战略锁定与企业间同时行动博弈——基于转换成本角度的分析

在具有转换成本特征的市场中,企业可以将消费者事后锁定于某一产品或服务中,因此企业可能拥有相对于消费者的事后垄断权力.为此,企业有动机在初期采取战略行为吸引消费者.这一方面缓和了后续阶段的企业间竞争,另一方面在整体上可能将该行业的产品价格维持较高水平.因此,某些行业在初期引进少数进入者并不必然地提高消费者福利.我国入世后,时外开放的过渡期结束,一些重要的服务领域转换成本较为明显.本文通过分析企业间竞争的市场效果和福利后果,为在该领域反垄断立法提供理论基础,并试图引出我国在关键性领域加快"时内开放"的理论探讨.     

混合寡头下的横向合并及反垄断控制研究

本文在混合所有制下研究了市场结构及企业产权结构对企业间横向合并福利结果的影响。研究显示，即使存在能够降低企业生产成本的协同效应，合并仍将导致消费者福利的下降；合并引起的社会总福利改变则随混合所有制企业中私有产权比重的上升呈现倒U型特征。以上结果显示，在混合所有制下企业间合并的反垄断审查中，反垄断机构应充分考虑产权因素对合并福利结果的影响，并在此基础上形成适用于不同产权类型企业统一的反垄断控制标准。     

商业营销要巧用消费者心理

社会主义市场经济的发展,使我国市场上的商品日益丰富,竞争也愈发激烈。每一位商业经营者都希望把商品尽快推销出去,而商业经营的成败则取决于是否赢得了消费者欢心。因此,在商业营销中不得不巧用消费者心理。 一、售前服务利用消费者心理 消费者在购买商品时较为关心的是价格。利用消费者购买不同种商品的不同心理来订价,有利于促进销售。 1.炫耀订价。高档消费品、名牌优质产     

顾客满意度的内涵及提升策略

随着市场竞争的日益激烈以及消费者购买自觉性的不断提高,顾客满意度已经成为影响企业生存和发展的关键要素.本文从顾客满意度的内涵出发,提出顾客满意度的提升策略.一是提高顾客对所购买的商品或服务的绩效价值评价;二是降低顾客对所购买商品或服务的期望值.     

我国入世3年对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响

本文分析我国入世以来百姓的消费者剩余和社会福利。进口产品的大量增加和外资的大量涌入,增加国内市场的供给,进一步促进国内市场充分竞争,对于大多数商品,消费者意愿支付的价格明显高于国内市场价格,全社会福利总体明显提高。由于历史原因和社会生产力发展不平衡,局部领域出现消费者剩余减少,福利水平下降。     

《经济法概论》学习辅导（续）

要有效解决消费者权益争议，就必须明确责任主体或损害赔偿的承担主体。赔偿主体的确定主要有下列几种情况：第一，消费者在购买、使用商品时，其合法权益受到损害的，可以向销售者要求赔偿。第二，消费者或者其他受害人因商品缺陷造成人身、财产损害的，消费者或其他受害人有对赔偿主体的选择权，可以向销售者要求赔偿，也可以向生产者要求赔偿。第三，消费者在接受服务时，其合法权益受到损害的，可以向服务者要求赔偿。第四，消费者在购买使用商品或者接受服务时，其合法权益受到损害，因原企业分立、合并的．可以向变更后承受其权利义务的企业要求赔偿。第五，使用他人营业执照的     

我国入世3年对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响

本文分析我国入世以来百姓的消费者剩余和社会福利.进口产品的大量增加和外资的大量涌入,增加国内市场的供给,进一步促进国内市场充分竞争,对于大多数商品,消费者意愿支付的价格明显高于国内市场价格,全社会福利总体明显提高.由于历史原因和社会生产力发展不平衡,局部领域出现消费者剩余减少,福利水平下降.     

保证分销领域消费者实现知情权的思考

消费者的知情权,在《消费者权益保护法》中被描述为:消费者享有知悉其购买、使用的商品或者接受服务的真实情况的权利。所谓分销服务,是指产品从生产出来一直到消费者手中的整个传递过程中所涉及的一系列活动,还包括在商品转移过程中取得这种商品和服务的所有权或帮助所有权转移的所有企业和个人(生产者、中间商、代理中间商、最终消费者)。分销的基本职能在于对产品从生产者转移到消费者过程中所必须完成的工作加以合理高效地组织,其目的在于消除产品(或服务)与使用者之间的分离。根据分销服务的特点,工商部门应当加强对分销企业的信用管理…     

消费者寻求多样化与企业定价竞争

消费者寻求多样化的购买行为会对寡头企业之间的价格竞争和经济效率产生重要影响。文章研究发现,针对消费者寻求多样化的购买行为,企业会对忠诚的消费者给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;消费者寻求多样化购买行为弱化了企业两期价格竞争,导致"默契合谋";而以两期统一定价为基准的经济效率分析显示,歧视定价机制促进了企业间竞争,导致消费者剩余增加,企业利润减少。     

浅谈金融消费者知情权的法律保护

随着我国经济体制改革的不断深入,尤其是加入WTO之后,金融业以前所未有的速度和规模不断创新和发展,金融衍生产品和新的金融服务类型层出不穷。就金融消费者而言,他们当中的绝大部分人并不具有金融专业知识,对于所购买的金融商品的情况一无所知,就更加谈不上对该金融商品的运作情况的了解与掌握,所以很难对所购买的金融商品或所接受的金融服务的好坏进行评价。所以,金融机构在金融消费领域更应该为消费者提供专业、真实、客观、全面的信息。相对于其他权利来说,金融消费者的知情权是其实现利益的根本所在,只有知情权得以实现的前提下,保护金融消费者的其他权利才有实现的可能。     

Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

Trade Liberalization and the Degree of Competition in International Duopoly

This paper analyzes how a reduction in trade costs influences the possibility for firms to engage in international cartels, and hence how trade liberalization affects the degree of competition. We consider a particular intra‐industry trade model amended to allow for firms producing differentiated products. Our main finding is that trade liberalization may have an anti‐competitive effect. We find that there is no unique relation between a reduction in trade costs and the degree of competition. When products are differentiated, a lowering of trade costs is pro‐competitive if trade costs are initially high, but anti‐competitive if trade costs initially are low. Hence, trade policy is not necessarily a substitute for competition policy.     

Cost Signals under Uncertain R&D Outcomes

When it is difficult for firms to differentiate their products from those of their competitors, research and development (R&D) spending on process innovation to lower the cost of production is crucial for profitability. However, the information asymmetry in production costs that results from innovation reduces the efficiency of all firms in a market for a homogeneous good. We employ a signalling game to discuss the feasibility of utilising R&D spending and output levels as cost signals in an environment of quantity competition. The results show that a firm does not spend its money on R&D solely to signal the type of cost. Rather, R&D spending may be chosen as a cost signal over the output level only if expenditures on R&D can lead to a sufficiently high probability of reducing production costs.     

Competition,Innovation And Increasing Returns ∗

When firms enjoy increasing returns in presence of a high rate of innovation, competition may obtain due to the continuous changes in demand and cost conditions even when there is no differentiation and the products of competing firms are essentially homogeneous. In this paper we intend to provide theoretical structure to this conjecture, and to confirm it by carrying out a simulation analysis in the case of two firms competing on the market.     

Ex-post efficient permit markets: a detailed analysis

This paper provides a detailed analysis of ex-post efficient permit markets. After a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex-post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information, we analyze the effects of an ex-post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms, on their investment behavior, and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets. Also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation. Our results show that ex-post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare.      

TALKING,SEARCHING, AND PRICING*

I study the implications of interpersonal communication for incentives for consumers to acquire information and firms’ pricing behavior. Firms market a homogeneous product and choose its price; consumers acquire price information at some cost to themselves. Also, each consumer accesses the information acquired by a sample of other consumers—interpersonal communication. An exogenous increase in the level of interpersonal communication decreases the information that consumers acquire, and, when search costs are low, firms price less aggressively. In an extension, consumers may choose to invest in interpersonal communication at some cost. A decrease in the costs of interpersonal communication decreases firms’ competition.     

Price competition and innovation in markets with brand loyalty

Intuition suggests that in markets with consumer lock-in (‘brand loyalty’), firms with a large customer base earn higher profits. We show for a homogeneous goods duopoly that the intuition can be misleading, as the intensity of price competition depends on the initial market split. We derive mixed-strategy equilibria, and show that competition is often most intense when the market is split evenly. As a result, firms coordinate on an asymmetric split when consumers are not yet attached to firms. We also allow for asymmetric costs, and analyze when firms with a larger customer base are more eager to innovate.     

New technology and the economic organization of the clothing industry

The economic organization of an industry is ultimately determined by the cost functions of its component firms. The costs that matter for the competitive state of an industry are not just long-run variable costs but also the costs of entry to and exit from the industry, and the joint costs of different products that the firms in the industry produce. In the clothing industry the costs of creating and implementing new designs is a further important factor affecting competition between firms. Since costs are largely determined by technology, we expect repercussions on the organization of the industry when technology changes. Application of the new information technologies in the clothing industry will encourag agglomerations by growth and by merger, with larger firms producing a wider range of products and introducing new products faster than hitherto. Trends in the geographic organization of production will also be reversed.     

Abstinence from child labor and profit seeking

Opponents of child labor suggest that demand-driven mechanisms can eliminate such practices. If consumers prefer adult-labor products, they suggest that labeling will drive out child-labor products. I show that under Bertrand competition, even with complete information, this is unlikely. When products are differentiated only by labor type, such a scheme requires at least three firms and child-labor costs at least as large as adult-labor costs. With additional lines of differentiation, child labor is eliminated only when the adult-labor costs are smaller. Thus, while labeling may reduce child labor, it is unlikely to eliminate it.     

The importance of government commitment in attracting firms: A dynamic analysis of tax competition in an agglomeration economy

Agglomeration tendencies of industrial firms significantly affect the nature of tax competition. This paper analyzes tax competition between two countries over an infinite time horizon in an economy with trade costs and internationally mobile industrial firms. Most of the previous studies on tax competition in the ‘new economic geography’ framework employ static models. In this study, two governments dynamically compete with each other to attract firms through their choices of taxes and subsidies. It is shown that the commitment of the governments to their policies is crucial in determining the distribution of firms in the long run. Specifically, if governments find each others׳ tax policies credible, then one country will attract all the firms when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration forces dominant. If policies are not credible, both countries may attract an equal share of firms even when trade costs are low, as the lack of commitment by governments acts as a dispersion force.