科斯定理1-2-3

可以把科斯定理划分为三个层次，或称三个定理。科斯第一定理的实质是，在交易成本为零的情况下，权利的初始界定不重要；第二定理认为，当交易成本为正时，产权的初始界定有利于提高效率；科斯第三定理的结论是，通过政府来较为准确地界定初始权利，将优于私人之间通过交易来纠正权利的初始配置。     

“科斯定理”和“科斯第二定理”辨析

<正> 科斯是产权理论的创始人和领袖。科斯的产权理论是关于产权界定及交易费用对议定契约的影响的理论。他把毕生精力用于分析影响生产的产权制度结构。科斯的产权理论由“科斯定理”和“科斯第二定理”构成。 1.科斯定理的三种表述 科斯定理是从一系列案例中提炼出来的,科斯自己没有明确讲什么是科斯定理。把一系列案例提炼成一个定理,不同的案例的含义不一样,不同的人会有不同的理解,因此出现了许多种对科斯定理的表述。现在有三种表述是比较公认的。(参见:Cooter,1987,Vol.I,pp.457—459) 第一种表述是:只要允许自由交换,不管产权最初是怎样界定的,最终都能使社会总产值达到最大化,即达到帕累托最优状态。这种表述可概括为自由交换论。第二种表述是:如果交易费用为零,不管产权最初怎样界定,自由交易的结果,会使社会总产值达到最大化。这种表述可概括为交易费用论。很显然,第二种表述的条件比第一种表述的条件要强得多,因为自愿交易并不见得没有交易费用。这两种表述并不是等价的。自由交换论成立,交易费用论一定成立。但交易费用论成立,并不能保证自     

贫困村庄乱收费现象比富裕村庄更严重

依据科斯定理,在交易费用为零的条件下,无论产权的最初归属如何,与资源的配置效率是无关的。如果假设将土地产权界定给村集体和界定给农民所产生的交易费用是一样的,那么,实际上土地资源的配置效率就没有什么不同,所不同的仅仅是收益分配问题。但是,在交易费用不为零的现实世界,土地权利界定给农民和界定给村集体所产生的交易费用不同,就必然导致了资源配置的效果不同。最根本的一条就是村集体是虚拟的,或者说村集体拥有虚拟的土地所有权及与之相关的子权利。由于村集体本身是村民的化身,但在本质上与村民的根本目标不同,在资源配置方面二者…     

生态市场何以失灵?

科斯的效益定理认为,如果交易成本为零,那么明确的产权界定都会达到经济效率帕累托最优。从科斯定理出发,似乎只要明确界分产权,市场就会自动建立,外部性及其它生态问题将迎刃而解。而现实却更多证明,“科斯市场”难以建立,为何?本文从多个方面阐述了其中原因。     

《社会成本问题》:经济分析方法的变革

对于外部性问题,科斯的《社会成本问题》不仅提出了全新的观点,而且提供了变革性的分析方法。它以外部性问题的相互性作为分析出发点,以现实假定和大量案例研究作为分析方式,说明了交易成本为正和制度内生可变的现实世界里,制度安排是至关重要的。科斯认为,解决外部性问题的方法必须根据具体情况在市场制度、企业行为和政府干预之间进行选择,从而证伪了庇古传统。最后它得出结论:传统经济学的错误根源在于其方法论的基本缺陷,因此必须从根本上变革经济分析方法。这是《社会成本问题》的主旨所在。     

产权界定的资源配置效应分析

对零交易成本市场的分析表明,不仅在交易成本为零时产权的界定不影响资源的配置效率,而且对损害者征收与损害相等的税收来解决因损害导致的外部性问题并非一定是最优的方式.现实的市场运行中无所不在的交易费用往往导致市场的失效,因而产权的界定以及相应的不同形式的产权安排便具有重要的资源配置效应.     

经济外部性问题中政府职能的定位——基于庇古、科斯的理论思考

外部性问题是一个长久引人关注的问题,对于此问题,庇古和科斯分别给出了自己的解决方案。庇古主要依靠政府干预,而科斯则主要依靠市场运作。然而他们的理论也不是完全的对立,虽然侧重点不同,但都需要政府和市场的配合。基于庇古、科斯的理论,从政府的角度出发,探求政府在解决外部性问题中发挥的作用,提出应设立环境税和推广完善排污权交易制度,以求达到外部性内部化的效果。     

论传统外部性理论解决环境代际外部性的失效

代际外部性问题主要是人类代际之间行为的相互影响,尤其是前代对后代、当代对后代的影响。在解决代际外部性上,施害者、受害者和政府生活在不同的时空中,新古典方法几乎就无能为力。产权的界定是在产权主体存在的前提下进行的,所以产权在代际进行界定是不可能实现的,所以通过科斯定理来消除代际的外部性也行不通。     

外部性校正之争与建立退耕还林还草补偿机制

退耕还林还草是一项具有“积极的”或“正的”外部性经济活动，作在分析了庇古等人的利益调整观点和科斯等人的改变利益调整的初始条件的观点这两种相对立的解决外部性问题观点以后，指出外部性问题解决的办法就是让政府找到一种内生交易费用与外生交易费用两难冲突的最优折衷方案，在解决退耕还林还草的外部性问题时保护产权模糊生是非常有利，因而应采取利益调整的办法，为此，作建议和加快建立退耕还林还草补偿机制。     

对科斯定理的修正

科斯定理使许多人相信,明确产权就会解决外部性问题。J.E.Stiglitz等人对科斯定理提出了质疑。作者通过对镶黄旗的调查发现,在集体经营牧草地时期存在“超额放牧”现象,而在私人经营牧草地时期存在“过度放牧”现象,这对科斯定理提出了挑战。本文认为科斯定理强调了产权的重要性,贡献是巨大的,但也存在局限性,有必要进行修正。本文认为,在解决“过度放牧”等外部性问题时,最有效的方法是采取“产权—政府干预”双约束机制和“事前干预法”。     

The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem

This paper clarifies and synthesizes elements of the two decade old debate concerning the Coase theorem and the empty core. Five lessons can be derived from this debate. First, the Coase theorem may break down when there more than two participants (provided the additional participants bring an additional externality to the table). Second, the problem of the empty core does not disappear in a world of positive transaction costs. Under reasonable assumptions about the transactions technology, transaction costs may well exacerbate the empty-core problem. As a consequence, it is important to differentiate between transaction costs (when the core exists) and costs due to the empty core because each has different implications for rationalizing institutional arrangements. Third, the Coase theorem will not break down when the number of participants increases if the new participants do not bring additional externalities with them. If, however, additional participants bring in additional externalities, then the core may be empty and Pareto efficiency may not emerge from costless negotiations. Fourth, Pareto Optimality can be achieved when the core is empty by judicious use of penalty clauses, binding contracts, and constraints on the bargaining mechanism. Fifth, when a non-excludable public good is involved, a free-rider problem arises as the number of agents increases, and this undermines the Coase theorem; in this case, Coasean efficiency requires the participation of all agents affected by the externality in the writing of binding contracts.     

Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs

This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, provides a dynamic foundation for the Coase theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient bargaining/negotiation outcomes. We show, when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, the Coase theorem holds in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs if and only if there are no transaction costs. Specifically, complexity considerations select only efficient equilibria in these models without transaction costs while every equilibrium induces perpetual disagreement and inefficiency with transaction costs. We also show the latter is true in the Rubinstein bargaining model with transaction costs.     

如何理解“制度重要”命题——从哈耶克“知识问题”视角看科斯的比较制度分析

虽然自科斯定理出现以来,人们普遍接受了在一个交易成本为正的世界中制度重要命题,但由于各种原因该命题存在着极大的被新古典化的风险,制度分析被窄化为制度的均衡分析。从这种分析出发,作为外在第三方的经济学家被认为可以基于对有关交易成本信息的完全掌握而对制度效率进行事前比较。本文从哈耶克的知识问题出发对这种分析路径进行批判,认为这实际上相当于以另外一种方式将人们重新拉回到零交易成本世界。     

The nature of Coasean property

The Coase Theorem is widely regarded as pointing to the importance of positive transaction costs for the analysis of economic institutions. Various interpretations of the Coase Theorem regard transaction costs as some set of impediments to contracting, or more broadly, as the costs of providing institutional solutions to conflicts over resource use. The abstract nature of the Coasean hypothetical tends to promote an abstract notion of property as a thin entitlement: a right in a designated person to take certain actions or derive value from a set of resource attributes. On this view, property is like a collection of tiny contracts. The property rights furnished by actual property law are much more coarse grained than this, and property is correspondingly “incomplete” for transaction costs reasons. Property and contract are substitutes in some situations, but they often are not interchangeable—because of Coasean transaction costs.     

The Optimal Distribution of Pollution Rights in the Presence of Political Distortions

A critical issue in designing a system of tradable emission permits concerns the distribution of the initial pollution rights. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the initial rights should be optimally set, when the determination of the number of tradable permits is subject to the influence of interest groups. According to the Coase theorem, in the case where there are low transaction costs, the assignment of the initial rights does not affect the efficiency of the final resource allocation. In the presence of political pressure, we show that the distribution of the initial rights has a significant effect on social welfare. In contrast to the conventional results, we find that grandfathered permits may be more efficient than auctioned permits, even after taking into consideration the revenue-recycling effect.      

论科斯定理的真理性

科斯定理具有隐含的私有产权制度偏好。在逻辑意义上,对科斯定理中"交易成本"、"可交易权利的初始配置"、"最终配置"作特定的理解,科斯定理在西方主流经济学逻辑、方法论意义上是正确的,但此时科斯定理完全等价于完全竞争理论,没有任何现实意义。在经验意义上,科斯定理是谬误。科斯定理的逻辑推论必然是私有产权企业比公有产权企业更有效率。在经济实践中,存在着三类证据:完全肯定科斯定理、完全否定科斯定理以及在肯定科斯定理的同时包含着否定科斯定理的成分。"超产权论"是对科斯定理的"革命",是对科斯定理的否定。     

Segmented Work and Divided Workers: A Review Article

The Coase theorem is often interpreted as demonstrating why private negotiations between polluters and victims can yield efficient levels of pollution without government interference. It is considered by many to provide the theoretical underpinnings for "free-market" solutions to environmental problems. This article explains why misinterpreting Coasian negotiations as a market driven process leads to erroneous conclusions. More importantly, this article demonstrates why negotiations between polluters and victims would fail to yield efficient outcomes even if property rights were well-defined, even if there were only a single victim, even if negotiations entailed no transaction costs, and even if negotiators behaved rationally and reached a successful agreement. Unlike other critiques of the Coase theorem that focus on irrational behavior and transaction costs, our critique identifies perverse incentives that arise even under conditions most favorable to the theorem. By accepting, rather than challenging, the premises of the theorem, our analysis provides an "internal" critique that strengthens well-known "external" criticisms.     

Induced Institutional Innovation and Transaction Costs: The Case of the Australian National Native Title Tribunal

The theory of induced innovation says that technological innovations which economize on relatively scarce inputs will be invented and adopted. Hayami and Ruttan have hypothesized that this model also holds for institutional innovations. Coase and Williamson suggest that economic organization, such as vertical integration, is the result of transaction cost minimization. Coase discusses the transaction costs of negotiation versus other alternatives for solving externality problems. This paper brings these previously unconnected threads of the literature together and incorporates transaction costs in an induced institutional innovation model.

This conceptual model is brought to bear on the issue of institutional innovations over time in relation to the National Native Title Tribunal. In addition to the reductions in transaction costs from a negotiated settlement rather than litigation, there are other advantages of negotiation. These may include improved “quality” of settlements, improved relations between the negotiating parties, and more timely resolution.     

The legacy of R. Coase (1910–2013): toward a theory of institutional 'moving equilibrium'?

Over almost a century, Ronald Coase’s works have largely differed in their contents. Under the general umbrella of the “law and economics” field, Coase’s scientific production has indeed covered a large variety of topics and policy issues. However, Coase’s analyses reveal a common framework, if not a structured methodology. We highlight five key ingredients of the “Coasean methodology” and apply them to revisit Coase’s main contributions. The resulting picture reveals a comprehensive theory of institutional “moving equilibrium”, where the institutional design of socioeconomic transactions is affected by the dimension of transaction costs.