On the Efficiency of Green Trade Policy

The paper derives conditions for second best environmental policy when there are foreign countries which fail to implement appropriate environmental regulations. It is shown that in such cases, efficiency in the global economy will not be achieved unless domestic environmental regulations are supplemented by trade provisions. The result is independent of whether environmental problems are local or international. Furthermore, when trade provisions are implemented, efficiency requires that domestic environmental taxes are fixed at the Pigouvian tax rate. The results imply that there is an economic rationale for regulating the trade between signatories and non-signatories of international environmental agreements. Efficient trade regulations will either take the form of trade restrictions or trade promotions, depending on whether the environmental problem is created by production or consumption activities, and whether the net import of the relevant commodity is positive or negative. It is argued that an efficient climate agreement, signed by a group of fuel-importing countries (e.g., the OECD countries), should include a subsidy on the import of fossil fuels.     

Abenomics and Japan's Trade Policy in a New Era

Trade policy, in particular, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), has been a centerpiece of the Abe administration's economic strategy. The TPP's contributions to Japan's growth strategy include: (i) creating trade and investment opportunities abroad for Japanese companies through ambitious liberalization targets; (ii) advancing domestic reforms – with the largest service and agricultural liberalization commitments to date; and (iii) increasing bargaining leverage in other trade negotiations. But the domestic reform goals of Abenomics in agriculture have come up short due to opposition from domestic lobbies. American trade politics – which culminated in the US withdrawal from the TPP – have upended the goals of trade policy under Abenomics. Japan's best option in this new environment is to deliver on high quality, multi‐party trade agreements: concluding negotiations with Europe; scaling up the ambition of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; and salvaging a TPP 11. The merits of a bilateral free trade agreement with the USA will depend on how the Trump administration operationalizes its America First policy.     

Market collusion and the politics of protection

This paper investigates the relationship between trade and competition policy within a model where market collusion and protectionist lobbying are themselves related. Collusion and lobbying are modeled as joint products of the same collective effort of firms. In equilibrium, firms cannot achieve greater cooperation in one dimension without reducing it in the other. A trade agreement that limits the effectiveness of lobbying may cause firms to increase market collusion, thereby increasing the domestic price. Thus, international trade agreements may run counter to the goals of competition policy. On the other side, a more restrictive competition policy is shown to either reduce the domestic price or reduce import protection. Thus, competition policy tends to promote trade policy goals. The reason is that restrictive competition policy undermines collusion at the source—it decreases the per-firm benefit to collusion relative to the gains from deviating—reducing firm cooperation in both dimensions.     

战略性贸易政策应用于中国轿车业量化效果的再考察--政策工具与外国政府行为对政策实施的影响

经验分析表明,战略性贸易政策可以起到从国外企业转移利润、支持本国企业竞争和提高国民福利的作用.本文以中国轿车业为例,在以前对我国单边实施进口关税效果量化分析的基础上,进一步应用数量模型对战略性贸易政策实施过程中应注意的两个问题进行考察,一是实施战略性贸易政策应当注意与其他政策工具相配合,二是应用该政策应当注意技巧,尽量避免引发其他国家的报复,这样才能收到更好的政策效果.     

Domestic Unionization and the Political Economy of Strategic Export Policy

This paper examines the effect of lobbying by a labor union and its parent firm on the argument for strategic export policy in a third market-unionized duopoly. The lobbying-induced export policy frequently deteriorates domestic welfare as compared with free trade. It is true that the politically-determined export policy can improve domestic welfare if the union's bargaining power is strong and the domestic government's responsiveness to political contributions is weak. However, even if the conditions are met, implementing the lobbying-induced export policy will not enhance domestic welfare more than improving labor–management relations. Moreover, the improvement of their relations will be hampered by the opportunity of their lobbying. These results indicate that strategic export policy toward a unionized duopoly should be restrained in light of political economy.     

贸易引力模型:来自中国的实证与启示

作者在采用并修正贸易引力模型的基础上,验证了决定中国双边贸易的主要因素是贸易伙伴的经济规模(GDP总量)、人口、空间距离和贸易政策等,并通过Beta系数检验证明区域经济合作组织是影响中国对外贸易最重要的因素;通过贸易潜力分析,说明中国目前应当充分重视国内市场,坚持扩大内需的战略,同时积极调整贸易结构,改善贸易增长方式。     

低碳经济下中国零售业发展的对策

“低碳经济”是以低能耗、低污染为基础的绿色经济,是应对气候变暖的必然选择。中国零售业积极发展“低碳经济”是适应国际政治经济发展、应对国内外同行竞争的需要;是节约成本,刺激新的经济增长点的需要。中国零售业应从政策层面、技术层面、管理层面等多方面入手,制定策略,发展低碳经济。     

Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.     

挤压还是促进?——内需对制造业出口的影响研究

文章结合新古典和新贸易理论研究范式,考察了国内需求对制成品出口的影响。研究发现,制造业中大部分产业的国内需求对出口有显著的正影响,但对于不同行业来说,出口的影响因素有很大差异,超过半数的产业内需对出口的影响已经超过劳动力禀赋的影响,并且贸易自由化会放大内需对出口的影响。我国未来出口将以产业内贸易为主,要更有针对性地采取政策措施以使扩大内需与稳定出口相辅相成,这样才能更大程度地获取贸易收益。     

ENTRY AND IMPORT QUOTA

An import quota set stricter than the free trade level is quite common for the domestic entry protection. However, this paper shows that as the products are vertically differentiated, an import quota that is simply set at the original free trade level could be effective on entrant protection. This quota policy also improves both consumer surplus and total domestic welfare, which is in sharp contrast to the implications of existing literature. Our result suggests that an import quota has a stronger protection effect on domestic production if the domestic and foreign products are vertically differentiated.     

Transition Problems in Policy Reform: Agricultural Trade Liberalization in India

What will be the domestic growth and distributional effects of agricultural trade liberalization in India? How fast should Indian agriculture be liberalized and what policies should characterize the transition? This paper uses Indian agriculture to analyze medium‐term transition problems that arise in many major economic reforms. Employing a dynamic applied general‐equilibrium model, the paper focuses on the implications for policy design of the absence of efficient capital and labor markets and on the distributional consequences of economic reform in the presence of realistic limits on available intervention instruments. The key finding is that trade adjustment should be supplemented by policies that raise land productivity and, because this takes time, the adjustment should be gradual.     

Tariffs versus quotas in the presence of imperfect competition and cross‐border externalities

Abstract.  We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government does not have full information on the foreign firm's production method and if cross‐border externalities exist, import quotas are in some cases preferable to tariffs. Otherwise, however, tariffs are preferable to quotas. JEL Classification: F13, F18     

Free trade versus strategic trade as a choice between two ‘second best’ policies: A symmetric versus asymmetric information analysis

Abstract

We analyse the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable in the form of R&D investment is chosen, and when the information can be either symmetric or asymmetric. The novel feature of our model is that the information asymmetry stems from the assumption that the government may not a priori know the true mode of competition. The intervention in the above set-up allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and results in a socially inefficient choice of the strategic variable. However, commitment to free trade leads to forgoing the benefits from profit-shifting. Yet, from the social point of view, free trade may be optimal even under the assumption of symmetric information. Due to costly signalling, this result is reinforced in the case of asymmetric information.     

Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly

In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.     

Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo

The literature on quid pro quo foreign direct investment describes how unwarranted investment may be undertaken because of the endogeneity of trade policy. The quid pro quo is that foreign producers, who are exporters to the host economy, invest in return for a liberal trade policy. We describe converse circumstances. The nexus between foreign investment and endogeneity of trade policy is implicit (not explicit as in quid pro quo investment), and a government with socially correct objectives (perhaps imposed by international-agency conditionality) wishes (i) to privatize a domestic firm by sale to a foreign investor who can provide technology improvement for domestic production and (ii) to pursue a liberal trade policy. The government is electorally constrained by needs of political popularity. The outcome is that efficient private investments may not be undertaken—in contrast with the quid pro quo case where in efficient investments are undertaken. While our model is general, the conditions we describe appear to be in particular present in post-socialist economies. Our model offers a contributing explanation for the slow pace of progress in many such economies, which rely on foreign technological transfer to improve the technology and product quality of post-socialist industry, but fail to receive the requisite foreign investment despite governments' good intentions.     

Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution

The paper develops a model in which foreign and domestic manufacturers producing differentiated goods sell through spatially differentiated retailers. There is free entry into retailing but access to the retail distribution network (by manufacturers) may be controlled. The author considers a domestic vertical control mechanism in which domestic retailers carry only domestic brands (termed “domestic dealing”) and compares the use of tariffs on imports and the enforcement of domestic dealing restrictions as means of increasing domestic welfare. It is shown that domestic dealing will always be prohibited when tariffs can be used. When trade policy is not available, however, domestic dealing may be desirable.     

A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies

Recently a number of studies have recognized that trade policy can be substituted for by competition policy. This study demonstrates, however, that there is a fundamental difference in the working of terms‐of‐trade effects between competition policy and tariff policy and that if countries optimally set their respective competition policies, it is unlikely to result in a tariff‐war‐like state in which all countries adopt distortionary policies. Instead, in a Nash equilibrium, one country maintains perfect competition in its domestic service sector while the other country tolerates imperfect competition.     

Political Economy of Altering Trade Restrictions in Response to Commodity Price Spikes

A model is developed to explain trade policy interventions in response to commodity price spikes. The model predicts that government preferences for averting losses for domestic interest groups lead to changes in trade distortions. In particular, trade interventions in response to downward price spikes are predicted, which is consistent with the proposal for a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Higher tariffs are likely in a noncooperative setting, and higher export subsidies will emerge in response. An efficient cooperative trade policy can be achieved in a repeated game setting and with possible involvement of the WTO.     

SHORT-RUN TRADE SURPLUS CREATION IN A TWO-SECTOR SETTING

This study investigates the effect of the suppression of competition in the domestic non-tradable sector on a country's trade balance in a small open economy. Using a two-sector model, this study demonstrates that the effect on the trade balance of such a suppression depends on the sector on which the policy is imposed. This result sharply contrasts with Yano's result in a one-sector model demonstrating that such a policy unambiguously creates a trade surplus in the short run.     

Dynamic Interactions in Trade Policy in a Differential Game Model of Tariff Protection

This paper develops a two‐country dynamic game model of tariff protection to reconsider optimal trade policies and their implications for welfare. The authors show that an import subsidy is optimal in the feedback Nash equilibria, which results in a curious possibility that the domestic market is monopolized by the foreign firrm. However, welfare comparisons among Nash equilibria, free trade, and autarky reveal that feedback Nash equilibria involve higher welfare than both autarky and free trade, i.e. dynamic noncooperative choices of policy serve as tacit policy coordination and ensure larger trade gains relative to free trade.