancassurance reduces prices
by just over 6%. The price reduction declines if both strategies are combined.
相似文献
C. Charles OkeahalamEmail: |
20.
John E. Core Wayne R. Guay Scott A. Richardson Rodrigo S. Verdi 《Review of Accounting Studies》2006,11(1):49-70
We examine whether managers’ trading decisions (both at a firm and personal level) are correlated with trading strategies
suggested by the operating accruals and the post-earnings announcement drift (SUE) anomalies. We discuss advantages and disadvantages
of the use of managerial trading activity to infer managers’ private valuation about their own securities. Our results provide
corroborative evidence for the accruals anomaly, i.e., managers’ repurchase and insider trading behavior varies consistently
with the information underlying the operating accruals trading strategy. On the other hand, we do not find corroborative evidence
for the SUE anomaly.
相似文献
Rodrigo S. VerdiEmail: |